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EDITORS ' NOTE 
Thy Nguyen and Nina Valentine 
We are pleased to present Pandora 's Box 2007. The theme for this year' s edition was 
inspired by the fol lowing quote : 
"Never bend your head. Always hold it high. Look in the world straight in the eye. " 
Helen Keller ( 1 880- 1 968)  
It has been our vision to breathe new l ife and meaning into these remarkable words by 
featuring articles which raise awareness of  various significant challenges faced in  the 
current legal and social environment. Continuing the tradition of Pandora's Box, we 
hope our readers come away with some fresh perspectives and a greater understanding 
of what can be achieved and what remains to be done. 
We would like to thank our contributors for devoting their time, effort and expertise, 
which have enabled us to produce a qual ity publ ication. We would also l ike to thank 
Her Honour Justice Debra Mull ins for writing our foreword this year, and for her 
guidance and attention as WATL's Patron. Special thanks must go to Ms C lare 
Cappa for adjudicating the Magistrates ' Work Experience Program Essay 
Competition. Finally, to the WA TL members, the Executive Committee, Judy Shum 
( President) and Maja  Doma (Vice-President) ,  many thanks for your encouragement 
and support throughout the year. 
We hope you enjoy the collection of artic les as much as we have ! 
Thy Nguyen and Nina Valentine 
Pandora 's Box Editors 2007 
1 8  September 2007 
Whilst the Editors have checked references/or authenticity, any mistakes belong to the authors. 
FOREWORD 
The Honourable Justice Debra Mullins 
Women and the Law Society Patron 
As Patron of the Women and the Law Society, I am delighted to introduce this year's  
Pandora 's Box. 
WA TL was establ ished in 1 993 because of the concern of students about a number of 
current issues that impacted on women, the legal system and the community. The 
fervour and enthusiasm with which WA TL was launched has not abated. Each year 
brings to WA TL students with energy, ideas and ideals .  
The early publications of Pandora's Box were offered by WA TL in the hope that 
Pandora 's Box would be a tradition of WA TL. More important than the tradition of 
publication itself is the high quality of the content of the publications - a variety of 
wel l  written articles that usually inform or educate, may challenge, may address issues 
that are not popular, but make for interesting reading and stimulating debate . This 
edition of Pandora 's Box continues the tradition and the standard. 
The value of the experiences and debates promoted by WATL in its publ ications and 
activities should not be underestimated. Involvement in an organisation l ike WA TL 
is good preparation for  serving the wider community through the legal profession or 
other chosen professions. 
What we do today will make a difference to what we can do tomorrow. 
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DRUG COURTS: OFFERING A H ELPING HAND 
Clare Cappa 
Lecturer, TC Beirne School of Law, The U niversity of Queensland 
Clare lectures in Torts and Criminology in the undergraduate curriculum and teaches 
Introduction to Australian Law and Introduction to Legal Systems in the Masters of 
Applied Law program. Clare is currently pursuing her PhD on Australian Drug 
Courts, focussing on the impact of alternative forms of adjudication on the future 
criminal justice system. 
Introduction 
The facts and figures on drug addiction show that the harm caused by both legal and 
i l l icit drugs has an impact at every level of society. Specifical ly, crime associated 
with i l l icit drug use catches the imagination of many, with research in Austral ia and 
internationally showing that a significant proportion of those apprehended for a range 
of criminal offences are frequent drug users 1 • Criminal behaviour and drug use are 
both complex phenomena, neither of which is susceptible to simple analysis - and the 
intersection of the two phenomena is more complex sti l l .  However, amidst a l l  the 
hype and the media attention, the plight of the individual drug addict caught up in the 
complexities of the criminal j ustice system is largely ignored. What faci l ities are in 
place to encourage such people, already struggling with a l ife-threatening addiction, 
to hold their head up, and "look the world straight in the eye"? The answer is drug 
courts, which, using diversionary strategies and principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, offer court-supervised treatment as an alternative to incarceration for 
low-level drug offenders. 
This article explores the dynamics and implications of the drug court diversion 
programme for drug-affected offenders in Australia jurisdictions. The analysis 
includes an examination of the soc io-legal forces that have shaped the implementation 
of drug courts in Australia over the last decade, and traces the ambiguous nature of 
the programme's objectives by contrasting its widely promoted ' therapeutic' and 
' diversionary' aims with the more oppressive qualities that emerge in practice. 
Drawing from the critical l iterature on informal justice and diversion, there are 
indications that such programmes disproportionately  focus on a small group of drug­
affected offenders2 . However, the article ends on a positive note, arguing that 
1 Austral ian Institute of Criminology, Illicit Drugs and Alcohol (2006) 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/crime/> at 6 July 2007. 
2 Melissa Bull ,  ' Just Treatment: A Review oflntemational Programs for the Diversion of Drug Related 
Offenders from the Criminal  Justice System' (Queensland. Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2003), 
1 5 . Bull  reports that 'some groups - white men of about 30 years of age - fare better than others in 
these programs ' .  
whatever their perceived anomalies, drug courts promote the best solution to the 
ongoing problems which underlie much criminal behaviour. 3 
In recent years, drug courts have become a popular, widely praised, and rapidly 
expanding alternative form of specialised court that deal with people charged with 
non-violent crimes who are substantial drug users. The popularity of drug courts 
stems from the fact that they strike a chord with a number of sections of society. The 
theoretical basis for drug courts comes from the proponents of therapeutic 
j urisprudence,4 the legal impetus from those who believe that drug addiction 
represents something less than the necessary criminal intent required to charge other 
property offences, and the economic uti l ity from the knowledge that a rehabi litation 
place is cheaper in the long run than a prison cell .  
Concealed among the enthusiastic and wel l - intentioned praise for  drug courts are a 
few voices which question the trend towards problem-solving j ustice. Such voices 
warn that the popularity of the drug court phenomenon has been: 
. . .  driven by politics, judicial pop-psychopharmacology, fuzzy-headed 
notions about "restorative justice" and "therapeutic jurisprudence, " and 
by the bureaucrats' universal fear of being the last on the b lock to have 
the latest administrative gimmick. 5 
They see the drug court as a panacea, which masks the hard questions which need to 
be asked - what is the purpose of drug courts? Do drug courts work? Are the costs of 
drug courts, including their costs in de-individualised justice, worth their benefits?6 
Should the perceived (but as yet unsubstantiated) benefits to individual drug court 
partic ipants outweigh any compromises made to the traditional safeguards thought to 
protect individuals within the criminal j ustice system? These are fundamental 
questions which have far-reaching repercussions for the future of drug courts in 
Australia. However, definitive answers are beyond the purpose of this paper, which is 
to explore the benefits of drug courts for the individual drug court participant. 
The first part of this paper presents a short overview of the Australian drug court 
phenomenon.  For the most part, my observations wil l  be based on Queensland Drug 
Courts, with which I am the most famil iar, but wil l  also draw from general 
characteristics of drug courts both throughout other Australian j urisdictions, and in 
America. The second part of the paper wil l  situate the Australian drug court 
3 M ichael King, 'What Can M ainstream Courts Learn from Probl em-Solving Courts?' (2007) 32(2) 
A lternative law Journal 9 1 ,  9 1 .  
4 See, eg, David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick, 'Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to 
M ental Health Law Poli cy Analysis and Research' ( 1 99 1 )  45 University of Miami Law Review 979; 
David B Wexl er and Bruce J Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence ( 1 996) ; and Dennis P Sto l le, David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick, Practicing 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession (2000) .  
5 Morris B .  Hoffman, 'Commentary: The Drug Court Scandal '  (2000) 78 North Carolina law Review 
1 437,  1 440. 
6 Ibid.  
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experience within the political, legal and social framework of Australian society. The 
final part of the paper addresses the perennial question of "do they work?" from the 
perspective of the drug court participant, focussing on the dichotomies between 
rehabi l itation and punishment and equity versus targeted justice as they manifest 
themselves in the drug court experience. Final ly, the paper proposes that, although as 
yet largely unproven7 , the drug court experience is for the most part a positive one for 
the participants, and is assuredly better than the revolving door model of criminal 
justice previously prevalent. 
Australian Drug Courts - An Overview 
A drug court is a specialised criminal court that streamlines drug affected offenders 
away from traditional processing and punishment into an intensive drug treatment 
programme. It involves cooperation between the courts and drug treatment 
programmes and ' combines the care elements of the health system and the control 
mechanisms of the criminal justice system' 8 in an attempt to intervene in the cycle of 
re-offending which characterises low-level ,  drug-motivated crime . Drug courts uti l ise 
a col laborative style of case management that promotes the welfare of the offender 
and community by acknowledging that there are alternatives to the mainstream 
criminal j ustice system. They combine retributive justice with 
rehabil itative/therapeutic ideals. One commentator has described them as 'an 
ambitious initiative designed to "coerce" drug dependent offenders out of crime, by 
using the threat of gaol as both an incentive to seek treatment and a reason to stay 
away from prohibited drugs. '9 Instead of the traditional trial in which the state takes 
an adversarial role by prosecuting defendants, the drug court represents a situation in 
which the state function is a therapeutic intervention and the focus is on the individual 
and his or her needs. 
There are currently nine Austral ian drug courts in operation - 5 in Queensland (at 
Ipswich; Beenleigh; Southport; Townsvil le and Cairns) ;  1 in NSW (at Parramatta) ;  1 
in Victoria (at Dandenong) ; 1 in South Austral ia (Adelaide) and one in Western 
Australia ( Perth) .  The Northern Territory operates a "MERIT" based programme 1 0 
which has the effect of diverting low-level offenders from the criminal justice system, 
but without the formal programme involved in a drug court. In the United States of 
America, as of April 2007, there were 1 699 drug courts operating with 349 more in 
the planning phases 1 1 , while Canada supports five, each in various provinces. The 
United Kingdom has chosen a slightly different path, which has been termed 'quasi ­
compulsory drug treatment' 1 2 and takes the form of Drug Treatment and Testing 
orders ( DTTOs ) .  In Austral ia, drug courts form part of the lowest hierarchy of 
7 The first maj or study of recidivism rates for the Queensland Drug Court is currently  being conducted. 
8 John Costanzo, Final Report on the South-East Queensland Drug Court Pilot (2003) 2 (emphasis in 
original) .  
9 Peter Homel and Bruce Flaherty, 'Drug Crime Diversion: Reconci l ing Criminal Justice and 
Health/Wel fare Goals' ( Paper presented at the l 9th Biennial Austral ian Crime Prevention Counci l 
Conference, Melbourne, 1 8  October 1 999) . 
10 Magistrates' Early Referral into Treatment 
1 1  United States. Office of National Drug Control Pol icy Drug Courts 
<http://www.whitehousedrugpol icy.gov/enforce/drugcourt.html> at 6 July 2007 . 
12 Mcsweeney, Tim et a l  'Twisting Arms or Helping H and? : Assessing the Impact of 'Coerced' and 
Comparable  'Voluntary' Drug Treatment Options' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 470, 470. 
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courts 1 3 , and are designed to deal with individuals who have committed an offence 
because of, or directly related to, their drug addiction. These individuals, who would 
ordinarily face a prison sentence, are presented with an option for long-term treatment 
and rehabil itation programmes within the community, under the supervision of the 
court. The aim is a rehabi l itated individual , who has overcome his or her drug 
addiction, and who no longer commits the criminal offences driven by that addiction. 
The drug court process begins before adjudication, once participants are identified as 
el igible. To be el igible for drug court a person must be: 
• An adult (although some jurisdictions, such as NSW, have juvenile drug 
courts) ;  
• Drug dependent, as opposed to merely having a drug problem, and that 
dependency contributed to the commission of the offence;  
• Likely to be sentenced to imprisonment if convicted, not have pending 
'disqualifying' offences (a 'disqualifying offence ' is an offence of a sexual 
or violent nature) 
• Willing to plead guilty (post-adjudicative programmes, such as those 
operating in Queensland, mean that applicants must p lead gui lty and are 
given an initial sentence of imprisonment which is suspended for the 
duration of the rehabil itation order); and 
• Residing within the specified area. 1 4 
Committal courts in the defined catchment area refer offenders, who appear to meet 
the el igibil ity criteria, to the drug court. At the defendant ' s  first appearance before the 
drug court, drug dependency and other eligibil ity issues are considered by the Drug 
Court Team. If it is decided that the applicant is eligible, he/she is refused bai l and 
remanded for detoxification and assessment. After assessment, the offender appears 
before the drug court where he/she enters a gui lty plea, receives a suspended sentence, 
and undertakes to abide by the programme conditions . The participant then 
undertakes an extended treatment programme, which is coupled with a monitoring 
regime consisting of frequent drug testing and appearances before the drug court 
Magistrate. The participant 's  progress and general well being are reviewed at each 
court appearance, with the possibi lity of rewards or sanctions for non-compliance 
being awarded. 
The Drug Court Team is an integral component of the drug court experiment, and the 
high level of planned collaboration between the various agencies and service 
providers i s  one of the unique identifiers of this sort of justice. The drug court uses a 
case management, problem-solving approach to meet the needs of the participant and 
focus on his or her addiction rather than simply adjudicating and sanctioning the 
13 With the exception of New South Wales, where they form part of the District Court hierarchy. 
1 4  These elements are taken from the el igibi l ity criteria under s 6 of the Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) 
which are similar to the criteria for a number of Australian drug courts. 
4 
offender. Fundamental aspects of the programme inc lude supervised rehabil itation 
programmes, regular appearances and reports to the drug court, regular urinalysis and 
the provision of social support and the development of l iving ski l l s .  The programme 
is structured in three phases, designed to encourage the participant to rec laim his or 
her place as a functioning member of society. The first phase concentrates on 
eliminating i l l icit drug use, and requires 1 2  consecutive weeks of clean drug tests. 
The second phase is stabi l isation, in which the participant is required to complete 
courses as well as attend their rehabi l itation programme and continued court 
appearances. The final phase emphasises reintegration, whereby it is expected that 
participants will  be living independently and either studying, training or working. 
The average time taken to complete an Intensive Drug Rehabil itation Order ( IDRO) is 
1 5  months 1 5• The programme is designed to be rigorous and intensive, and is 
definitely not a soft option for drug offenders. As one observer has commented, any 
such accusation is an unwarranted and unfounded proposition which ignores both the 
complexity of drug addiction and the true nature and purpose of the drug court. 16 
Nevertheless, for many onlookers, the existence of drug courts is an anomaly in a 
system which otherwise displays an uncompromising attitude to drug use and drug 
induced anti-social behaviour. 
Political, Legal and Social Frameworks 
Australia has historical ly exercised leniency in the treatment of minor drug offences, 
reserving the imposition of heavy incarceration penalties as a deterrent to drug 
trafficking and more serious drug crimes.  Neither of these methods has resulted in 
reduced rates of drug use or drug related crime within contemporary society. 17 Drug 
court initiatives are part of a growing response to increased drug use, high rates of 
recidivism among drug users, and the overloading of prisons and courts. There is a 
'growing recognition that the traditional adversarial justice system, on its own, cannot 
effectively deal with causes of recidivism . . .  in cases where intractable social and 
personal issues are involved. ' 1 8  For many, the philosophy underpinning the drug 
court model represents a much needed transformation of the criminal justice system. 
However, the intentional integration of treatment and criminal j ustice system services 
is a novel, and therefore somewhat problematic approach. One commentator has said: 
The underlying conceptual framework of the drug treatment court model 
is  that treatment and criminal justice services are integrated in such a 
way that an obvious delineation among the systems does not exist .  The 
systems function interdependently, both supporting the goals of 
15 Peter Kent, ' Problem Solving Courts ' (Speech del ivered at the Crime Statistics Network Seminar, 
Bri sbane, 6 June 2007) .  
1 6  Judy Alcock, ' Supporting Secondary Victims ( Family) and Enhancing Drug Court Participant 
Outcomes through the Role of Parent Drug Information Services in the Perth Drug Court ' ,  ( Paper 
presented at the 3rd International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence. Perth, 7-9 J une 2006 ) .  
1 7  Makkai, Toni ( 1 998), "Drug Courts: Issues and Prospects", Austra l ian Institute of Criminology, 
Trends and Issues, No 95, Australian [nstitute of Criminology, Canberra. 
1 8  Sherry L Van De Veen, 'Some Canadian Problem Solving Court Processes' ( Paper presented at the 
3rd International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence . Perth, 7-9 J une 2006) 5. 
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recovery as a means to reduce recidivism, and promoting recovery as a 
key goal . 1 9 
The reality may be that such a seamless integration is not possible - that the drug 
court experiment is attempting to do too much. Integrating drug user treatment into 
the operating phi losophy of a criminal court, burdened as it is with the vestiges of due 
process and adversarial principles, leaves the experiment open to disapproval . There 
is tension between the traditional adversarial system and its concern with the 
protection of a defendant's  l iberty, and the drug court 's  primary aim of restoring the 
participant ' s  health and wel l  being. However, criticism of the drug court 's  reduction 
of traditional safeguards, designed to protect individuals within the legal system,  
ignores the pervasive nature of discrimination in traditional j udicial institutions. The 
notion of 'equal ity before the law '  and the 'objective person' is an elusive concept for 
most members of society. Drug courts can therefore be seen as taking a form of 
affirmative action in addressing systematic discrimination faced by already 
disadvantaged or marginalised groups. 
In spite of the potential ,  none of the current drug courts in operation would c laim to 
be the ideal model .  This is largely because although the practice is derived from the 
theory, implementation and operation is affected by political and resource constraints. 
These restraints can influence the number of el igible offenders who are taken by the 
programmes, the efficacy and effectiveness of the screening and assessment 
procedures, as wel l as the availabi l ity of treatment interventions. It is an unfortunate 
reality that the number of substance involved defenders needing drug court 
intervention exceeds the capacity of the criminal j ustice system to provide quality 
services and most drug courts place a cap on the number of offenders who can be 
admitted to the programme. Although the drug court programme funds additional 
places for partic ipants in an environment where there are ordinari ly insufficient places 
available for voluntary rehabi l itation, it appears that lack of funding and political 
inertia is such that the gap between need and provision wil l  remain. 
Criticism by those who see drug courts as an i ll- informed reaction to a social crisis 
and an inappropriate compromise of the impartia l  j udicial adj udication function20 fails 
to acknowledge that the drug court model represents a fundamental paradigm shift in 
j ustice - away from a predominantly punitive orientation towards an approach that 
looks at drug-related crime in a holistic way. The drug court process deals with the 
causes of the crime which has been committed, instead of accepting the traditional 
compartmental isation of justice which renders the underlying causes of crime 
somebody else's responsibi l ity. 
There are a huge number of questions which can be asked about the drug court 
phenomena, ranging from the overreaching question of whether they work, to the 
19 Faye S Taxman and Jeffrey Bouffard, 'Treatment Inside the Drug Treatment Court: The Who, What, 
Where and How of Treatment Services' in Lana D Harrison et al (eds), Drug Courts: Current Issues 
and Future Perspectives (2002) 1 93 .  
20 Hoffman, above n 5 .  
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more mundane but seminal question of whether they are cost-effective. These are 
questions which require an analysis of political will ,  economic rationalism and public 
opinion driving policy - all issues which are too wide and far reaching for this  forum. 
The question which can be addressed is whether drug courts satisfactori ly realise the 
needs of the low-level drug affected offender. 
The Participants' Perspective 
The main premise on which the operation of drug courts relies is that the threat of 
incarceration serves as a stimulant to engage and retain participants in treatment. 
Because treatment completion means that any prison sentence is cancel led but fail ing 
to complete the programme means that the participant is ' terminated' and the sentence 
is re-activated, this is a fairly understandable motivation. It has been shown that 
diversion is more effective if those involved are motivated to make the change rather 
than coerced into doing so . This is supported by evidence which  suggests that when 
people perceive themselves as having choice, control, and self-determination over 
their behaviour, they perform better, are more persistent, and feel more motivated and 
interested to engage in the activity than people who feel control led by their 
environment.2 1 Thus, motivation of drug court participants is a key factor in the 
success of the programme. 
Drug court judicial officers monitor the progress of the participants and respond to 
compliance or non-compliance with incentives or sanctions. The Drug Court Team 
strives to be empathetic to the participants ' underlying problems and to capitalise on 
the strengths of each participant. Although individual drug courts differ in the content 
of their programming, they share several common goals which are aimed at the 
individual participant. These goals are to: 
• Provide immediate intervention, treatment, and structure in the l ives of 
participants through the ongoing, active oversight and monitoring by the 
drug court judicial officer; 
• Improve the level of functioning in the participant ' s  environment, addressing 
problems that may be contributing to the use of drugs, and developing or 
strengthening his or her abi l ity to lead crime and drug-free lives; 
• Provide participants with ski l ls that will aid him or her in leading productive 
substance-free and crime-free l ives, including ski l l s  relating to their 
educational development, sense of self-worth, and capacity to develop 
positive relationships in the community; and 
• Strengthen the families of participants by improving the capacity of fami lies 
to provide structure and guidance. 
The fact that drug court judicial officers are more directly involved in supervising and 
monitoring the l ives, treatment, and recovery of the participants highl ights the fact 
that certain kinds of defendants are unsuitable for participation in the programme. In 
21 T Cameron Wild, Brenda Newton-Taylor and Rosalia Al letto, 'Perceived Coercion Among 
Clients Entering Substance Abuse Treatment: Structural and Psychological Determinants' 
( 1 998) 23( 1 )  Addictive Behaviors 8 1 ,  83 .  
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an article that considers the behaviour of partic ipants in California drug treatment 
courts and considers the differences between drug courts and more traditional 
criminal courts22, the authors argue that, while drug courts provide participants the 
chance to avoid imprisonment and permanent stigmatisation by taking part in the 
discourse of aid and treatment, ' offenders ' in drug court also submit to a combination 
of penal and therapeutic aims. In practice, this  means that judicial officers are likely 
to exercise enhanced supervision, monitoring, and control over the l ives of 
programme participants because they are being rehabil itated. There are valid 
concerns that the ' best interests of the client according to the court' may impart undue 
arbitrariness, albeit wel l  intentioned, that threatens procedural fairness for participants 
and may result in the imposition of sanctions disproportionate to crimes committed 
for the professed ' good' of the participant. 23 The composition of rehabi litation orders 
and judicial discretion to terminate and impose sentence constitutes a double 
enforcement mechanism which can potential ly result in the imposition of heavier 
penalties than would be experienced in the traditional system. Procedural conditions 
required to complete a drug court order can also disadvantage participants whom have 
difficulty complying with technical or procedural matters due to reduced 
mental/learning capacity common to long term drug users. 24 
Discussions about whether the interests of partic ipants are protected, and ' the extent 
to which their autonomous rights of choice are respected in these environments ' 25 wil l  
inevitably be on-going in any environment where practices and procedures deviate 
from those which have been traditionally accepted as providing the most complete 
protection of individual rights. In relation to Austral ian drug courts, such debate is 
healthy and helpful, and will  inform the future development of similar problem­
solving courts. 
Conclusion 
For their most ardent proponents, drug courts have been hai led as a ' fundamental 
paradigm shift in justice away from a predominantly punitive orientation (aka 'justice 
as usual ' ) ' 26 and the implication is  that different is necessari ly better. There is no 
question as to the extent to which the drug court movement represents a significant 
change in the way courts del iver justice, but there is understandable doubt as to 
whether the 'different ' can be guaranteed to be ' better ' .  This article has posited that, 
although there are a myriad of intersecting perspectives from which they can be 
viewed, for the drug court participant, there is only one perspective. Referral to a 
drug court is the beginning of a process which, after a lot of hard work, sel f  
22 Stacey L Bums and Mark Peyrot, 'Tough Love : N urturing and Coercing Responsibi l ity and Recovery 
in Cal ifornia Drug Courts' (2003 )  50( 3 )  Social Problems 4 1 6,  424 . 
23 Daniel McGlone, 'Drug Courts: A Departure from Adversaria l  J ustice' (2003 ) 28( 3 )  A lternative law 
Journal 1 36, 1 3 8 .  
24 Ibid, 1 40. 
25 Terry Camey, 'New Configurations of Justice and Services for the Vulnerable :  Panacea or 
Panegyric?' (2000) 3 3 ( 3 )  A ustralian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 3 1 8, 328 .  
26 John S Goldkamp, 'The Drug Court Response : Issues and Impl ications for J ustice Change' (2000) 
63(3 )  Albany law Review 923, 924. 
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motivation and soul searching, will allow that individual to break the crime cycle, and 
begin to hold their head up and look the world in the eye. 
9 
THIS JACKET DOES NOT FIT AND IT NEVER WILL 
D r  Rachel Baird 
Lecturer, TC Beirne School Of Law, The U niversity of Queensland 
Rachel lectures in Environmental Law and Property Law in the undergraduate 
curriculum and has published extensively on environmental law and international 
fisheries law. She also advises the Australian Defence Force on border protection 
and fisheries enforcement in her role as a specialist A ir Force Legal Officer. Rachel 
is a consultant in the Planning and Environment section at Clayton Utz. 
One Size Does Not Fit All 
When I joined the Royal Austral ian Air Force in 1 988  as a fresh faced undergraduate 
cadet, I was informed by the uniform outfitters that I was an irregular fit and would 
need a jacket custom made for my long arms. Truth be told, my arms had not 
previously (and have not since) presented me with any wardrobe problems. 
Nevertheless I spent subsequent years furtively comparing my arms to those of friends 
and workmates reassuring myself that I fitted in. It took some time for me to realise 
that the 'one size fits al l '  approach by society failed to accommodate individual 
differences - be they limbs, gender, race or creed. By sometimes marginal ising those 
that don 't fit the mould, society fails to embrace the value in differences. 
I have been challenged by i l l -fitting 'jackets ' on a number of occasions throughout 
my working and personal l ife. More often than not it was gender stereotypes being 
imposed upon me and they rankled as I set about my daily  life. You know them well .  
Successful men are bold, daring and aggressive. Such attributes in women hang l ike 
the sword of Damocles above your head. Too ambitious and you are dubbed the 
'perfumed steam roller ' .  Too passive and you are seen as uninterested in your work, 
perhaps even distracted by home duties. 
Yes, the work place is a much better place than it was 40 years ago. We no longer 
have to resign when we get married (as my mother did) and then re-apply for our jobs.  
At least on paper we are entitled to be paid as much as men, 1 although working 
women are not seen to 'need the pay' as much as their male counterparts who are cast 
as 'breadwinners . '  I recall  one workplace where a male colleague received a pay rise 
simply because he had become a father and hence had more 'mouths to feed ' .  There 
was no such offer made to the female worker upon the birth of her child, after all ,  she 
had a partner to provide for her. 
1 In 1 95 1  female  workers at Rheem went on strike in Brisbane because management wished to cut pay 
to 75% of the male wage . After a three month dispute the workers settled on 87 .5%. During World War 
l l  female workers in traditional l y  male j obs received 60- 1 00% of the set wage. After the War female 
wages dropped back to 54-60-% of their male counterparts. 
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Some women sti l l  think it is necessary to assume masculine traits to succeed in the 
workplace. In a world where women quickly return any unsatisfactory item of 
c lothing to the retai l  outlet at which it was purchased, why do we continue to accept 
the i l l  fitting jacket of masculinity? 
It reminds me of a story my Grade nine science teacher once told my c lass of a man 
who had a very expensive suit made (and I admit this had very little to do with 
science) .  When he went to collect the suit one of the arms was too long. When he 
expressed some dissatisfaction, the tailor suggested the man shrug one shoulder up to 
even the length out. The man then pointed out that the trouser crotch was too baggy. 
The tailor disinterestedly advised him to place one arm between his legs to hold the 
crotch up. The man left the shop with his left shoulder raised high, thus forcing his 
right shoulder to hunch down, and his right arm held firmly between his legs. He 
soon passed two men talking just outside the tai lors, one of whom remarked to the 
other: "Look at that poor fellow he ' s  in a bad way but hey, his suits fits wel l ' .  
So, do we change ourselves to fi t  the j acket or discard the jacket (no matter how 
attractive it appears with its offers of pay rises and promotions) in favour of 
something that actually fits? 
Throwing Off the Stereotype 
The question I often ask myself is when will women (myself included) be brave 
enough to voice our dissatisfaction with the masculine straight-jackets which 
dominate workplace relations? When will we speak as a col lective and suggest that 
there are alternative ways of managing people and workplaces. These masculine 
jackets tel l  us to be aggressive in personal interactions and that the only way to 
success is through long (though often unproductive) contact hours at the workplace. 
Many workplaces sti l l  value materiality and economic output more highly than 
relationships and cooperative outcomes. 
I am not aiming here to strike a blow for the sisterhood or to fell men at the knees 
(well ,  perhaps some could do with a j ab) .  Indeed I happen to love dearly two young 
boys who wil l  one day grow to be men. What I am aiming to do is to highlight the 
differences between masculine and feminine approaches and to ask does one 
necessarily have to be better? Or to tum the question on its head- why is it that some 
women wear themselves out trying to fit into a man's  world whilst many men remain 
oblivious to the fact that there is another way of doing business? Why does 
Condaleeza Rice, arguably one of the most powerful women in the world, adopt a 
rather masculine fa9ade from her structured suits to her speaking style? 
Why is it acceptable for successful men to be childless or divorced? Why are 
successful unmarried women derided because they have not fulfilled society 's  
expectations that they breed and be dutiful wives?2 This issue is a real di lemma for 
women. Chi ldren slow your career down, there 's  no avoiding that fact. However, 
another fact is that married fathers can usually continue to work, pace unabated, 
2 Recently l iberal Senator Bi l l  Heffernan revealed his true colours when he slammed Deputy 
Opposition Leader Jul ia Gi l lard for being 'del iberately  barren' .  Yer t was not the first time he had 
uttered such comments. See, The Good Weekend, ' Hard Man on the H il l ' ,  27 May 2006. The Bulletin, 
1 May 2007. 
11 
because they are not the primary carer of the children. Women who employ 'help ' so 
that they can focus on their careers are ' unfeeling automatons who don't  deserve 
children ' .  Women who don' t  have children are deliberately barren' . 3 Women who do 
have chi ldren and take time off to care for them have ' lost interest in their careers ' .  
There i s  no easy answer for this age-old di lemma. Some women seem to ' have i t  all ' -
great job, wel l  adjusted children and even a husband. Yet this reveals yet another 
stereotype- the ' turbo charged happy homemaker ' .  Society sti l l  subscribes to the 
view that women are best suited to homemaking ski l ls  and raising tomorrow leaders . 
If they can keep their ' hubby'  happy and manage to hold down a good job, then that 's  
a bonus. Is society happy for women to have a career as long as they meet their 
domestic obligations? 
Stereotyping Affects Us All 
Lest you think I am driving a feminist resurgence, let 's  place the impact of gender 
stereotyping in a wider context. It ' s  not just women who are harmed by the i l l  fitting 
jacket of masculinity which shapes the way decisions are made. The world's  citizens 
are endangered through the adoption of traditional conflict resolution models .  
Consider for example the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 . I remember the day 
wel l ,  as students in my International Law tutorial could talk about nothing else. The 
authority of UN Resolutions, the defiance of Saddam and the need to make him 
comply with UN sanctions were paramount in the students ' minds . The plight of the 
Iraqi people was less so. Even the dec larations of intent to take action against 
terrorists after the events of September 11, 200 1 ,  which lead inexorably to the fateful 
day the ' coalition of the wi l ling' entered Iraq; were masculine. 4 George W. Bush 
famously declared: 'You are either with us or against us . '  Tony B lair chimed in with: 
'We must do something or do nothing' - presumably implying that further talk was 
useless. 
Over four years later the war is  sti l l  not won. The score card reads thus: Saddam is 
dead; the Museum of Bagdad has been looted and irreplaceable antiquities have been 
lost forever; countless civi l ians have been maimed or killed; the weapons of mass 
destruction have not been found; mill ions of dollars have been spent by occupying 
Defence Forces; there remains no stable system of governance in Iraq. Perhaps a l ittle 
more negotiation with the recalcitrant Saddam was worth pursuing to avoid the 
current quagmire the ' coalition of the wil ling' finds itself in. 
In justifying the aggressive stance taken with respect to the evil posed by the Iraqi 
dictator, comparisons were drawn with the famous apologist Nevil le Chamberlain. 
Anxious to avoid war at all costs, Chamberlain looked the other way when Hitler 
muscled in on Czechoslovakia and Austria and instead sought to b ind Hitler to 
agreements that he would curb his expansionist ambitions. When Churchi l l  was 
appointed Prime Minister in May 1 940 he delivered his now famous ' Blood, Toil ,  
Tears and Sweat ' speech in the House of Commons. Churchil l  stated:  
3 lbid. 
4 For a critique of the war in Iraq and the role of women's  voices see. H. Charlesworth, 'The M issing 
Voice: Women and the War in Iraq ' (2005) 7 Oregon Review of International law 5-25 .  
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[Y]ou might ask, what is our pol icy? I can say: It is to wage war, by sea, land 
and air, with al l our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to 
wage war against a monstrous tyranny. 5 
In this one speech Churchill managed to save a nation. The masculine approach is not 
always wrong. But it ' s  not always right. 
Trying a Different Ja ck et 
Professor Hi lary Charlesworth made a tel ling comment about the success of gender 
mainstreaming6 when she observed that : 
Women so often on the margins of the international arena, are more likely to 
drown in, than wave from, the mainstream, unless they swim with the current. 7 
She continued to conclude that: 
Changing the course of the mainstream requires radical and difficult 
interventions . . . . It must mean more than al lowing women into international 
institutions; it must require transforming the structures and assumptions of the 
international order. It would involve working to change men ' s  behaviour as 
much as women 's. 8 
I would venture that the changes are needed at the grass roots level as well. I'm not 
suggesting that women face these chal lenges every day or even at every workplace. 
However the jacket of masculinity is sti l l  lurking in the workplace. It colours meeting 
agendas, dec isions and relationships with the same inescapable grey. Women 
however bring subtle hues to their approach to any problem and because they are 
subtle they are often dismissed as unl ikely to produce results . 
Andrew Jackson, the seventh President of the US remarked in relation to his mother 
(who died when he was 1 4  years old) that: 
There was never a woman l ike her. She was gentle as a dove and brave as a 
l ioness ... The memory of my mother and her teachings were, after all ,  the only 
capital I had to start life with, and on that capital I have made my way. 9 
Conclusion 
The genesis of this  piece was my belief in respecting differences in others without 
making them feel l ike they are an irregular fit in their own world. Is  an ill fitting 
jacket better than no jacket at al l? I would argue not. You have no idea of what you 
5 The Churchi l l  Centre, <http://www.winstonchurchi l l .org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=39 l >. 
6 H .Charlesworth, 'Not Waving but Drowning: Gender M ainstreaming and Human Rights in  the U nited 
Nations ' (2005) 1 8  Harvard Human Rights Journal. 
7 fbid, 1 8 . 
8 I bid. 
9 President 1 829- 1 837 .< http://byrd. senate.gov/speeches/2006 may/mothers day. html> ( 1 7  Apri l 
2007). 
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are capable of if your thinking and actions are constrained by stereotypical constraints 
dictating how you should respond and in what manner. You might surprise yourself if 
you go with your instinct. You might even influence other women and men in their 
thinking and introduce options for operating in the workplace and beyond. 
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WOMEN ARE NOT JUST MEN WHO WEAR SKI RTS 
Magistrate Di Fingleton 
This speech was delivered at the Regional Woman Lawyer of the Year A wards, hosted 
by the Queensland Women Lawyers Association on the 24 August 200 7. 
I ntroduction 
If male criticism of eligible, talented and worthwhile women being appointed to the 
bench at any level is not challenged, the profession, the judiciary and the community 
may wel l  think that such unwarranted and impolite statements are implic itly accepted 
by women lawyers. We must be constantly watchful of such attacks upon our 
competence and we must immediately respond publicly when they occur. 
I came across a recent photo of the current Supreme Court of Canada, on which there 
is a 4 to 9 balance of female versus male judges on the bench. This is around the 
proportion of women versus men in the legal profession in Australia. In Australia, we 
meet at a time when one of only three women ever appointed to the High Court is a 
Queenslander. Bravo to Her Honour, Justice Susan Kiefel . 
There has been a fascinating debate about Ms Kiefel ' s appointment. I found the 
c learest commentary to be that of Professor Ross Buckley from the University of New 
South Wales. 1 He commented on the fact that many people, inc luding the Federal 
Attorney-General, had been attempting to avoid the issue of Ms Kiefel ' s gender in the 
appointment. Not to put too fine a point on it, he said: ' . . .  what bol locks. Of course 
her gender was a factor. Just as the fact that she has a reputation for being a sensible 
and balanced person, was a factor. ' 2 
Ms Kiefel has received quite of a lot of advice on how to behave once she gets there : 
we are advised to watch her, as she is sti l l  quite young and - should she choose to act 
as some previous Judges and Chief Justices have done - she could have 'enormous 
influence in Austral ia ' . 3 
I don't  intend to put any further pressure on Ms Kiefel but, entirely independently, I 
wish to address the unmet need for women who achieve positions of power to work 
towards furthering the interests of women when they get to their lofty positions. I 
believe that when women are appointed to positions of power, they should do their 
best to use the power inherent in these positions to help other women. They should 
not think: ' I  got this position on merit, I deserve it, and the best thing I can do is be 
competent and show that they were right to appoint me . '  I cal l it the 'don' t  make any 
waves approach ' .  That is one way to approach one ' s  career. But I quote His Honour, 
1 Ross Buckley, 'Gender Lie is Bad Judgment ' ,  The Courier Mail (Bri sbane), 1 5  August 2007, 30. 
2 Buckley, above n 1 ,  30. 
3 Amanda Watt, 'Lavarch:  Silk Wi l l  Raise Bar' ,  The Courier Mail ( Brisbane),  5 August 2007, 1 0. 
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Justice Michael Kirby, who has said: 'women are not just men who wear skirts ' .4 I 
say, if we are feminists we do not hide it; if  we have had a hard struggle, we mentor 
young women to make their path through the system easier, if we wear pants to work 
we must remember that we will always be seen as women, so we may as well stick 
together. 
I make it clear I make no personal references or critic isms of any particular woman in 
a position of power and my views are strictly my own and not the v iews of the 
Magistracy as a whole, or of women lawyers necessarily. 
Women lawyers need to be particularly resi l ient to survive and to succeed in the legal 
profession, especial ly if they are to serve in rural and remote areas. In due course, I 
wil l  share a l ittle of my journey through the unhappiest years of my l ife and the way 
in which resil ience got me through, if I may. 
T h e  State of Women in the Profession at Present 
I recently learned a new term, which describes some of the difficulties for women in 
the legal profession. I had heard of, and indeed bear the scars of, breaking through 
the ' glass ceiling' but not about the ' sticky steps '  on the career ladder for some 
women. It means that: ' instead of progressing upwards, women lawyers remain 
c lustered at the entry and associate levels and are general ly leaving law firms without 
becoming partners '.  5 There is anecdotal evidence that women are often confined to 
less interesting work and even where female partners are to be found ' their authority 
is often more ostensible than real ' .  6 Fortunately, it appears that professional firms are 
real ising is that losing women is costly. The cost of replacing a fourth year lawyer is 
$ 1 45 ,000.7 When dollars are involved, smart people start putting on their thinking 
caps.  
As I understand it now, some of the big firms are actually competing to attract the 
best women law students - who are often the best in the market - by offering 
progressive policies that aim to keep women at work at the time they wish to start 
having fami lies. The real isation that ' so long as a lawyer is meeting the c lients ' needs 
and the firm ' s  financial imperatives, it does not matter when, how and where they 
work. This is particularly so when the Internet, remote access email and call 
diversion means that clients can be serviced to a large extent from home. ' 8 
In  Queensland, women make up 35  to 40 per cent of the legal profession. Young 
women predominate over young men by a margin of 24 per cent but decrease steadily 
after age 30. In 2003,  a membership survey by the Law Society's Equalising 
Opportunities in the Law Committee was carried out. The results of the survey 
showed that at the time, only 1 2  per cent of women were earning more than $ 1 00,000 
as against 39 per cent of men. 
4 J ustice Michael Kirby, 'Women Justices for the H igh Court ' ,  (Speech delivered at the H igh Court 
Dinner hosted by the Western Australia Law Society, 27 October 2004) .  
5 Jennifer Batrouney, ' Return to Gender' ,  (2005) Summer A ustralian law Management Journal 20.  
6 Jennifer Batrouney, ' Gender Issues in Law F irms' , (2004) 30 Portia 1 0- 1 1 .  
7 Bratourney, above n 5 .  
8 B ratourney, above n 6 .  
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More alarming is that 1 5  per cent of the 2 ,536 practitioners surveyed had experienced 
some form of discrimination during their legal career, with 8 per cent reporting more 
than one type of discrimination. The highest level of discrimination was on the basis 
of gender, although family responsibi l ities rated highly. Not surprisingly, it was 
younger women - especially those in the 25-29 year old age group - who were most 
likely to report discrimination of this type. Again, those in private profession would 
best be able to inform us if things had improved at al l .  
For those women at the Bar, there may be  some hope of  addressing the under­
representation of women who work as Queensland Barristers. A recent survey by the 
Bar Association of Queensland (hereafter referred to 'the BAQ ') was aimed at 
beginning to address problems encountered by women at the Queensland Bar by 
reason of their gender. Family responsibi lities was listed as the major reason why the 
percentage of women at the Queensland Bar is so much lower than that of women 
graduating from Law School and why women stay a shorter period of time at the Bar. 
By a factor of three to one, women Barristers and Judicial Officers who responded to 
the survey believed that women at the Bar encounter difficulties practicing, which 
men do not encounter. Again, the issue of family responsibi l ities was a major reason 
but the reluctance by solicitors to brief women or attempt to change the mind of a 
cl ient who does not want a woman counsel or to brief a woman for trials, combative 
court work or highly paid work, also rated high. ' Sexist (patronising, aggressive and 
disrespectful) attitudes from other members of the profession' were also reported, but 
fortunate! y not towards the top of the l ist. 
The BAQ came in for some criticism in the way they assist women to firstly, become 
and remain involved in the association itself, and to engage with women members. 
Specific mention was made of statements made by the BAQ on appointment of 
women judges. 
To be fair, the concern over the last several years about the promotion of women 
Barristers to the bench at the expense of their male counterparts was based on the 
concerns about the traditions of seniority. This is at odds with the difficulty some 
very experienced women barristers suffer when applying for silk and in obtaining the 
sort of work, which will  provide them with the experience to be deemed suitable for 
appointment. Without this connection clearly being made by representatives of the 
male-dominated BAQ, their bleating at the appointment of competent women to 
judicial positions who are not senior counsel is even more unforgivable. I look 
forward to a woman President of the Bar Association one day, or - as exists in 
Victoria - a Women' s  Bar Association hopefully, then such travesties of etiquette and 
sol idarity would become a thing of the past. 
Women in Positions of Power - Not Just Men Who Wear Skirts? 
Let ' s  cut to the chase. We know women can do key j obs and do them very well .  I am 
suggesting that their real chal lenge is to use the position to further the aims and needs 
of women, through the way they support other women aspiring to, or assuming 
positions of power. Then there is the issue of appropriate public comment on issues 
of importance to women and children. Of all sections of society, children have the 
least voice in public affairs. Therefore, women leaders wil l  more easi ly see areas of 
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discrimination against women and in tum, women leaders with shared experiences of 
the work/family balance wi l l  be more open to progressive policies in these areas. 
As Chief Magistrate of Queensland, I was responsible for introducing one 
administrative reform and laying the groundwork for another, which were primarily  
aimed at  improving the working conditions of female Magistrates. Firstly, there was 
the introduction of the '48 for 5 2 '  scheme, which al lowed Magistrates (men and 
women) to take a further four weeks leave a year but to lose the pay for that period . 
The salary is paid on a 'pro rata ' basis for 5 2  weeks of the year. While some 
Magistrates took and sti l l  take advantage of it, it was initiated and is largely enjoyed 
by those women Magistrates with school age chi ldren, so that they can spend more 
time with them in holiday periods. 
I was also able to lay the groundwork for the later introduction of a scheme for the 
appointment of part-time Magistrates, whereby women who are not able to, or not 
prepared to work as full time Magistrates, can work part-time. This has been taken up 
by at least two Brisbane Magistrates, both of whom are women with school age 
children. 
Forgive me a l ittle reference to my performance as Chief Magistrate - there has been 
precious reference to my success as Chief in comments over the last few years ! But 
having been in a position of power, I think it is relevant to speak about my 
expenences. 
Walking in Front - The Traps 
Perhaps I should be the last person to encourage courage in leadership ! As Chief 
Magistrate of Queensland, I bel ieved that female Magistrates who are mothers should 
also serve at regional centres throughout the State. This policy, based on a sense of 
fairness to all Magistrates - many of whom had served long periods of time away 
from their home bases - and the fact that regional centres provide all  essential services 
necessary for family life was deemed to be inappropriate by some and I paid the price. 
This leads me to another point. Women who are appointed to positions of power 
within the legal profession are sometimes also progressive on social j ustice issues. 
This combination is  considered particularly dangerous, I think and it may well be why 
some appointees prefer a ' softly-softly' approach .  In my case, I was happy to be 
remembered for (among other matters) the improvement in the democratisation of the 
administration of the Magistracy as a whole and of a more productive interface of the 
Magistracy with the Indigenous community, exemplified by the establ ishment of 
Murri courts. I also strove to ensure that victims of domestic violence received 
courtesy and an educated approach to the issue by Magistrates, when they appeared in 
our courts. 
Professor Rosemary Hunter, former Professor of Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law 
at the Griffith University Law School, wrote an excel lent artic le, ' Fear and Loathing 
in the Sunshine State' ,9 which should be read by all women lawyers. It is, at one 
9 Rosemary Hunter, ' Fear and Loathing in the Sunshine State ' (2004) 1 9  A ustralian Feminist Studies 
1 45 .  
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level, a wel l-researched analysis of the case of R v Fingleton 10 ( I  knew the Queen 
would one day hear that I am a republican) .  But for the purposes of tonight ' s  address, 
I refer to Professor Hunter' s  observation of the consequences of my ordeal. She refers 
to the 
. . .  terrorising effect on other women in senior positions in the legal profession 
in Queensland. No one in any position of prominence dared to speak out 
about her treatment. Senior women kept their heads well down and tried to 
avoid becoming the next sacrificial victim. This kind of intimidation and 
disciplining is a very powerful way of ensuring that women in a pos ition to do 
so do not actually make a difference, and of reinforcing the view that women 
are not real ly up to it - they cannot manage, they create problems, they make a 
mess of it and therefore are better suited in the end to stick to the traditional 
male incumbents. 1 1 
In conclusion, the article argues that obviously we want women to get into positions 
of power. We have a good understanding of the various barriers women face in 
attempting to do so. But what we have not developed, Professor Hunter argues, is 
much analysis of what to do when we get there . Two models of behaviour appear to 
have developed. One is to keep quiet and try to establish credentials by conforming to 
masculine norms. The other is to crash through or to crash, to try to make a 
difference and risk losing all in the attempt. 1 2  There ' s  no need to ask which was my 
approach !  Professor Hunter refers particularly to feminists networking to 'foster 
greater dialogue between feminist academics, judges and practitioners ' 1 3  to ' forge 
sol idarity, explore further the question of what it means to be a feminist in a position 
of seniority and leadership in the profession and more generally strategise around 
power ' . 1 4 
We should not be surprised when women become professors or judges, she says, that 
'we tend not to be accorded the same prestige and respect as are men who attain those 
positions ' 1 5 and indeed, I think so much is made of our gender in relation to our 
appointments as I have pointed out above. 
We should no longer find this surprising or individually confronting. Instead, 'we 
should be able to expect and know how to deal with backlash and opposition, to find 
and mobi lise support and to work out where the spaces are for us to pursue feminist 
agendas . '  1 6 Unfortunately, Professor Hunter has left our shores to be professor of 
Law at Kent University in England, so we miss her leadership and support. However, 
she leaves us with some worthwhile suggestions as to how to survive and even 
prosper in positions of leadership, if only we stick together! 
For those women who do not proclaim themselves 'feminists ' ,  unfortunately you will  
suffer from the same prejudices as are handed out to women who outwardly proclaim 
10 [2003] QCA 266. 
1 1 f bid 1 54 .  
1 2  lbid. 
1 3 Ibid. 
1 4  Ibid. 
15  f bid. 
1 6 I bid. 
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their desire to change the experiences of women before our courts or, by extension, in 
society as a whole.  What wi l l  not work, I suggest, is for a woman who justifiably 
bel ieves she has worked herself into a position of power (even in an era of affirmative 
action policies, such as existed under the form Attorney - General -ship of Matthew 
Foley), to eschew a role that wil l  enable her to work for women. 
It is significant to note that there has been a decl ine in the number of women 
appointed to the Supreme and District Courts in Queensland since 200 1 - and fewer 
women Magistrates have been appointed than under Foley. At the moment it seems 
that such appointments have come to a total standsti l l !  I f  after the next round 
appointments the trend continues, I suggest that the Executive of the QLAQ would be 
making an appointment to talk to the new Attorney - General . 
Resilience and Hope in the F ace of Adversity - Keep Your Eyes on the Stars 
It is ironic, I know, that I should be making all  of these suggestions to inspire other 
women to possibly put their heads on the block as I did. But out of every experience 
there comes inspiration. Of all the many messages of support I received - 1 00 letters 
and cards during the six months of my imprisonment - the ones I was least interested 
in were those which said: ' this has happened for a reason' or ' there is a lesson for you 
all of this. ' Of no help at all were the ones that read (although I respected the feel ings 
with which they were offered) ' God has a plan for you in all of this ' .  ' If so ' ,  I would 
mutter under my breath, ' She did not consult me on it and I'm not happy ! '  The most 
comforting messages were from those women and men who themselves had suffered 
some soul-destroying, l ife-threatening or career-eradicating event and told me how 
they surmounted the tragedy. 
And I read the inspiring stories of such heroes as Nelson Mandela, surely the 
champion of resi l ience and hope, and of Christopher Reeve ( ' Superman ' to so many 
of us) ,  struggl ing to survive a devastating accident which brought him to earth so 
definitively, and Hilary Clinton - a woman mortified by her bri lliant husband' s  
infidelities - now poised to be  President of  the greatest super power on earth ! 
In a speech to women at the annual Janet Irwin Dinner in October 2005 at Parl iament 
House entitled ' Resilience - Keep Looking at the Stars ' ,  I spoke of the intense 
lonel iness I felt in the evening in my cell  at the Wacol Women's Prison, where I spent 
the first two months of my six month sentence, the other four months having been 
spent at the Helena Jones Community Correction Centre at Albion. As a prisoner in 
the Protection Unit at Wacol ( I  was there for security reasons) ,  I was ' locked down' 
(by a door about 9 inches thick) at 6 .30pm at night until 7 .00am. The nights were the 
worst - one 's  daily  calls to loved ones were over, one ' s  simple evening meal was 
over. All that awaited was the cel l ,  a book, the television and the ubiquitous 'Tim­
Tams'  ! 
On a fine night, I would look out of my window up at the sky and see the stars and 
that would give me some joy. It is hard to maintain a sense of self-centred misery for 
long when one can look up at the sky and realise one ' s  small part in the universe. 
Those stars, at night, were often my companions. When, during the day, I would look 
out the same window, I could see the wallabies congregated on the hill outside the 
prison wire. They would also give me comfort. It was when I started to give those 
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wallabies the names of my husband, my brothers and other members of my family 
and good friends that I thought I should find some other interest ! !  
So, I began to write a book about my experiences. Bl issfully, when I moved to the 
Helena Jones Centre, my husband bought me my own laptop . Then I could record the 
experiences of a good and law-abiding woman who had lived in and through the law 
for many years, going through a system usually reserved for people with scant regard 
for the law. 
I had the opportunity, through meeting many women who had sometimes done some 
brutal and horrible things to other people and sometimes to children, to think about 
the nature of 'good' and 'evi l ' .  I had an excel lent opportunity which couldn ' t  be 
bought as a writer, to experience the prison system in Queensland. I had the chance to 
reflect on my career to date and my performance as Chief Magistrate and to analyse 
just what had happened to me in a job I once c laimed I would do for nothing ! 
I continued to write my book after I left prison, as I tried to come to terms with a 
shattered legal career - equivalent to a great personal loss, as I had nurtured that career 
over a number of years. The greatest battle with oneself is to constantly resist the 
tendency towards bitterness, which is always lurking over one ' s  shoulder. During my 
long wait for justice - after my appeal had been lodged with the High Court in late 
2003 , through the grant of leave to appear and the suggestion from the Court that 
there may be a point of law which would assist my appeal , through the appeal itself - I 
began to find a way to cope. 
I read more inspirational stories, I taught law students at Griffith University Law 
School (which I loved), I worked as a consultant to community groups, I played golf, 
I gardened, I was a loving wife. A bel ief in my own goodness and ethics (which so 
many others involved in my prosecutions appeared to have ignored) and the 
wonderful support I received from my husband, family, friends and colleagues, got 
me through. 
Finally, the day arrived and the bl issful decision was handed down by the High Court. 
I am often asked how long it took for my faith in the j ustice system to be restored b y  
that decision and my reply has always been 'about 20  seconds ' .  I had never actually 
given up hope that the brightest legal minds in Australia would be able to see c learly 
through the mire that was my prosecution, conviction and imprisonment. A c lose 
friend from within the legal profession told me that I would have to leave Queensland 
to gain justice and she was correct. This made it particularly difficult when, after the 
celebrations which followed the decision, I had to decide whether or not to return to 
the bench. I was fortunate enough to l isten to those who pointed me in the direction 
of reappointment as a Magistrate at Caloundra. 
Now that I am back on the bench, I feel vindicated and once again fulfilled in my 
career. I enjoy the job of local Magistrate - I am told that I am good at it, and I enjoy 
the respect of those I work with in the profession and from the prosecution. I 
regularly meet with local stakeholders, consistent with my belief that courts -
especially the Magistrates courts, those in the most constant touch with the most 
people - belong to the people, not the Judges or Magistrates. We discuss innovative 
programs constantly being developed to best deal with offenders and generally  
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exchange ideas on the access to and the administration of j ustice m the local 
community. 
In response to an approach from the local Indigenous community and a touching 
public 'welcome to the country' from the local elders, I am thril led to have just 
recently sat in the first Youth Murri Court in Caloundra. That alone was worth 
returning to the bench for. I am pleased to now be a practitioner of what I came to 
know as 'therapeutic jurisprudence ' ,  which I supported in the establishment of the 
Drug Courts during my time as Chief Magistrate, and the subsequent Murri Court, 
throughout the state: both forms of therapeutic courts. These courts are now firmly 
entrenched in and funded by the state justice system in Queensland. 
Throughout this concept, court can be used with the participation of a ' team' of 
experts in the court process, importantly the Judge/Magistrate, to heal and rehabi l itate 
certain offenders rather than commit them to the hopelessness of the prison system. It 
involves a transition in thinking for all members of the team, from a formalistic and 
legalistic approach to sentencing - the ' square ' of imposed authority - to the softer 
embrace of ' circ le '  sentencing. 
The Resilience of Regional Women L awyers 
As I have suggested, women lawyers all need to be resi lient. We may not get the jobs 
we want, we may be passed over for promotion, and we may suffer from sexual 
harassment (note the ordeal of the woman partner in Sydney at the moment, sti l l  
fighting her way through the courts) .  How much worse it must be for regional women 
lawyers, who have less support ' out in the bush ' or ' further up the line ' .  I imagine 
one of the worst issues they have to deal with is that of isolation - from support 
systems, l ike-minded women struggling with the same issues - and discrimination 
perhaps more able to be perpetrated further away from large urban centres. 
It is l ittle wonder that women often start up sole practices or go into practices with 
other women - so as to enjoy practices built  around mutual appreciation of family 
responsibilities. I t  is  good to see that the new President of the Queensland Law 
Society, Megan Mahon, intends to travel throughout the state to meet members. I am 
sure they wil l  have much to tel l  her. 
Women have the opportunity for exciting careers in the bush. I read recently of a 
B arrister from Western Australia, Judy Seif, who regularly flies to remote 
communities in Western Austral ia (no - she was not on 'The Circuit' ! )  to participate 
in ' circle sentencing ' .  Several women solicitors have recently been appointed as 
Magistrates, who were previously practising in rural areas. Their practices in country 
areas often see women lawyers appearing in the Magistrates ' courts and it seems a 
natural progression onto the bench. It would be great to think that this pattern could 
continue. 
In the meantime, you alone know of the heartbreaks, and of the joys of practice in 
rural areas. However, be assured of the support of your city slicker sisters in the law ! 
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INSTRUCT ION OR P ART I C IP A TI ON? 
MAXIMISING OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN IN A NEW LAW 
SCHOOL 
Rohan Price 
Senior Lecturer, School of Law and Justice, Edith Cowan University and 
M anaging Editor, Australian Journal of E mployment Law & Policy 
Rohan lectures in Contract Law, A lternative Dispute Resolution and Employment 
Law at Edith Cowan University (ECU). He also consults for the New South Wales 
Parliament on employment discrimination and criminal procedure issues for 
Indigenous peoples. Rohan 's research interests include employment and social 
security law, operational requirements and redundancy and minimum wage regimes. 
I want to begin by asking what it is that makes a person sparkle? What is it that gives 
a person - any person - a sense of wit and presence when they walk into a room? The 
answer, of course, is confidence. The aim of legal education, to my mind, is to 
produce students who possess confidence and self-assurance and have true reasons to 
feel that way. If you don 't  know the answer, you wil l  know where to find it, if you 
are in a situation of conflict, they you will  know how to defuse it, if you need to speak 
a new language to achieve a goal , you will master it and use it to good effect. 
Now, where does this confidence come from? How does a law student develop a 
genuine and thorough-going sense of their abil ity to do what a professional situation 
requires of him or her? Certainly, this  sense does not simply material ise - it is based 
on hard work and reflection, a process of measured feedback and modification unti l a 
point where the student can stand in a court room and advocate, can sit in an office 
with a c l ient and advise,  can write an email or make a telephone call that alters the 
course of events. 
In the course of setting up a Year 1 Law Program at ECU, I have had cause to ask 
how is it that a course of study can be designed so that the people who emerge are 
self-aware and capable, or, in a word, confident of who they are and what they can do. 
The surest way to achieve this is an educational model based on participation. First, 
we must ask why is participation important in legal education? We live in a world of 
real ity TV and big screen movies and play station games - we live in a world that 
places so much emphasis  on being passive and vicarious. 
L ittle of an individual is brought to the watching of a movie, no effort is required, it is 
a one-way process. If  it is a good film, you sit and enjoy sublime emersion.  A law 
lecture does not, by way of contrast, involve sublime emersion. For many students it 
is a confusing and boring and unfruitful monolog. Lecturers may enjoy greater or 
lesser levels of intellectual engagement with their students in their lectures - but no 
matter how good the lecturer the lecture it is sti l l  a one-way process that often 
promotes passivity because the very substance of law can seem to a student to be an 
impenetrable thicket. Just watch students switch off one by one when I start talking 
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about perpetuities and future interests in land and you will see what I mean about 
disengagement. 
So what do we do about the problems of the lecture? Perhaps it is more useful to 
think about what we don't  do to the lecture. We don 't try to compete with TV, we 
don't  consciously try to make ourselves more entertaining and we don 't  'dumb down' 
the content of our units. Rather, we take every opportunity to teach through 
interaction and participation. 
I bel ieve that the role of a modem educator, in law, or any field, is to encourage action 
in their students. To get them to try things, do things and above all ,  to bring the 
student out of themselves. 
At ECU we require our law students to conduct mini-moots and to do alternative 
dispute resolution role-plays on a weekly  basis. They are required to look at a set of 
facts from both a l itigious and a mediative point-of-view. These are Year 1 law 
students. At first, there was some trepidation about sitting in front of the c lass and 
playing a role. When it became c lear that doing a role play was an opportunity for 
personal growth and for the development of professional ski l ls that it was enjoyable 
and on occasions quite funny, students warmed to it and threw themselves 
enthusiastical ly  into preparation and performance of their moot or role play. We have 
also organised in-house negotiation and mooting competitions and are fielding teams 
in both competitions here at ALSA. Students in my units can opt to do a moot or they 
can do a major written assignment, in other law units they can do a paper presentation 
or do a major written assignment. 
Why then do we have such an emphasis on participation and engagement in our law 
program? 
It is based in large part on my view that students who have highly developed skil ls of 
advocacy and negotiation will not only become enviable lawyers, but in fact wil l  be 
enviable and sought after employees in a wide variety of fields. 
It is almost trite to observe that the law degree is now viewed the most desirable 
generalist qualification in the way that Arts was in the 60s and Economics was in the 
80s. In the medieval sense that it was desirable to have a child who inherited the 
family estate, one who was a knight and one who was a clergyman - in that very 
sense - the law degree has come to be regarded in many quarters as some kind of 
middle c lass birthright. This means too that we wil l  continue in the trend of there 
being too many law graduands and too few jobs as solicitors . 
On national trends, at least half of our students will  not become practitioners. ECU's 
emphasis on advocacy and ADR training wil l  make our graduates better lawyers as 
wel l  as job ready for the multitude of other career streams that wil l  open to them. 
The proposition I make here today is  that in pursuing specialisation in the way we 
teach and the skil l s  we expect students to acquire, we are preparing them for l ife after 
university, whether it is as a legal practitioner or as a government sector employee, 
media worker, trade unionist, community activist or non-government worker etc the 
l ist goes on. 
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This is far from a radical agenda for legal education; in fact, it takes its cues from the 
very earl iest form of tuition, namely the Inns of Court, where observation and 
participation and interaction with one ' s  peers were what qualified one as a lawyer. A 
pupil  took the required number of meals at Lincoln ' s  Inn - the pupil  was social ised 
into the ways of lawyers by sitting down and eating with them. 
Our Law Program delivers to students a quite traditional black letter exposition of 
law. We are however different in that we actively provide opportunities for role play, 
advocacy, ADRs and encourage students to look at a set of facts from both mediative 
and adversarial perspectives, and to consider if the law needs to be reformed. 
As mentioned we have also moved actively in many of our units toward assessment 
methods that offer scope to students who opt for participation in a moot, a negotiation 
or a presentation to class in l ieu of a written coursework requirement. 
As I have said I am an academic who teaches a curriculum in Contract Law that is 
about a black letter and case-based as it gets, and much the same can be said for my 
colleagues. This means that to me the notion of assessing a student ' s  performance in 
an ADR role-play exercise, in the past would not have been my first inclination. 
Why? Because when you adopt a participative model of legal education you have to 
stop trying to 'be the lecturer' ,  you have to refrain from the idea that unless the 
students are listening to me talk about the law and taking notes then, somehow, they 
can ' t  really be learning something of value. 
Students can't  after al l ,  very well teach themselves, can they? Well  the answer to that 
question is actual ly yes .  If you confine your role as an academic confine to setting the 
facts, setting the parameters and objectives of the role play or problem question - then 
you let the student find their own way, you let the student use the tools laid out in 
front of them. In essence you sit and observe your student' s capacity to create a 
solution to a problem. The future of legal education is going to be in the creating and 
managing contexts through and by which students acquire a direct experience of the 
world. This wil l  mean that words like ' tutorial ' and ' lecture ' ,  'online ' and 'offline ' 
wi l l  hold less and less meaning, as we combine the experiential and curricular 
objectives into new educational forms. 
I will give you an example that I experienced when I was a student. I studied 
Advanced Administrative Law at the University of Tasmania. One of our assessment 
tasks was to lodge an FOI  request with a government department, another was to 
research and update the legislative basis of a chosen statutory authority, I chose the 
Grains Elevator Board of Tasmania - a topic that I found it is possible to know a little 
too much about. Another assessment item was to give a short, spoken critique of a 
federal tribunal. In this course there was little or no such thing as ' a  lecture ' : it was a 
series of weekly opportunities for students to practice, contribute, formulate, 
articulate. It was based on the idea that we all need to be active in the careful 
dissemination of knowledge, that it wasn 't  the lecturer's responsibility to hold the 
floor. Another formative experience I had at UTas came when I later became a tutor 
in the law school there. A lecturer there, who remains a good friend, said to me: 
' Look, if the students have the tutorial problem, show up to the tute and don ' t  want to 
talk, then that is their problem. It doesn 't  matter whether the tute goes for 1 0  minutes 
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or one hour. ' This, although it seemed a rather ' bolshy' perspective at the time, has 
come to stand me in good stead as a lecturer of law. If we start with the expectation 
of participation it must emanate from the students themselves - they must see some 
use and advantage in expressing themselves. If the problem question posed to them i s  
relevant and challenging, and their teacher is  motivated and encouraging, then there i s  
no  excuse for them to fai l  to  get involved. 
I take some faith that a student who in Year 1 at ECU who can solve a problem with a 
variety of interpretive approaches will  become and employee in Year 5 with a mature 
and sophisticated view of the world and celebrated abi l ity to put it at the disposal of 
col leagues and c l ients . We are actively investing in the abi l ity of our students at ECU 
to do this. 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: 
QUEENSLAND v MOHAMMED & VIRGIN BLUE AIRLINES PTY 
L TD v HOPPER 
Yasmin Gunn 
Solicitor, Legal Aid Queensland 
In two recent high-profile cases, the Supreme Court of Queensland has affirmed 
decisions in favour of Queensland's  Anti-Discrimination A ct 1 991 (hereafter referred 
to 'the Act')  complainants. ' 
Queensland v Mahommed 
In Queensland v Mahommed, 2 the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal the findings of 
the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal that a prisoner had been discriminated 
against both directly and indirectly. 
Mr Mohammed - a Muslim prisoner - complained that he had been discriminated 
against, as the Department of Corrective Services had not provided him with fresh 
Halal meat as part of his prison diet. Instead, pri son officials had given him a 
vegetarian diet with supplements and tinned Halal meat for a period of time . 
The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal determined that the prisoner had been directly 
discriminated against because non-Muslim, non-vegetarian prisoners were given fresh 
meat as part of their diets . Evdence was presented to the tribunal about the 
unpalatable nature of the tinned Halal meat provided. 
In addition, the tribunal found indirect discrimination, as the complainant had been 
required to eat a standard prison diet following his transfer to another prison. This 
situation was found to be indirectly discriminatory because most non-Muslims would 
have been able to eat the standard diet, but Mr Mohammed could not because of his 
faith. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was argued that providing Mr Mohammed with 
the general prison diet was reasonable and that Mr Mohammed had not raised the 
issue of direct discrimination. Lyons J ruled against these grounds and affirmed the 
Tribunal ' s  decision. 
1 Anti-Discrimination A ct 1 99 1  (Qld). 
2 [2007] QSC 0 1 8; (2007) EOC 93 - 452 .  
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Virgin Blue A irlines Pty Ltd v Hopper 
In Virgin Blue A irlines Pty Ltd v Hopper, 3 Virgin Blue Airlines was also unsuccessful 
in appealing an Anti-Discrimination Tribunal decision, which found the Airline had 
discriminated against job applicants because of their age. 
In October 2005 , the Tribunal found Virgin Blue had breached the Act by 
discriminating against a group of women, aged 36  to 56  at the time, who had 
unsuccessful ly appl ied for cabin crew positions. 
The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal held that Virgin Blue 's  assessors had 
unconsc iously discriminated on the basis of age when selecting employees. He 
considered there was: 
. . .  inevitably a danger of employing the behavioural competencies 
system, especial ly as it required an assessment of 'Virgin Flair' was to 
identify with persons of the same age and experience as the assessors, or 
what the assessors regarded as, if not of the same age, a 'fun' person. 
That person was I think l ikely to be a person of the same age, social 
class and life experience as the assessor . . . 4 
Virgin Blue appealed the decision of the Tribunal , on the bases that the Tribunal erred 
in law in holding that direct discrimination could be unintentional or unconscious and 
that it had not been accorded procedural fairness, as it had not been given adequate 
notice of the case, which succeeded before the tribunal .  
Moynihan J upheld the finding that direct discrimination could be unintentional or 
unconscious, referring to the Act provisions which state that it is not necessary for the 
person who discriminates to consider the treatment less favourable, and that the 
motive for discrimination is irrelevant. 
Moynihan J was not persuaded that Virgin Blue had been given inadequate notice 
about the case. He stated the tribunal was not bound by the rigor of formal court 
proceedings and took a "commonsense approach not constrained by technical or 
procedural considerations"5 as to whether the appellant had "sufficient knowledge of 
the case that was ultimately made out against it so as to be afforded an opportunity to 
meet that case. "6 
3 [2007] QSC 075 .  
4 Hopper & Others v Virgin Blue Final [2005] QADT 2 8  ( 1 0  October 2005) .  
5 Above n 3 ,  at  80. 
6 I bid 80. 
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I ntroduction 
In 2006, the Austral ian federal parl iament enacted legislation to implement the 
recommendations of the Lockhart Committee 1 on human embryo and stem cell 
research.  2 When the amending legislation is fully effective, Australian scientists will 
be able to do research that their counterparts have been doing in the United Kingdom, 
some European and Asian countries and in privately funded laboratories in the United 
States: see box below. 
Much of this research involves women 's  bodies, especial ly obtaining eggs for 
research on the process of fertil isation and early embryo development, and creating 
embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer3 to obtain embryonic stem cells for research.  
There has been widespread reporting of the concerns of women ' s  groups about the 
potential risks of drugs given to women to stimulate egg formation and the col lection 
of eggs from women' s  ovaries, which is necessari ly an invasive procedure. 
Commentators have also raised issues about the pressure that women may face to 
donate their eggs - either when they are undergoing ferti l ity treatment, or to assist 
research into a disease that affects their family or the broader community. These 
concerns are all legitimate and have been met at least in part by the guidelines that the 
National Health and Medical Research Counci l  (NHMRC) has prepared on the 
1 Legislation Review Committee for the Review of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 and the 
Research involving Human Embryos Act 2002 : see http://www. lockhartreview.com.au/ (at l June 
2007). 
2 Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo research 
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). Simi lar legislation is being passed in the states; see for example, the 
Inferti l ity Treatment Amendment Act 2007 (Vic) .  
3 This  is  the so-call ed ' Dol ly technique ' ,  in which the nucleus of a human body ce l l  is inserted into a 
donated human egg from which the nucleus is removed. This is then stimulated to develop l ike a 
natura l ly  formed embryo with a view to using it in research, subject to a l icence. The legislation 
prohibits the development of such an embryo for more than 14 days and it must not be implanted into a 
woman's  body. There are severe criminal penalties for attempting to do those things. 
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procedures for egg donation.4 This paper is concerned, however, to explain why 
many women want to donate their eggs for this research and the benefits that may 
arise from it. 
Fertilising H uman Eggs U ntil Fertilisation is Complete 
Unti l the former legislation5 was amended, it was not lawful for scientists to ferti l ise a 
human egg with human sperm for research purposes unti l  the process of fertili sation 
was complete.6 That has now been changed by inserting a new definition of a ' human 
embryo ' ,  so that where an embryo is formed by fertilisation , the entity that is cal led 
an embryo starts from 'first mitotic division ' .  Research can therefore be done up to 
that time, provided that the researcher obtains a l icence from the federal l icensing 
authority. 
There are several reasons for scientists wanting to undertake this research. It wil l  
improve the cl inical practice of reproductive technology programs, particularly by 
assisting the training of the medical staff who undertakes ferti l ity treatment and 
enabling new techniques to be developed. Indeed, contrary to what many people 
bel ieve, many of the embryo research proj ects undertaken to date in Australia, have 
been to improve fertil ity treatment. 7 In time, this research will  help infertile couples 
to have babies. 
Women in ferti l ity programs may also benefit from research into oocyte (egg) 
maturation. Current practice in ferti l ity programs involves the use of drugs to 
stimulate egg production and the removal of 'mature ' eggs from the woman's ovaries 
at the appropriate time in her menstrual cycle .  The eggs are then ferti l ised and frozen 
for use in a later menstrual cycle (because experience has shown that there is a greater 
chance of pregnancy by later implantation) .  The possible impact of such drugs on the 
woman's health, especially in the long term, is not known. Even if the risks are not 
great, it would be less invasive for the women if eggs could be obtained at any time of 
the cycle without the need for ovarian stimulation and then artificially 'matured' so 
that they can be fertil ised and used later. Although the earlier legislat ion did not 
prevent research on maturing eggs, it was not possible to test whether the maturation 
process had been successful because it was unlawful to attempt to ferti l i se the eggs 
until ferti l isation was complete. 
The possibi lity of artificial maturation of eggs also raises the possibi lity of other 
sources of eggs for research. Eggs may be obtained from women whose ovaries are 
surgically removed, such as ovaries that have developed tumours. Furthermore, eggs 
4 Draft guidel ines on the use of assisted reproductive technology in cl inical practice and research, 2004 
(as updated in 2007) :  
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/consult/ fi les/art guidelines consultation draft final .pdf (at 1 June 2007) .  
5 The Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) and the Research involving Human Embryos Act 
2002 (Cth) and similar legislation in the states and territories.  
6 Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2 002 (Cth) s 1 2 : Offence to create a human embryo by ferti l ising 
egg with sperm outside woman's body except to achieve pregnancy. 
7 Unti l recently, as explained later in the paper, it  has been possible to do research only on embryos 
created fro ferti l ity programs but l ater not needed by the couple for their treatment. Research can only 
be done if the couple consent and the researcher obtains a l icence from the federal l icensing authority. 
To date, ten l icences have been issued to date : five for the derivation of human embryonic stem cel l s :  
four for improvements in reproductive technology procedures; and one for biopsy training. 
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may be donated from corpses where women have died, or they may be obtained from 
aborted foetuses (since female foetuses have all the eggs that the girl or woman will  
have in her l ife).  Eggs from these sources wi l l  need to be artificial ly matured before 
they can be fertilised by sperm and there may be a ' yuk' response to some aspects of 
this research. However, that was once the case with the use of tissue from cadavers in 
transplantation, which is now a common practice. Community attitudes change. If it 
is possible to find alternative sources of human eggs for use in research and treatment, 
that wil l  reduce the need to use hyper-stimulating drugs for women in fertil ity 
programs and to ask women to donate their eggs for research and treatment. 
Research on ' I mpaired' Embryos Formed in Fertility Programs That Were 
Previously Discarded. 
Another type of research that wil l  be possible after the 2006 amendments is research 
on ' impaired' embryos that were previously discarded in ferti l ity programs.  It should 
be remembered that there are two reasons why couples enter fertil ity programs. The 
first is inferti l ity - they are having difficulty in conceiving a child. The second is that 
there is a risk they will  pass on a serious hereditary condition to their chi ld. For 
couples in the second category, it is  common to form embryos in ferti l ity programs 
and to test them before implantation for the particular condition (such as cystic 
fibrosis) .  If  the embryos are not affected, they are frozen with a view for later 
implantation. On the other hand, if they are affected, they are discarded. Because 
they were not frozen, they could in practice not be used in research because the 
consent procedures required a 1 4-day ' cooling off period that would not al low the 
use of ' fresh '  embryos. 
However, much could be gained from research on impaired embryos. A UK 
geneticist, Professor Dian Donnai, said at the 1 1  t h  International Congress of Human 
Genetics in Brisbane last year8 that parents often ask her: 'What's wrong with our 
baby? Why did it happen? Will it happen again? ' Studying the early development of 
impaired embryos may help sc ientists to start answering some of these pressing and 
heart-wrenching questions. 
Research That I nvolves Creating Embryos for Research 
A third type of research that is open to scientists subject to licence after the recent 
legislative amendments is the creation of human embryos for research by the process 
of somatic cel l  nuc lear transfer ( SCNT, the ' Dol ly technique ' ) .  This involves 
removing the nucleus from a person's  body cell (such as a skin cell )  and inserting it 
into a donated human egg from which the nucleus has been removed. The resultant 
entity is artificially stimulated to develop into an embryo from which embryonic stem 
cel ls can be removed for use in research. However, nearly all the genetic material in 
this type of embryo comes from the person whose body cell was used. It is quite 
different from a human embryo created by fertilisation of an egg by sperm where half 
of the genetic material in the embryo comes from each parent. 
8 I I th International Congress of Human Genetics Brisbane, Convention & Exhibition Centre, Brisbane, 
6 - I 0 August 2006. 
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The capacity to create SCNT embryos for research opens up new possibil ities for 
scientists . S ince 2002, scientists have been permitted to use for research ,  embryos 
that are not needed by couples in fertil ity programs, subject to licence and obtaining 
consent from the donors. Many of the couples whose gametes (sperm and ova) were 
used to create those embryos have been eager for them to be used in research ,  as the 
only alternatives for embryos that they do not need are to donate them to another 
couple to have a baby, or to have them removed from storage (which means, of 
course, that they die) .  It is not possible to have them stored indefinitely. 9 
However, embryos that have been formed in ferti lity programs are not ' matched' to a 
specific person, l ike SCNT embryos. They have the genetic material from both of 
their parents. With SCNT embryos, on the other hand, it will be possible to create 
embryos that carry the DNA of one person so that, if they were implanted back into 
that person for treatment for a medical condition, they would not be rej ected l ike 
tissue that is transplanted after being donated by another person. Also, scientists wil l  
be able to create SCNT embryos that have cel ls  carrying the genes for particular 
medical conditions they want to study, both for pure science (to understand the 
reasons for the condition and its progress) and also for developing new drugs and 
other interventions to prevent or treat the condition. 
A major issue for women as this new technology proceeds is where the eggs wil l  
come from. 1 0 There are several alternatives. As noted earlier, women in ferti l ity 
programs may donate eggs (and the NHMRC guidelines mentioned above wil l  help 
protect the women donors from pressure to donate) .  Eggs may also come from 
donation of tissue removed during surgery and from corpses. In future, eggs may be 
derived from stem cel ls or animal eggs could be used for research, but only for the 
purpose of hosting a human nucleus ( though that is not lawful in Australia) . One day, 
it may be possible to create embryos without the need for eggs at all as researchers 
have recently been able in animal experiments to derive stem cells with the properties 
of embryonic stem cel l s  by applying a mix of proteins to adult cel ls and then 
stimulating them to develop . 
Meanwhile, we must be conscious of the need to protect the women from whom the 
eggs wil l  be obtained for the research, as least in the next few years. Women have 
been will ing to donate their excess frozen embryos for research and they wi l l  no doubt 
be at least as wi l l ing to donate impaired embryos from whom so much personal 
information may be gained to help them and their fami lies in their medical and 
reproductive deci sion making. Also, there is no reason to believe that women wil l  not 
want to donate eggs that they do not need for fertil ity treatment. Moreover, some 
women, who are not in fertil i ty programs wil l  offer to have their ovaries stimulated to 
produce eggs for donation to research to help members of their fami lies with genetic 
conditions - or in an act of even greater altruism, to assist the community as a whole. 
Provided that these decisions are made freely after an opportunity to read and 
consider information that sets out potential risks as c learly as possible ( including the 
fact that some risks may not yet be known) ,  there seems to be no reason to prevent 
egg donation in al l  cases. I am reminded of a question put to me at a briefing of 
9 The legislation requires that stored embryos must be removed from storage after a certain time. 
1 0  See Sushi Das, ' Let the egg hunt begin ' ,  The Age, 9 June 2007, p 5 .  
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federal politicians in Canberra shortly before the Commonwealth legislation was 
amended last year: 'Would you allow your daughter to donate her eggs for research? ' 
In fact, I have a daughter in her 20s so the question was particularly pertinent for me. 
I repl ied that it would depend on whether she was undergoing ferti l ity treatment at the 
time. If so, and she produced more eggs than needed for the program, I would have 
no hesitation in saying that she should donate eggs if she chose to do so and that this 
would be a good action that might help someone else. If, on the other hand, she 
wanted to donate her eggs before she had had chi ldren, I would advise her not to do 
that. Even if the risks appear to be minimal, we do not yet know what the risks might 
be, particularly in the longer term. After the meeting, two women came up and 
chal lenged me, saying that I had been unduly paternalistic towards women. Why 
shouldn' t  competent adults, properly informed women, make an altruistic decision to 
donate their eggs, even if there is some possible risk to themselves? We do not 
prevent competent adults ( including women) donating bone marrow and even 
kidneys, where the risk of harm is much greater. 1 1  
During its del iberations, the Lockhart Committee l istened closely to the views of the 
women who appeared before it and made submissions . One 'voice ' that had particular 
resonance was that of women in fertil ity programs who spoke about the special 
feel ings they had for their own embryos.  Having tried for some time to have a baby 
and to endure the emotional, invasive and stressful process of fertility treatments, the 
creation of an embryo formed at last from the gametes of a particular couple, 
combining their genetic material ,  is profoundly significant. For this reason, the 
Committee ultimately recommended that embryos should not be formed for research 
by fertil isation, but only by SCNT. Some people who later read our report considered 
this distinction odd and i l logical , since research is permitted on embryos that are not 
needed in ferti l ity treatment, subject to l icence and consent from the couple. 
However, for the Lockhart Committee, the recommendation was a fair compromise 
and one that can be defended even when one is asked (as I was recently) whether the 
objection to creating ' sperm-egg embryos' for research would hold if the eggs and 
sperm were donated separately for research, rather than an embryo being formed for 
research from the gametes of a couple in a ferti l ity treatment. One might say that 
people who donate their gametes for research in those circumstances do not attach the 
same significance to embryos formed from their embryos as couples in fertility 
programs. 
The special moral status of early human embryos was recognised by members of the 
Lockhart Committee as it is by many other people. This status makes early human 
embryos more worthy of respect than other types of bodily material . This is accepted 
by regulators and the members of the federal l icensing committee for embryo 
research, from whom scientists must obtain a l icence to do research on embryos. To 
get a l icence, they have to justify the use of human embryos and use the minimum 
number, disposing of them later with 'respect ' .  They also have to report on the 
outcome of their research, so that the process of human embryo research is transparent 
and accountable. This wil l  not answer entirely the belief of some people that even a 
mass of cells the size of a full stop has the same ' right to l ife' as a person but they 
1 1  With non-regenerative ti ssue l ike kidneys, donation is permitted only for medical treatment but 
generative tissue l ike blood and bone marrow may be donated for research as wel l  as treatment. 
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should know that the embryologists who do research on early embryos also regard 
them as 'special ' .  
Some people have asked why scientists should not do their experiments on animals, 
rather than on human embryos. The answer, of course, is that scientists should do 
genetic research on animal models and they do. But that research cannot provide all 
the answers because the results cannot always be extrapolated to people. S imilar 
arguments apply to research using adult stem cells, which have been used successfully 
in treatment for many years ( such as bone marrow cells, which are adult stem cells, in 
the treatment of leukaemia).  Many types of research should be done 
contemporaneously until we see which types of stem cells are most l ikely to be 
effective in treating particular conditions. 
Other people have questioned whether women's health should be put at risk by egg 
donation to do research when there have been no cures found to date from embryonic 
stem cell research. However, it is not for scientists to prove that their research has 
therapeutic promise before they are permitted to do it. Rather, the onus is on those 
who object to the research because of their moral or other beliefs to show why the 
research should not be done. All  medical research moves slowly and there are many 
steps between the first findings and the development and testing of new drugs and 
other treatments . As the Lockhart Committee recommended, we should move slowly 
but carefully, l istening continually to the concerns of everyone involved. 
Final ly, embryonic stem research has been permitted for some time in the UK, in 
privately funded projects in the US and in some other countries. We do not know 
where it will lead but it will inevitably be many years before treatments are available 
for genetic conditions. If the research is prohibited in Australia, local scientists will 
leave to do research in other countries. That will give scientists in other countries an 
advantage and involve immediate and long-term economic costs as wel l  as a ' brain 
drain' .  Australian scientists wil l  take with them their funding from international 
sources like the US National Institutes of Health, which could be used in funding 
Austral ian laboratories and training the next generation of Australian scientists if the 
funds remained in Australia. There is also the future cost of paying for imported 
treatments and procedures that could have been developed here. As the Honourable 
Anna B ligh, Premier of Queensland, said in opening the Brisbane Congress of Human 
Genetics :  if treatments are found from such research, it is inconceivable that 
Australians would not want to use them. 1 2 Another Queenslander, Professor John 
Mattick, made the same point at another Brisbane conference, saying that health wil l  
always trump ethics. 1 3 If  a patient with spinal injuries could walk after treatment with 
a product from embryonic stem cells, that person's  health interests would surely 
override objections from those who oppose the research, 
1 2 See note 8 above. 
13 Professor John Mattick, Foundation Director, Institute of Molecular Bioscience University of 
Queensland, 'Ethics and Ideologies in Biology and Medicine', 1 1  th Conference of the Australasian 
Bioethics Association incorporating the l Oth Annual Conference of the Austral ian and New Zealand 
I nstitute of Health, Law & Ethics, Brisbane, 5 July 2006. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, women and their families have much to gain from research on human 
eggs and embryos and from embryonic stem cell research .  Many of them have been 
eager to donate their surplus embryos from ferti lity treatment for research and they 
may be equal ly will ing to donate their eggs for research. Provided that there are clear 
processes to protect women from pressure and exploitation in the process of donation, 
there is no reason why this important research should not be al lowed to proceed. 
Research al lowed after implementation of Lockhart recommendations 
1 .  Fertilising human eggs until fertilisation is complete. This wil l  help scientists 
understand factors that impair early embryonic development and lead to genetic 
diseases. 
2 .  Research on 'impaired ' embryos formed in fertility programs that were 
previously discarded. Scientists need to study impaired embryos as well as healthy 
ones, to learn more about genetic disease and the way that drugs might help alleviate 
the symptoms. 
3. Creating embryos that are 'matched ' to particular people by somatic cell 
nuclear transfer. This wi l l  enable scientists to develop disease-specific stem cells to 
study the cause, progression, diagnosis and treatment of disease. In the future, it may 
be possible to treat genetic diseases l ike diabetes and Parkinson's  disease, or spinal 
injuries, by implanting stem cells developed from a person ' s  own ti ssue and the 
transplanted cel ls are less l ikely to be rejected than cells donated by another person. 
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I ntrodu ction 
Austral ia  now has a new Family Law System that, since 1 July 2007, requires parties to 
attend family dispute resolution (mediation) before they are able to file proceedings in the 
court relating to children ' s  matters. This artic le explores issues for women arising out of 
these reforms. In particular, the article focuses on the policy decision of government to 
make family dispute resolution services offered through the new Family Relationships 
Centres exclusive of lawyers. The article considers how mediation can be considered a 
positive process for women, but argues that for many women the risk of unjust outcomes 
resulting from mediation is high where lawyers are absent from the process. This is 
argued to be particularly the case for victims of family violence who are participants in 
mediation. The article suggests a distinct model of family law mediation for matters 
where there is a history of family violence, a model in which lawyers play a central role 
as legal advocate for the victim. 
The New Australian Family Law System :  M a ndatory Pre-Filing Mediation fo r  
C h ildren's M atters 
In 2006 the Australian Federal Government passed the Family Law Amendment 
(Shared Parental  Responsibility) A ct 2006 (Cth) which amended the Family Law Act 
1 9 75 (Cth) (hereafter referred to ' the Act ' ) .  The Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock 
described the amendments as 'the most significant reforms to the family law system 
• B A/LLB(Hons)(ANU) LLM(Hons)(QUT) Grad Cert in Education (Higher Education) (QUT) Barrister 
and Sol icitor (ACT) Solic itor (Qld) Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology. This material draws on some of my previously publ ished work as follows: ' A  
Feminist M odel O f  Mediation That Centra l ises The Role O f  Lawyers A s  Advocates For Participants Who 
Are Victims Of Family violence ' (2004) 20 The A ustralian Feminist law Journal 65; ' Using Lawyers As 
Advocates For Partic ipants Who Are Victims Of Family violence In A Feminist Model Of M ediation ' 
(2005 ) Autumn Edition, Newsletter for the Family violence and Incest Resource Centre, Victoria 3; and 
'Us ing the Feminist Critique of Mediation to Explore 'The Good, The Bad and The Ugly' I mp lications for 
Women of the Introduction of M andatory Family Dispute Resol ution in Austral ia'  (2006) 20(5)  Australian 
Journal of Family Law 45-78 . 
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in 30 years . '  1 This is an ambitious statement given the significant reforms made to 
children' s  matters in 1 995 ,  but justified because one of the effects of the amendments 
is to introduce mandatory pre-fil ing family dispute resolution. Section 601 of the Act 
now provides for compulsory attendance at family dispute resolution before an 
application relating to chi ldren 's  matters can be filed with the court. 2 
The amending Act's explanatory memorandum asserts that the new requirement for 
pre-filing family dispute resolution ' is a key change to encourage a culture of 
3 
agreement making and avoidance of an adversarial court system. '  The initial push to 
encourage such a culture came from the 2003 House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Family and Community Affairs '  inquiry into chi ld custody 
4 
arrangements in the event of family separation. That committee ' s  report 
recommended that separating parents should be required to 'undertake mediation or 
other forms of dispute resolution before they are able to make an application to a 
court or tribunal for a parenting order, except when issues of entrenched conflict, 
fami ly  violence, substance abuse or serious chi ld abuse, inc luding sexual abuse, . 5 
require direct access to courts or tribunals. ' The recommendation reflected the 
Committee 's  concern about ' the animosity that adversarial legal proceedings create 
6 
between separated parents . '  
Section 601 effectively prevents the Fami ly Court from hearing an application for an 
order under Part VI I  (that is relating to chi ldren ) unless a certificate from a family 
dispute resolution practitioner is also filed. This  certificate must state one of four 
7 
things. Either that the person did not attend a fami ly dispute resolution, but it was 
due to the refusal or failure of the other party to attend; that the person did not attend 
because the practitioner considered that it would not be appropriate; that the person 
did attend and all attendees made a genuine effort to resolve the issues; or that the 
person did attend but they or the other party did not make a genuine effort to resolve 
the issues. A certificate will not be required in circumstances where a history or 
8 
threat of family violence or child abuse is estab li shed, although the court must sti l l  
consider making an order that a person attend a session where such an exception 
. 9 
applies. 
1 Phi l ip Ruddock ' Bi l l  Marks 'Cultural Shift' in Deal ing with Famil y  Breakdown' ,  News Release 
232/2005 issued on 8 December 2005 at I avai lable at www.law.gov .au/ag (accessed 1 3  February 
2006) . See also, Donna Cooper ' Family Law Changes: How Wi l l  They Affect Your Practice? ' CCH 
Onl ine Family Law Feature Story, avai lable at 
http://www.cch.com.au/feature story.asp?document id=7 l 1 46&topic code=7&category code=34 
(accessed 3 1  March 2006) .  
2 See in particular subsection 601 (7) .  
3 Explanatory Memorandum (accessible v ia  a l ink at  http://www.ag.gov.au) at 1 9 . 
4 House of Representative Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs Report, ' Every 
Picture Tel ls  A Story' Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family 
Separation, December 2003, Canberra, avai lable at 
http://www.aph .gov.au/house/committee/fca/chi ldcustody/report.htm (accessed 4 July 2007) .  
5 I bid at xxiii referring to para 3 . 73 .  
6 I bid at para 4 .36 at  75 .  
7 See subsection 60 1 ( 8 ) . 
8 See subsection 60 1 (9) .  
9 See subsection 601 (  10). 
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The end result is that it is now clear that family dispute resolution i s  the dispute 
resolution process of first resort for the majority of chi ldren' s  disputes. That is, it wi l l  
be  very difficult, despite the exceptions, for a party seeking a parenting order, other 
than by consent, 1 0 to avoid family dispute resolution. 
The key concern for this artic le is that the increased demand for dispute resolution 
services that will result from the reforms wil l ,  in large part, be managed by the new 
Family Relationships Centres, 1 1  and these centres wi l l  be ' lawyer-free ' environments, 
in that parties wil l  not be permitted to have a legal representative with them in the 
process. I wil l  consider some of the positive aspects of the new system's  
requirements, but argue that removing lawyers from the fami ly  dispute resolution 
environment creates significant potential for unjust outcomes for women, particularly 
for those who are victims of family violence. Therefore, I propose a specific  model of 
mediation to be used for vict ims of family violence as a part of the new system. This 
model includes a lawyer who acts as a coach and (where necessary) an advocate for a 
party who is a victim of fami ly violence. 
Family Dispute Resolutio n  (Mediation) : A Good Dispute Resolution Process for 
Women? 
The term ' family dispute resolution' is  defined in section 1 OF of the Act as 'a process 
(other than a judici al process) : (a) in which a fami ly  dispute resolution practitioner 
helps people affected, or l ikely to be affected, by separation or divorce to resolve 
some or al l of their disputes with each other; and (b) in which the practitioner is  
1 2  
independent of all the parties involved in the process . '  The emphasis in the 
definition is clearly on a process that is both 'helping ' and not adjudicative, which 
could infer any one of many informal approaches to dispute resolution. However, as 
mediation is  the key form (apart perhaps from counsell ing) of informal dispute 
resolution used for fami ly disputes in Austral ia, and internationally, the focus for the 
1 3  
analysis in this artic le is on mediation. This focus is  also justified by government 
information relating to the new Family Relationship Centres which refers to ' fami ly  
1 4  
dispute resolution (mediation and similar services) . ' 
Mediation can be defined as ' the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an 
acceptable, impartial and neutral third-party who has no authoritative deci sion-making 
1 0 See subsection 60 I (9)(i ) .  
1 1  For further detai l  regarding Famil y  Relationships Centres and other services associated with 
mandatory dispute resolution see http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/familvrelonli ne (accessed 4 July 
2007). 
1 2  A family dispute resolution practitioner is  defined as someone who is  accredited under the 
Accreditation Rules or authorised to act on behalf of an approved organisation, or authorised to act by 
the Family Court or other provisions of the Family law A ct or the Federal Magistrates A ct, 1 999: 
section 1 OG. 
1 3  The Standing Committee' s  Report also envisaged when making its recommendations that 'the 
avail able processes of primary dispute resolution, such as mediation' would be central to the reforms: 
House of Representative Standing Committee on Famil y  and Community Affairs, above note 4 at para 
4.44 at 77 .  
1 4  The website states that the Fami ly  Rel ationship Centres wi l l  provide ' famil y  dispute resolution 
(mediation and similar services) to assist families sort out their separation issues rather than going to 
court and to hel p  identify unresol ved conflict before going to court. ' See http://www.ag.gov.au/family 
(accessed 4 July 2007) .  
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power to assist disputing parties in voluntari ly reaching their own mutually acceptable 
1 5  
settlement of issues in dispute . ' This traditional , faci l itative model o f  mediation 
offers a direct contradiction to some of the elements of the formal legal system that 
work to isolate and exclude women, and with its emphasis  on party control and 
empowerment can be said to reflect feminist values and beliefs .  
Mediation can also be said to validate women's  emotions, their voices and narratives; 
and to recognise the agency and competency of women in making their own 
decisions. Mediation contradicts the ostricization women can experience from the 
abstract nature of formal public legal processes that focus on l inear reasoning, and the 
application of abstract principles. It can be seen as minimizing the divide between 
public and private life because the values of the individual and their personal context 
are integrated into the dispute resolution environment in a way that accords them 
priority and relevance. 
Further, mediation can potential ly save women from enduring the heavy individual costs 
(both financial and emotional) that almost inevitably result from bringing traditional 
rights-based claims in court; and the integrated approach offered by mediation offers the 
possibil ity of avoiding or overcoming 'the legal system' s  historical tendency to classify 
women as a homogeneous class without recognition of their cultural, racial, ethnic, and 
economic diversity. ' 1 6 For many reasons, mediation can arguably be seen as 'an ally of 
1 7  
feminism. ' 
However, the l imitations of mediation, particularly in disputes where there is a history of 
family violence, are widely acknowledged, and there is a strong feminist concern about 
the participation of victims of family violence in the mediation process. This concern 
challenges mediation' s  value, particularly for victims of violence in family law disputes, 
and is explored further in the following section. 
Fa mily Dispute Resolution (Mediation) : Problems Arising Where There is a 
History of Fa mily Violence 1 8  
Before the 2006 reforms i t  was widely acknowledged that mediation was generally 
19  
not an appropriate process for disputes where there is a history of family violence. 
This acknowledgement was found not only in the feminist l iterature on mediation, but 
also in statements of proponents of mediation, and was included in the practice 
1 5 C Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict Jossey Bass San 
Francisco 1 986 at 1 4 . 
1 6 B Herrnstein, ' Women and Mediation:  A Chance to Speak and Be Heard ' ( 1 996) 1 3( 3 )  Mediation Quarterly 
229 at 23 1 .  
1 7 Marsha Lichtenstein, 'Mediation and Feminism: Common Values and Chal lenges '  (2000) 1 8( 1 )  Mediation 
Quarterly 1 9  at 30.  
1 8 The term ' family violence ' is used here to refer to a l l  forms of violence perpetrated against women in 
domestic relationships; for example, physical , emotional, financial ,  psychological, and social violence. 
The Family law Act 1 9 75 (Cth) defines fami ly  violence as ' conduct, whether actual or threatened, by a 
person towards, or towards the property of, a member of the person's fami ly  that causes that or any 
other member of the person's fami ly  reasonably to fear for, or reasonably  to be apprehensive about, his 
or her personal wel lbeing or safety ' :  see section 4.  
1 9  Of particular importance in gaining this acknowledgment was H i lary Astor's  paper for the National 
Committee on Violence Against Women: H Astor for the National Committee on Violence Against Women, 
Position Paper on Mediation AGPS Canberra 1 99 1 .  
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directions of the Family Court of Australia in 1 99 1 .  The Australian Law Reform 
Commission Reports on Equality Before the Law also discussed the pervasive nature 
of violence against women and acknowledged that a history of fami ly violence makes 
participation for women in alternative dispute resolution processes problematic . 
It is important to acknowledge, before embarking on a discussion of fami ly  violence 
in the context of mediation, that violence against women manifests itself in many 
different ways and women's  experiences of, and reactions to, family violence are 
diverse . The intention of this artic le is not to homogenise women 's experience of 
family violence or their experience of mediation, but to identify issues of common 
experience, or perspective, that may compromise the effectiveness of mediation as an 
appropriate dispute resolution process for relationships where there is a history of 
family violence.  
The key concern that arises in terms of mediations that take place when there is a history 
of family violence is that the positive claims about the process relating to sel f­
determination, party empowerment and party control are all  significantly undermined in 
relation to the victim's  participation. As a result, mediation can be a process that 
entrenches and exacerbates the patriarchal control and domination of women rather than 
providing any emancipation from it. It is exactly the party-oriented nature of the process 
that provides perpetrators with an opportunity to continue to exercise power over their 
victims and to extend that control ,  through their influence over the outcome of mediation, 
to future interactions between them. In this way, mediation places victims at grave risk 
of suffering inj ustice in terms of the process itself and its outcomes. Mediation, as a 
result, cannot be seen as contributing positively to the common feminist commitment to 
ending the perpetration of violence against women. 
Therefore, notwithstanding some of the possible theoretical consistencies between 
mediation and feminist princ iples that were identified above, mediation can in fact be 
argued as a very dangerous place for women who are victims of family violence. It is the 
nature and dynamics of a violent relationship that make this the case, and there is a 
significant amount of l iterature that identifies the process and outcome dangers for 
victims of fami ly  violence in mediation. Some of these issues, i l lustrate how the 
theoretical rhetoric of mediation becomes potential ly inaccurate when applied to disputes 
where there is a history of family violence, and in fact can result in the endangerment of 
victims and the possib i lity of unsafe and unjust mediated outcomes. 
F irst, in wanting to create a level playing field for all parties through party empowerment 
and sel f-determination, the mediation process ' ignores the power differences between 
20 men and women that put women at a disadvantage in negotiating with men. ' When the 
dynamic  of family violence exacerbates this imbalance, a level playing field is possible in 
rhetoric only. Further, mediation is a process that focuses emphatically  on cooperative 
and consensual dispute resolution. A history of violence, however, wil l  make such 
approaches inherently impossible. Not only is  it almost impossible for a victim to 
confidently represent her own interests against her abuser, but genuine consensuality is  
an approach that is diametrical ly opposed to patterns of dispute resolution used by 
20 Lichtenstein above note 1 7  at 20 referring to M Fineman, ' Dominant Discourse 
Professional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision Making' ( 1 987-
1 988)  1 0 1 (4) Harvard Law Review 727.  
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perpetrators of family violence. As Hart has said, the idea of cooperative bargaining with 
a perpetrator of family violence is  an oxymoron.
2 1  
Perpetrators of fami ly  violence do not 
cooperate with their victims; they impose their interests over them, they coerce, 
intimidate, monitor and threaten, they devalue their victims and deny their own 
22 
violence. 
Moreover, mediator assertions about being able to create a fair negotiating environment 
for victims of family violence are unconvincing. This is  not only because claims of 
neutral ity are mythical, but also because they are problematically based on an assumption 
that a victim ' s  violence-induced fearfulness can be addressed through simple process 
interventions such as al lowing her a fair opportunity to speak. The reality is that these 
interventions, whi lst not inappropriate, cannot reverse what might be years of dominance 
and control .  This is  because the impact and effects of violence, whilst perhaps at their  
worst close to the time of separation, can continue in terms of the victim 's  interaction 
with the perpetrator for a significant time after that event. 
( It is an important consideration that many fami ly  separation mediations take place 
relatively close to the time of separation. This wi l l  be exacerbated in the Family 
Relationship ' s  Centres which promote the informal resolution of disputes as soon as 
possible after separation. Separation is a time when the victim could well  sti l l  be 
experiencing strongly the impact of the perpetrator 's  violence and may be in increased 
danger of violence. Hart in fact has noted that many mediators erroneously bel ieve that 
23 
victims of family violence are safe once they have separated from the perpetrator. ) 
Also problematic for victims of violence is the private nature of the process, which 
results in its having little accountabi l ity in terms of how victims are treated during the 
process and in relation to the outcome reached. The dangers for victims in terms of their 
partic ipation in mediation are exacerbated by the fact that the process occurs behind 
closed doors, with no publ ic record of what was said, or of the outcome, and no real way 
to address any injustices suffered, for example via appeal . Not only does the private 
nature of mediation preclude the process being held properly accountable for its 
participants ' experiences of it, but it also removes the handl ing of important publ ic  
issues, such as justice for victims of fami ly violence, into the private sphere. 
Furthermore, not only i s  the political nature of fami ly  violence essentially lost in the 
privacy of the mediation session, but mediation ' s  focus on promoting equality and 
cooperation between the parties can result in the reframing of the pol itics of power as 
24 
' individuali sed instances of miscommunication or misunderstanding. '  
Added to these concerns i s  the fact that mediator training i s  not yet sufficient to al low for 
the safe participation of victims of fami ly  violence in mediation. Mediators may often be 
unaware that there i s  any history of family violence. As Gribben confirms, ' It can be 
difficult to identify a relationship with a history of violence, because the man can be 
frightened that disclosure wil l  threaten his control ,  and the woman can be frightened of 
2 1  B Hart, 'Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Chi ldren in Custody Mediation ' 
( 1 990)  7 Mediation Quarterly 3 1 7  at 320.  
2 2  I bid. 
23 I bid at 324. 
24 Lichtenstein above note 1 7  at 20. 
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what he wil l  do if this  happens, and they may both have become expert at rationalising, 
25  
minimising, and hiding the violence and its destructive consequences. ' 
These are significant concerns. However, they are discussed with a pragmatic 
acknowledgment that the new system is now in place, and that this new system creates an 
important imperative to find ways in which to protect women in mediation, as victims of 
family violence. In the next section, therefore, I argue for a model of mediation that wil l  
offer such protection, and perhaps l imit the number of unjust outcomes for victims of 
violence resulting from the new system. 
A Mediation Model for Victims of Family Violence That Centralises a Role fo r  
Lawyers 
A Lawyer 's Pre-Mediation Role 
In the proposed model,  the role of the victim 's lawyer prior to the commencement of the 
mediation is focussed on ensuring that the victim is not a participant in mediation if the 
risks are too great for her personal and emotional safety. If considered appropriate to 
proceed, the lawyer then takes on the role of coaching her about the process and 
strategies for taking part. Therefore, the lawyer would assess the risk mediation poses for 
the c lient, prepares the cl ient with information about the mediation process, provides her 
with some ski l ls  for her participation, and begins a process of generating satisfactory 
options for the resolution of dispute. 
The lawyer' s  risk assessment for the victim is central to her effective participation in the 
process and involves weighing the victim ' s  capacity to engage in a face-to-face informal 
negotiating environment with the perpetrator, against the reality of the availabi l ity of 
2 6  
other options to her. This involves 'balancing the client 's  strengths and weaknesses 
27 
against those of the other spouse ' ,  because, even though under this model where the 
victim wil l  have advocacy support in the mediation itself, she must sti l l  have some 
. . 28  
capacity to speak on her own behalf and to pursue her own mterests. 
Sordo suggests that ' the most important aspect of preparing clients who have agreed to 
mediation is giving them sufficient information about the process and in particular its 
29 
potential to settle their dispute . '  This sort of advice and information is particularly 
crucial to any fair participation in the mediation process by victims of family  violence, 
and has inevitable consequences for a fair and just outcome. Preparatory information 
should also include an explanation of mediation's  philosophy, and an emphasis on the 
elements of that philosophy that might empower her. For example, that she should feel it 
is appropriate to seek to terminate the mediation if she feels unsafe, and that she should 
25 S Gribben, 'Violence and Fami ly Mediation:  Practice' ( 1 994) 8 Australian Journal of Family Law 22  at 25 .  
26 To make a sound decision ' c lients who consent to mediation should do so only after being briefed 
of a l l  other options avai l able to them. ' :  B Sordo, 'The Lawyer's  Role in Mediation ' (1 996) 7( 1 )  A ustralian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 20 at 22.  
27 P B ryan, ' Reclaiming Professional ism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation' ( 1 994) 28 Family law 
Quarterly 1 77 at 207. 
28 See MD Samuels  and J S hawn, ' The Role of the Lawyers Outside the Mediation Process ' ( 1 983)  2 
Mediation Quarterly 1 3  at 1 4  on this aspect of a lawyer's role for general c lients also. 
29 Sordo above note 26 at 22. 
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feel confident of having significant input, with the assistance of her lawyer to support her, 
in determining the final outcome of the negotiations. Also relevant here is the more 
practical level of assistance in terms of identifying the sort of information that she wi l l  
need during the mediation process; for example, after school care opening times, or 
details of sport commitments for the chi ldren. 
Coaching the victim about participation ski l ls requires lawyers to have a good 
understanding of these skil ls themselves, as wel l as of issues relating to family violence, 
their impact on victims and their impact on a victim 's capacity to engage in negotiations 
with the perpetrator. Susan Gribben has written of the benefit women can derive from 
mediation coaches, especial ly where there is a history of family violence, and bel ieves 
30 that this  coaching task is one for which lawyers are particularly appropriate . She writes 
that 'a really good coach can be teaching assertiveness ski l ls, increasing self-esteem, and 
3 1 also addressing safety issues ' ,  for example, helping the cl ient to adopt protective 
behaviours . 
The coaching process should also explore ' the l ikely reaction of the other party and ways 
32 
of overcoming any objections. ' The victim 's intimate knowledge of the perpetrator, 
when combined with the lawyer's  knowledge of negotiation strategies, can allow for 
some specific preparations to be made about how to direct discussions towards the 
victim 's  preferred or best outcome. Another key aspect of coaching in this context is to 
33 assist the victim of violence to prepare her opening statement in her own words, and in 
34 the best possible l ight. The opening statement is important in terms of enabl ing her to 
take control of her own role in the process, and providing an opportunity for her to 
outline her needs and concerns and to describe the issues in dispute from her own point of 
3 5  
view. Even a brief statement can be a critical step in empowering the victim and in 
36 establishing an appropriate dynamic for the communications between the parties. 
Victims of family violence can further benefit if their lawyer has assisted them to identify 
'a  firm sense of what result they must obtain through mediation: a benchmark against 
37 which to compare an emerging settlement, ' as well as a flexible spectrum of satisfactory 
options . In fact, ' the lawyer and the cl ient carefully should develop and set firm bottom 
3 8  
l ines on each anticipated issue prior to mediation, ' and develop some strategies for 
3 9  
deal ing with what might be the perpetrator' s  ' last gap ' in negotiations. This involves a 
process of 'assisting cl ients to identify their needs, interests and issues and exploring with 
30 Gribben above note 25 at 34. 
3 1  Ibid at 34-3 5 .  
32 Sordo above note 2 6  at 23 . 
33 I bid.  
3 4  Ibid at 2 5 .  
3 5  Ibid a t  25 : ' Helping t o  prepare but not giving the opening statement also helps t o  ensure that the 
lawyers fal l  into their correct role in the mediation early in the process and to dissuade those lawyers 
who are incl ined to use the adversarial approach. ' 
36 Ibid. 
37 Bryan above note 27 at 2 1 7-2 1 8 . 
38 I bid at 2 1 8 . 
39 Sordo above note 26 at 23 referring to J Wade, 'The Last Gap in Negotiations - Why is it 
I mportant? How can it be Crossed? ' ( 1 995) 6 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 1 90 .  
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them what could be the worst, best and possible outcomes; exploring ways of achieving 
40 
c l ients ' desired outcomes and priorities. ' 
Samuels and Shawn refer to the pre-mediation interaction between the lawyer and the 
4 1  
cl ient as ' the beginning o f  a relationship of trust and confidence. ' This trust and 
confidence is the important foundation to the lawyer's next role in the model; namely as 
the victim's  representative in the mediation itself. 
The Lawyer 's Role as Victim 's Representative in Mediation 
As the victim ' s  representative in the mediation process the lawyer has a number of 
significant contributions to make, all of which focus on the protection of the victim's  
interests in the dispute and ensuring her safety and comfort in the process itself. Of 
course, the lawyer is there to be able to provide advice and c larification throughout the 
process, and also to redress inequalities in bargaining power by taking control of the 
content when necessary, or contributing to the way the process is managed, so as to 
ensure that the victim ' s  perspective is not subordinated to the perpetrator' s .  They can 
also assist the victim by ensuring that options generated in the process are thoroughly 
tested and ' reality checked ' .  Prior to the conclusion of an agreement, the lawyer can 
provide immediate legal advice and counsel .  These tasks are explored further in the 
paragraphs below. 
Essential ly the key role of the lawyer in the mediation process itself is to assist the victim 
42 
during the course of the mediation. This assistance will take various forms depending 
on the ski l ls  of the victim and her capacity in the mediation context to be confident about 
expressing herself  and articulating her own position under pressure. Where the victim 
feels she lacks confidence, the lawyer may need to help with the expression of her 
position and her response to the perpetrators ' communications . Where she feels able to 
43 contribute herself, the lawyer can act as a supportive presence only. During the 
mediation, the victim can cal l on the lawyer to clarify issues with the other party or with 
the mediator, suggest alternatives to proposals made by the other disputant, and help with 
44 
the further development of her own proposals. In addition, the lawyer is able to advise 
the victim, in an ongoing way throughout the process, as to the legal implications and 
realities of statements made or proposals put forward by the perpetrator. Being able to 
effectively use the lawyer's  legal knowledge and expertise to 'bargain in the shadow of 
45 the law' throughout the mediation allows the victim to develop appropriate responses to 
46 
the perpetrator' s  proposals and trade-offs on issues subject to negotiation. This 
40 Sordo above note 26 at 2 3 .  
4 1  Samuel s  and Shawn above note 28 a t  1 5 . 
42 Sordo above note 26 at 24.  
43 'Participation may involve:  presenting their c l ie nt ' s  position and negotiating on their behalf while  
the c lient sits passively beside them . . .  or  adding to  what their c l ient expressed when necessary but 
otherwise acting as legal advisers to their c lients whenever required to do so. ' :  Ibid. 
44 Samuel s  and Shawn above note 28 at 1 5 . 
45 On the issue of bargaining in the shadow of the law see R Mnookin and L 
Kornhauser, ' Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce ' ( 1 979) 88 
Yale Law Journal 950. 
46 Samuels  and Shawn above note 28 at  1 5 . 
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knowledge al lows the victim to firmly contradict any inaccurate assertions on the part of 
47 the perpetrator about his legal rights and entitlements . 
It may be that at different times throughout the mediation sessions, the victim moves 
through various feelings about her participation in the process. It is the role of the lawyer 
to remain flexible and constant in providing the sort of support the victim needs at those 
different times, both in joint and private sessions. That is, depending on the particular 
c ircumstances and developments throughout the process, the partic ipation of the lawyer 
will vary from active involvement to relatively minimal involvement; and depending on 
the energy levels of the victim, different levels of involvement may occur at different 
stages of the mediation. 
One of the most important aspects of the lawyer's  presence is to contradict the dominant 
position of the perpetrator and redress some aspects of the inequalities in bargaining 
power that exist. The lawyer achieves this by bringing the law and legal protections into 
the mediation environment. This role for the lawyer can be contrasted with the 
limitations on the mediator's  role in redressing imbalances, discussed briefly above, that 
result from mediator 'neutral ity '  and from restrictions on the sorts of interventions that 
are viable and realistically effective in redressing imbalances of power that are created by 
family violence. Altobelli has commented that, generally, lawyers have particular ski l ls  
48 in 'providing for participation on an equal basis , '  and that ' because of their experience 
in negotiation, ( lawyers) are sensitive to issues of both power and rights . '  49 Importantly 
for victims of family violence, it can be argued that ' the legal profession has a history of 
accepting the responsibil ity for protecting the rights of traditionally disempowered 
50 members of society. ' 
Another aspect of the lawyer' s  role in maintaining a fair negotiating environment is their 
involvement in controll ing aspects of the mediation 's  content and process. Lawyers have 
5 1 been noted as having particular ski l ls in 'ensuring the discussions stay on track' ,  and 
this is important if the perpetrator attempts to dominate discussions with tangential issues 
or with a focus on his own interests and perspectives. The lawyer can also act as a 
52  
' second pair of ears ' ,  and help the victim by remaining alert to attempts on the part of 
the perpetrator to pursue, for example, information fishing expeditions. 
Specific tactics that can be employed by the lawyer to ensure that the process is  not 
manipulated to the victim's  disadvantage include: overtly naming and contradicting 
inappropriate behaviour from the perpetrator, detecting when pressure from the 
perpetrator is resulting in the victim losing energy for the negotiations and cal l ing for a 
break or ' time-out ' ,  insisting where necessary that several short sessions take place rather 
than one exhausting and lengthy one, providing motivational encouragement to the victim 
47 Murayama comments on the empowering aspect of the knowledge of legal rules and princip les that 
lawyers can bring to the mediation process which provides at least a sound and obj ective basel ine for 
negotiations: M Murayama, ' Does a Lawyer Make a Difference? Effects of a Lawyer on Mediation Outcomes in 
Japan ' ( 1 999) 13 International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 52 at 73 .  
48 T Altobel l i ,  'Family Lawyers a s  Mediators ' ( 1 995) 9 A ustralian Journal of Family Law 222 at  229. 
49 lbid at 230 .  
50 l bid. 
5 1 lbid at 229. 
52 Sordo above note 26 at 25 . 
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and helping reorient her if the discussions become difficult, and taking responsibi l ity for 
53 advising if  it i s  t ime to withdraw from or terminate the mediation process. 
The final key role of the lawyer during the mediation is  that of protecting and promoting 
54 the victim's  interests in relation to advising on the detail of any final agreement. The 
55 balance here i s  to assist the victim in terms of pursuing what is  equitable, whilst also 
56 acting on her instructions. It would be appropriate for a lawyer to use a private session 
(or sessions) with the victim to discuss any offers for agreement and to determine 
57 . ' whether they are acceptable or not. The lawyer can also act as an ' agent of reality by 
testing the strengths and weaknesses of agreement options in general, more practical , 
terms. 58 Altobell i  believes that lawyers have particular ski l ls in terms of ' turning 
59 decisions into workable plans . '  These skil l s  allow the lawyer to provide assistance in 
60 the process of drawing up the agreement to ensure that it accurately represents what the 
victim has agreed to. 
It is important however, that in bringing their expertise and assistance into the mediation 
room as the victim's  legal representative, and in working to protect the victim 's  interests, 
the lawyer does not allow the environment to become a courtroom-style contest with the 
6 1 perpetrator. Not only would thi s  impede the mediation process and counteract any of 
the benefits of the process for the victim, but it may also endanger the victim ' s  post­
mediation safety by exacerbating the conflict between the victim and the perpetrator. 
Important also is the need for the lawyer to remain sensitive to the victim 's  need for as 
62 
much autonomy in the process as possible . They must be able to allow the victim to 
pursue options that may not sit with legal authority but are consistent with the victim's  
own notion of what is  safe and fair. 
The Lawyer 's Post-Mediation Role 
Where the mediation has resulted in an agreement between the parties it is a clear role for 
the lawyer to provide assistance in ensuring that the agreement becomes enforceable 
through fil ing it, for example, as a consent order. This provides the victim with security 
in relation to what has been agreed and ensures that she has breach actions available to 
her in the event that the perpetrator does not comply with the agreement. 
Where the mediation has been unsuccessful or no agreement has been reached, the lawyer 
also has a role in terms of ensuring that the victim 's  post-mediation safety is assured. 
Even walking to the car, having terminated a mediation, for example, might be a 
53 Ibid at 26 referring to G Sammon, 'The Ethical Duties of Lawyers Who Act for Parties to a 
M ediation ' ( 1 993)  A ustralian Dispute Resolution Journal 1 90 at 1 93 .  
5 4  Note ' Lawyer Mediation in Family Disputes ' ( 1 985)  59 ( 1 1 )  Law Institute Journal 1 1 63 .  
55 Altobel l i  above note 4 8  at 229. 
56 Sordo above note 26 at 26 referring to T B ishop, ' Mediation Standards: An Ethical Safety Net' 
( 1 984) Mediation Quarterly 5 at 8 and Sammon above note 53  at 1 96 .  
5 7  Sordo above note 26 a t  26 
58 Altobel l i  above note 48 at 229. See also Sordo above note 26 on the issue of real ity checking at 26 .  
5 9  Altobel l i ,  ibid. 
60 Sordo above note 26 at 27. 
6 1 Ibid at 23 .  
62 Samuels and Shawn above note 28 at 1 5 . 
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dangerous process for a victim. It is also the role of the lawyer to support the victim by 




It is  certainly true that mediation can be seen as offering potential benefits to women 
seeking assistance to resolve fami ly disputes. These benefits centre on the empowerment 
of women in the negotiation environment, and contradict the way the formal legal system 
works to isolate and disengage women and their i ssues.  For women who are victims of 
family violence however, these benefits are less relevant, and in some cases not 
appl icable at all .  Rather, for victims of fami ly  violence, mediation can be argued as 
providing a dangerous environment through which unfair and unjust outcomes are 
possibly reached. 
This article argues that one way of making mediation a more equitable process for 
victims of family violence is to ensure that victims have a lawyer to help them prepare for 
mediation, to help represent and protect their interests during the mediation, and also to 
assist them with the terms and enforcement of a final agreement. This proposal sits well  
with mediation' s  concern to uphold self-determination, to empower its participants and to 
ensure that fair and appropriate outcomes are reached through the process .  
A lawyer's involvement in family mediation as an advocate for victims of family 
violence presents far greater opportunities for making the process more equitable than it  
does threats. However, the costs assoc iated with involving lawyers more extensively 
may prohibit these benefits from becoming a real ity for many victims. Hence, this 
requires a review of legal aid funding polic ies to make funding for appropriate legal 
representation in mediation avai lable to al l  victims of fami ly  violence. 
As Kathy Mack has said ' the reai long term goal must be to attack the sources of 
women's  vulnerabi l ity directly, by l imiting violence against women, especially within the 
fami ly  and by providing real opportunities for economic  independence and full 
64 
participation in publ ic l ife. ' In the meantime, we must strive to work within the 
constraints of the existing system with the overriding aim of supporting women who are 
victims of violence in the post-separation context, and ensuring their safety. 
63 It has been said that ' when attorneys see cl ients who have previously been to mediation it is general ly 
because mediation fai led to generate a settlement or produced an outcome that both the c l ient and attorney 
now perceive as gross ly unfair. ' :  G B lumberg, 'Who Should Do the Work of Family Law? ' ( 1 993) 2 7  
F amity law Quarterly 2 l 3 a t  2 l 7. 
64 K Mack, ' Alternative Dispute Resolution and Access to Justice for Women ' ( 1 995) 1 7  Adelaide Law Review 
1 23 at l 46 .  
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with the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement, serving as the director, chairperson and 
also solicitor. She has written and spoken extensively both in Australia and abroad 
on Indigenous issues, and presented the following paper at a Rob Riley Memorial 
Lecture in October 2006. 
I ntroduction 
In this paper I wil l  examine the shifts in Austral ian government policy and laws in 
respect of Aboriginal peoples and wil l  argue they are shifts which have created 
obstacles to moves moving towards real izing and developing a more just and humane 
society. The question I pose in this paper is :  how is it possible to achieve human 
rights when those who hold power to effect change are committed to a universal 
world order - one which is at the expense of diversity of peoples and cultures?2 
In recent publ ic  debate known as the history wars, Aboriginal people and our 
communities were advised by the Howard Federal Government to move on from the 
' blaming game' ,  that is, blaming white Austral ia for colonial ism and all of its social 
and economic outcomes. We are expected to simply move on with our l ives, get a job 
and try to forget that racism is endemic in the Australian workplace as it is in the 
schools and the hospitals  and the housing market. Windshuttle, among others, argued 
that the blame was not based on truth but fabrication. White guilt took a s igh of relief 
and overnight Aboriginal people became l iars and fabricators of a 'black arm-band' 
view of history. 
Further to that call to move on, we saw the birth of policies of shared responsibility 
and began to hear over and over again a mantra about taking responsibi lity. The 
problem for us in moving on is that the legacy of colonialism and the continued 
colonial relationship between Aboriginal people and the state has not been addressed. 
Many Australians deny the real ity of colonialism. How can we go on? 
1 This paper was presented in October 2006 to the Curtin University as the, Rob Riley Memorial 
l ecture. I would l ike to acknowledge Pat Dudgeon for her commitment to this lecture series and kind 
invitation to participate as a presenter. I am grateful to the support of N yoongar elders while attending 
Curtin University and in particular J oan Winch. 
2 For discussion on the displacement of Aboriginal laws and sovereignty and the failure of the state to 
accommodate see Watson Irene " International is ing, H umanising and Diversifying: The One Nation 
State", in Offord Baden and Porter E l isabeth ( Eds), A ctivating Human Rights, Peter Lang European 
Academic Publ ishers Bern, 2006 p 257 .  
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But now the blaming game has switched. The Aboriginal problem is now being 
blamed upon Aboriginal peoples and in particular blame is focused on what has been 
deemed their ' inherent cultures ' .  For instance, Aboriginal culture has been 
characterized as being permissive of violent sexual assaults against Aboriginal women 
and chi ldren; this is even though Aboriginal peoples have repeatedly stated that 
violence against women is not a part of their culture. 3 There is an injustice in these 
'history wars ' and other debates. Aboriginal people and culture are much 
misrepresented - how is it possible to take responsibi l ity when we lack the tools  and 
resources to do so? Many Aboriginal peoples are victims of inter-generational 
traumas sourced in our experiences of colonial ism. It has been said that comments 
l ike mine, which blame colonial ism for al l of our problems, are a hindrance to 
Aboriginal community development, and the better approach is to stop the welfare 
cheques that purchase ' the grog' and 'just get up and go and get a job ' .  However, it is 
not that simple. In this paper I explore the tension between cultural relativism and 
universal ism, and how these tensions have been manipulated by the federal 
government to support their recent initiatives in Aboriginal affairs, inc luding their 
proposed amendments to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1 976 
(Cth) (hereafter referred to ' the Act ' ) .  
Violence against Aboriginal women has been presented by the Australian media as 
being inherent in Aboriginal culture and law. In May 2006, Tony Jones interviewed 
Northern Territory Crown Prosecutor Nannette Rogers, on ABC Latel ine, who spoke 
of the rape of small Aboriginal children in the Northern Territory. What followed 
was a month awash with media stories on 'dysfunctional ' Aboriginal communities. 
Now, prior to these stories of violence and rape the Howard government had been 
promoting freehold land, as opposed to communal land ownership. A rhetoric of one 
law for al l Austral ians grew during the media avalanche of reports of rape and 
violence.4 With that also came the cal l for the privatization of col lectively-held 
Aboriginal lands.  In his second reading speech for the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006, Mal Brough, Minister for Famil ies, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, showed his support for the idea that 
col lective land ownership contributes to the vulnerabi l ity of Aboriginal women and 
that private ownership of land provides greater protection for women and children. It 
is a very tenuous l inkage and although there i s  no evidence to support this  position it 
is  a position which Howard espoused over 20 years ago, along with his intention to 
dismantle the Act. Subsequently, I am left to wonder what culture has to do with it. 
However, it is  more l ikely that it concerns the interests of powerful industry groups. 
Why blame Aboriginal culture? Why demonise Aboriginal culture and law? Does 
this process of demonisation serve to better allow for regressive shifts in Aboriginal 
Affairs pol icy? 
3 Betty P ierce, speaking to Jean Kennedy 'Customary Law B lamed for the Low Reporting Rates of 
Aboriginal Crime' PM, 1 6  May http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/sl 1 64009 1 .htm spoke out 
against the references made to Aboriginal law and culture as being permissive of violence. 
4 See, ' Howard Pans Indigenous Law' ,  News.Com.Au, 28 M ay 2006, 
<http ://www.news.com.au/story/O, 1 0 1 1 7, 1 9283530-42 1 ,00.html>;  M ischa Schubert, ' P M  B lasts 
Custom of Promised Brides ' ,  Age, 29 May 2006 http://www.theae:e.eom.au/news/national/pm-blasts­
custom-of-promised; Patricia Karvelas, 'One Law for A l l :  H oward ' ,  A ustralian, 29 May 2006, 
http://www.theaustral ian. news.com.au/printpage/0,5942, 1 9288622,00. html 
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Sites of the Debate on Cultural Relativism 
Most evident sites in the debate on cultural relativism are in relation to violence 
perpetrated against Aboriginal women. Spivak has cal led these public campaigns, 
'white men rescuing brown women from brown men ' ;  also referred to as ' the white 
crusader complex ' .  5 But as argued earl ier, the real ity of the crusader-like intervention 
is more one of entrapment; that is, Aboriginal people are hunted into confined spaces, 
or removed from collectivity to the isolation of individualized spaces. An example 
would be the rep lacement of collective land ownership with that of individual ized 
land ownership. However, privatization of land as a remedy for violence towards 
women and children appears elusive. There is no evidence that supports the notion 
that col lective land ownership creates a less safe community. 
In this critically important debate on the possibility of building safe communities, 
why is the focus put upon Aboriginal culture? People continue to abstract culture 
from the power relations between Aboriginal peoples and the dominant culture which 
has been in existence in Australia for more than 200 years. But any analysis based 
upon that simple abstraction of culture is flawed. The real picture is more complex 
and should hear the voices of inter-generational trauma and the processes of 
internalized colonialism. While Aboriginal culture is  centrally located and demonised 
as being blamed, white guilt of colonialism is enabled to disappear. 
In a recent publication7 I have argued that the recent ' history wars ' debate 8 is looking 
like a relative of the current critique on Australian Aboriginal cultures. As the history 
wars attacked the ' black armband' or Aboriginal views of history, the current attack 
against cultural relativism9 is simi larly an attack on Aboriginal peoples ' cultural right 
not to have values imposed from outsiders. Cultural relativism challenges the 
application of universal human rights laws that would displace cultural particularity. 
Blaming culture for violent and dysfunctional behaviour inevitably leads to the 
demonisation and undermining of the right of peoples to cultural self-determination. 
The demonisation of Aboriginal culture and law occurs when the focus shifts from the 
social , political and economic disempowerment of Aboriginal communities. To focus 
entirely on questions of culture, and then to measure civil ity by the standards 
represented by the dominant culture (one that is responsible for our colonised and 
subj ugated non-status), gives a distorted view. It emanates from a position of 
comparative power, an outsiders view. What is wrong in thi s  measuring of standards 
of Aboriginal peoples '  culture is that the culture picture is abstracted from questions 
of power, and the destruction that that power has wrought on the social, political and 
5 Spivak Gayatri Chakravorty A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present Harvard University Press Cambridge 1 999, 284. 
6 For a critique of the federal government position on remote communities and their future prospects, 
see, Watson, Irene " I l lus ionists and H unters : Being Aboriginal in this Occupied Space" (2005) 22 
Australian Feminist law Journal, 1 5 .  
7 [ bid.  
8 The ' wars ' were perhaps kicked off by the rev isionist historica l  writings of Keith Windschuttle, The 
Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Volume One Van Diemen 's land 1 803 - 184 7  (2002), where he 
questioned the val idity of recordings which documented a violent colonial history of massacres, 
cultural genocide and the overal l violence of the colonial frontier, instead preferring a more 'sanitised ' 
view of colonial ' settlement' .  
9 Perhaps i t  could b e  said was kick started b y  Peter Sutton at fn 7 above I discuss his influence o n  this 
debate. 
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economic pos1t10n of Aboriginal peoples over 200 years. As always with this 
'measured civi lity '  approach we are seen, as we were at the time of the 1 788  invasion 
and first contact, as the barbarians of our past. 
The Culture Defence 
In the making of the 'barbarian, '  attention has recently been paid to what is known as 
the ' culture defence' which has sometimes been used by defence lawyers when 
defending Aboriginal offenders . The courts sometimes show 'sensitiv ity' towards 
Aboriginal men in matters of rape where ' culture ' is taken as a mitigating factor, but it 
' is often about the cultural ization of rape: how cultural and historical specificities 
explain and excuse the violence men direct at women. ' 1 0 In taking what they perceive 
to be Aboriginal law into consideration, the courts contribute to 'making invisible the 
harm that is done to Aboriginal women ' while constructing or deeming Aboriginal 
men as inherently violent, thus confirming the ' superiority of white men. ' 1 1  
On this issue Benhabib has argued: 
The cultural defence strategy imprisons the individual in a cage of uni vocal 
cultural interpretations and psychological motivations; individuals' intentions 
are reduced to cultural stereotypes; moral agency is reduced to cultural 
puppetry. 1 2 
Benahabib goes on to suggest : 
. . .  encounters between diverse cultural practices take the form in these cases of 
total izations that eliminate the space for renegotiations, re-signification, and 
cultural boundary shifting. White l iberal gui lt is pitted against the "crimes of 
passion" committed by Third World individuals .  In all of these cases, the 
judges could have upheld stri �ter sentencing of the defendant, thus protecting 
the equal rights of women and children under the Constitution. This would 
have signalled to the rest of the communities involved that they were 
confronted with cultural negotiations through which they would need to learn 
to maintain their cultural integrity without engaging in discrimination against 
and subordination of their women and children. 1 3  
But instead o f  entering into negotiations the Commonwealth government has 
proposed the shutting down of any such processes. 
Workin g  on Unmasking the Myths of E quality 
Both state and federal Austral ian governments are not tel ling the true story when they 
assert that Aboriginal people have equality of recognition. Evidence proves gross 
continuing inequalities are suffered by most Aboriginal people. The High Court in 
' 0 Sherene Razack, ' What is to be Gained by Looking White Peopl e  in the Eye? Culture, Race, and 
Gender in Cases of Sexual Violence ' ,  ( 1 994) 1 9  (4) Signs 899 . 
I I l bid, 899-900. 
1 2 Benhabib Sey la, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Princeton 
Uni versity Press Princeton 2002 p89. 
1 3 I bid. 
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Mabo 's case had the opportunity to correct the inequali ty of land dispossession, but 
we need to ask how far the court went in providing a framework for recognition. The 
answer is they did not go very far at al l .  The recognition amounted to the right to a 
beneficial use of the land for the purposes of hunting and gathering. The question of 
our status as sovereign peoples in international law was negated by the Mabo 
decision. In the Mabo (No 2) l itigation the question of sovereignty was not p leaded 
yet it was a question that was critical to the outcome of the case. The plaintiffs in 
Mabo (No 2) did not claim sovereignty over the Murray Islands; the issue between the 
parties was one of entitlement to property. However, the question of sovereignty was 
inextricably l inked to it, and of concern to the High Court . Hence, the problem for the 
court was to recognize a form of property entitlement while not 'fracturing the 
skeletal frame of the law ' .  U ltimately, the Mabo decision confirmed colonial 
foundation, and its supremacy and capacity to extinguish Aboriginal law and culture. 
But the question remains: How can Australian law erase Aboriginal law when 
Aboriginal law sits outside of its proclaimed legal foundation? There are two ways in 
Australia; that is ,  two different frameworks; one that refuses to recognize the 
existence of the other, stating that to 'give recognition ' would be to fracture the state ' s  
.c: d . 1 4 very ioun atlon. 
Austral ian law has had to assume that it has had the legitimacy to extinguish the laws 
of the other, but where does it draw its legitimacy from? Is it simply because it can as 
it has the force and power to do so? The High Court in Mabo (No 2) answered this 
question; confirming that Australia was lawfully settled in an act of state, when at the 
same time it rej ected terra nul l ius as the foundational principle of Austral ian law. In 
the High Court ' s  rejection of terra nullius, many thought that there would appear an 
opening for an Aboriginal presence; instead, it was just a recognition of the l imits of 
Australian law, and a measuring of the 'native ' s '  remaining connection to land in a 
contemporary colonial context. The court decided it would not give recognition to an 
Aboriginal presence that held any possibi l ity of damaging the skeletal framework of 
the body of an imposed Austral ian law. The fiction of settlement under international 
law prevailed in the Mabo (No 2) decision. The skeleton of Austral ian law remained 
intact and the question of its legitimacy did not arise as the court found no need to 
address it, its own legitimacy. The High Court ' s  attempt to shift the 'darkest aspects ' 
of Australian history in Mabo (No 2), did nothing but re- invent and re-legitimise the 
fiction of Australia as a ' settled colony' ,  thereby perpetuating the contradictions 
within Australian law and its conflict with principles of international law. The 
paradoxes created in the imposed spaces of domesti c  law over the rights and 
obl igations of Aboriginal people continue post Mabo, as opposed to having l ies in 
Austral ian legal history corrected. We are left with the decision in Mabo (No 2) , and 
the court ' s  failure to provide a remedy beyond the possibi lity of meagre 
acknowledgment of a lesser right to land, or one which falls outside the common law 
of man, and now by the good grace of the common law has been brought inside for 
recognition. 1 5 
What does bringing Aboriginal law into the body of the common law mean to the 
future survival of Aboriginal law and culture? Benhabib commenting on John 
Locke ' s Second Treatise of Government and the concept ' state of nature ' argues :  
1 4  Mabo v The State of Queensland (No 2)  [ 1 992] 1 75 CLR 1 ,  a t  pp 29 ,  30 ,  43 ,  45 . 
1 5  l n  reference to John Locke in the Second Treatise on Civi l  Government on the 'state of nature' refers 
to the condition of men and how it would be if not governed by common laws. 
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Psychological ly, the state of nature metaphor is an affirmation of 
individualism, autonomy, independence, and self-rel iance. The male is seen 
as one who owes nothing to others for the rights to which he is entitled; it is  
not his historical community of birth and entitlement which endows him with 
these rights; rather, it is his "Maker" and the law of nature, which all men of 
sound reason and good will can consult in order to discover this radical 
message of equal ity and autonomy. 1 6 
The universal centre becomes 'man ' as community is displaced. The universal is 
mans' becoming and community' s  demise. For Locke, Aboriginal governance is 
under-developed and Aboriginal relationships to land are not seen as a legitimate form 
of ownership. It was one of the positions used to justify colonization. 
We are yet to see how Aboriginal title might translate in the mouth of modernity, or 
upon the more settled lands of Austral ia. We could assume that it might include right 
of access to un-al ienated Crown Lands. However, fol lowing the recent response of 
the government of Western Australia (WA) to appeal the Nyoongar Native Title 
decision in Perth, we may be left only to dream the possibi l ity of even that event. 
So what are the possibil ities of equality when Australia ' s  colonial foundation makes 
imperative the Australian government' s  stake in maintaining inequality and its 
oppression of Aboriginal peoples? Extending 'protection ' of the law to protect the 
'human rights ' of Aboriginal people under Anglo Austral ian law creates the il lusion 
that 'equality '  for Aboriginal people is possible. But under colonialism, it is never a 
possibil ity. Our land was parceled out to British merchants and squatters, and 
maintaining privi lege is the natural position of colonial ism. Universal principles of 
equal ity remain abstract, disembodied and meaningless in practical terms, and the 
maintenance of privilege ensures that universal principles remain abstract, 
disembodied, and not reali sed in practice. In maintaining the il lus ion of equality the 
state retains the real ity of inequality. For Aboriginal peoples, real ity is a space in 
which our laws have no space to develop healthy communities. Instead, they have 
become disembodied laws. The oppression of Aboriginal people is further guaranteed 
by the state ' s  failure to deliver basic human services, such as adequate housing and 
health care. Our lack of privi lege remains guaranteed. In Austral ia, the divide 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples is well revealed by all social and 
economic indices. With the weight of the West bearing down in its extraction of our 
lands and natural resources, how will  all iances with universally-dreamed standards 
help us survive, let alone prosper? The WA government 's  appeal of the Nyoongar 
decision is an example of the continuing colonial regime ' s  embedded interests . 
The state is excused and allowed to disengage from the onuses of equality and the 
recognition of Aboriginal laws. Culture is deployed to explain the rape of small 
children, 1 7 and the focus is thus shifted from the social, economic and political 
environment of those being raped. On the ground, at home, reality is more complex. 
Blaming culture as though culture is fixed and able to determine all there is to know 
1 6  Locke, as above n 1 5 , 43 . 
1 7  In a South Austra l i an court decision Justice Gordon Barrett, referred to 'culture sickness ' when 
referring to the impact of Aboriginal people disconnected from country as an explanation for the rape 
of a woman. See ' Rapist 's "Cultural Sickness" ' ,  Advertiser, South Australia, 1 0  June 2006, 2 1 .  
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about an individual ' is itself a racist proposition. ' 1 8 Angela Davis  argued that the 
United States deployment of culture to explain the tortures at Abu Ghraib or 
Guantanamo Bay is based on the assumption of an inferior ' Islamic culture. ' 
However, these situations of torture say more about US strategies than they do about 
the cultural response of the torture victims. 1 9 The violence in Aboriginal 
communities is also more a comment on the Australian government ' s  management20 
of the colonial project, than it is about the culture of the perpetrators of violence. As 
Aboriginal communities across Australia continue to decl ine, the gaze shifts away 
from the poverty and dispossession of Aboriginal Austral ia to cultural profiling of it 
as 'barbarian ' .  We are delineated ' friend and enemy. ' So we return to the same old 
racial discourse we know so well ,  the one which nourishes the ideology which 
underlies the colonial foundations of the Austral ian state. 
Douzinas suggests that, 'perhaps we have taken cultural relativism too simp ly; that is ,  
to see culture as embedded is unhelpful and negates the effects of history on how 
culture is constructed. ' 2 1 
In particular, on the history of colonial ism and i ts impact upon Aboriginal culture, 
Douzinas writes : 
. . .  both positions can become aggressive and dangerous. When their 
respective apologists become convinced about their truth and the immorality 
of their demonised opponents, they can easily move from moral dispute to 
ki l ling. At that point, all differences disappear. One could only add that the 
name of the common poison is self-satisfied essentialism: whether communal, 
state or universal it suffers from the same heterophobia, the extreme fear and 
demonisation of the other. 22 
Cultural Differences and the Australian State 
Such a critique should consider the impact of the colonial project upon the l ives of the 
colonized. Benhabibs ' critique of the recognition of culture and the United States 
fails  to examine the colonial project and the way in which Aboriginal  aspirations and 
knowledge could function where they might otherwise collide with the colonial order 
of things. For example, within Australia, the Aboriginal quest to protect cultural sites 
frequently loses out to natural resource development deemed in the national interest. 
There are few possibilities ever invoked or successful when it comes to the 
recognition of Aboriginal culture and law. C learly, we are negotiating within a 
horizon that does not allow for the equality of the colonial subject. The assimilation 
agenda within this horizon will prevail .  The possib i lity of having both recognition of 
1 8  Angela Davis, Abolition Democracy Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture, (2005) 58-59. Here 
Davis  is referring to culture being used to frame an understanding of the torture of Muslim men; she 
asks the question: "why do we think a Musl im man would act differently?" suggesting assumptions 
about culture are themselves racist. 
1 9 Ibid.  
20 The H oward Government 's Practical Reconci liation project has been hai l ed a failure, Lowitja 
O ' Donoghue, Third Annual H uman Rights Oration, Age, Victoria, 1 1  December 2003 . 
2 1 Further discussion see Douzinas Costas The End of Human Rights : Critical legal Thought at the 
Turn of the Century Oxford Portland 2000 at p 1 3  7 .  
2 2  Ib id  1 39 .  
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cultural difference and the assimilation agenda of the state working together is a 
contradiction. 
Native Title, Misrepresentations, and U niversalizing the Nation State 
Native title claims have required us to jump mountainous hurdles of proof to establish 
a 'native title'  right to land. In those rare instances where native title is deemed to 
have survived there is sti l l  a requirement that the community is able to stand against 
the power of the state to extinguish it. The Federal Court decision of Justice Wilcox23 
is, from the states ' perspective, the more controversial of the native title decisions. It 
is seen as contentious in the claim to large ' chunks of urban, suburban Australia, ' 24 
because most had thought the previous native title decisions in the Larrakia and Yorta 
Yorta decisions had rendered white Austral ian back yards and public spaces safe from 
native title claimants. Now no one feels safe, but we look at an appeal by the WA 
government ' s  attempt to regain that feeling of security, that certainty - but certainty of 
what? 
So far however, all native title c laims have failed to give recognition that wil l  survive 
the threat of extinguishment. Also, there is a growing advocacy against col lective 
rights, as reported by the media: 
But there is increasing understanding, not least among Aboriginal 
communities themselves that the real problem l ies with the nature of the title 
obtained. Title is communal ; title is inalienable. The property rights it 
contains are more or less useless. 
As with Locke, the dominant thinking is of an Aboriginal culture not yet developed. 
The problem is seen to be inherent in Aboriginal culture and our methods of holding 
land, and not in the Australian legal system 's  inabil ity to give greater recognition to 
Aboriginal sovereignty claims. 
From Mabo onwards, mis-representation surrounding the nature of native title 
abounds. In an interview with the ABC, Justice Wilcox commented on the 
misunderstanding in the community as to what constituted a native title right and its 
benefits to Aboriginal people. He was reported as thus: 
There has been I think, a lot of misunderstanding, and sadly there has been 
some politicisation over the years. I think more and more people now are 
recognising the reality that native title isn't a threat to people's backyards, 
doesn't take away free hold land or in fact the rights of most lease holders .  25 
23 Moran v Minister for land and Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales [ 1 999] FCA 
1 637 .  
24 The Western Austra l ian, "Native Title Hosti l ity Pointless" l 8th October, 2006, Tony Rutherford 
reporting; http ://www.thewest .com.au/ default .aspx?M enul 0=77 &Content ID= 1 023 8 .  
25 "Wilcox speaks out on Noongar rul ing" October 3 ,  2006, 1 0 .34 am, 
http://www.theage.com .au/news/N A T IONA L/Wi lcox-speaks-out-on-Noongar­
ruling/2006/ 1 0/03/ 1 1 5964 1 300742 .html 
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Can We Navigate a Peacefu l  Settlement? 
I am not convinced that there can be a peaceful settlement when we are locked into 
protecting positions and where the positions being protected are based upon fear, 
ignorance and misrepresentation. We also need to critical ly  examine who is locking 
whom into position. To what extent do Aboriginal people have voice over the 
representation of our culture and the call for recognition of our humanity? Who holds 
the keys to the castle? Clearly not the Aboriginal peoples. How much further can we, 
as an Australian society, evolve towards a place where all spaces are filled with 
empathy for both the collective and individual belonging? 
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WOM E N  AT WORK: EQUAL O PPORTUNITY AND 
DISCRIMINATION 
N eroli Holmes 
Deputy Commissioner, Anti Discrimin ation Commission Queensland 
Neroli is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Queensland and has practised law in the 
United Kingdom where she worked as legal advisor and solicitor in a number of 
statutory authorities. Prior to working with the Anti-Discrimination Commission, she 
worked in Government in the Office of Premier and in Aboriginal and Islander 
Affairs. She delivered the following speech during The University of Queensland 
Office of Women celebrations for International Women 's Day on 8 March 2007. 
Introduction 
The University of Queensland Office Of Women ' s  theme in celebrating International 
Women 's  Day this  year is -' Women at Work - Know your Rights - it ' s  your future. ' 
This theme wi l l  be covered in my speech today, but before doing so I wil l  reflect back 
on the issues that have confronted the female workforce in recent generations - to 
reflect where we have come from, where we are now and to try to look at where we 
sti l l  have to go to achieve full equal ity for female workers . 
Where We Started 
The women 's  movement has been with us for a much longer period than the 
legislation prohibiting sex discrimination. However, many of your mothers and 
grandmothers wil l  remember back to the 1 980s when the federal Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) was passed in 1 984. Just seven years later, Queensland passed its 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1 991  (hereafter referred to ' the ADA' ) . 
More mature-aged women will be able to reflect back on the days prior to the passing 
of the federal Sex Discrimination Act 1 984 (Cth) . Here are a couple of reminders of 
those days. 
• Up unti l  the 1 960s women in some sectors had to resign from their jobs when 
they married (Commonwealth Public Service/Rockhampton City Counci l ) .  
• Also in the l 960 ' s, women were not al lowed to drink in the public bar at 
hotels, but were confined to the ' Ladies' Lounge' or the car park. In protest to 
this rule, the feisty Merle Thornton ( Sigrid Thornton's  mother) chained herself 
to the publ ic bar of the RE Hotel in Brisbane. 
• The Deborah Wardley case, a landmark sex discrimination case of the 1 970s 1 -
1 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wardley ( 1 980) 28 ALR 449. 
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Deborah appl ied for a job as a pi lot at Ansett Airlines and was refused 
employment because she was a female. She fought her case all the way to the 
High Court and won. It was one of the first major sex discrimination cases to 
be determined. That was way back in 1 979, j ust over 28 years ago. She was 
the first female pi lot in a large commercial airl ine in Australia. 
Twenty-eight years after winning her case, Deborah W ardley is sti l l  working 
as a pilot with Lufthansa and no doubt there are many female pi lots working 
across Australia and the globe at this moment who have followed Deborah 
Wardley' s  footsteps. 
• It was only in the 1 970s that the term 'sexual harassment' was coined and the 
fight began to gain a legal right to protect women from this behaviour. It was 
accepted by many female workers that this conduct could occur without a right 
to complain. 
We have moved on a great distance since those early days when sex discrimination 
and sexual harassment were first mentioned in legislation. 
Where Are We Today? 
It is very important that all workers understand that the passing of the Workplace 
Relations Amendment (Work Choices) A ct 2005 (Cth) has not impacted upon a 
workers right to make discrimination, sexual harassment, or victimisation of 
vi l ification complaints . Unfortunately, many workers are misinformed and bel ieve 
they no longer have any right to complain about decisions of their employers . While 
it is true there is a much more limited right to complain to the State Industrial 
Commission than there used to be prior to Work Choices, all workers retain the right 
to complain about discrimination or sexual harassment, vilification or victimisation 
occurring in the workplace. They can do thi s  under the ADA, and the various federal 
discrimination laws, which include the Sex Discrimination Act 1 984 (Cth). 
Today, there are 1 6  grounds of discrimination prohibited by the ADA. These include 
impairment, age, race, rel igious and political belief, trade union activity, sexuality and 
gender identity discrimination. The five types of discrimination that have particular 
relevance to women in the workplace are: 
• Sex discrimination 
• Pregnancy discrimination 
• Breastfeeding discrimination 
• Family responsibi l ities discrimination and 
• Parental status discrimination 
Sexu al harassment i s  also prohibited and in the vast majority of cases, the victims of 
sexual harassment are women. It is defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature 
in relation to the victim. It happens when a reasonable person would expect that you 
would feel offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct. Sexual harassment 
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remains as a major issue m the workplace, particularly for young women. It is 
consistently the second or third highest ground of complaint to the Anti 
Discrimination Commission. 
It is interesting to look at the stage of l ife that a woman is at, to see what 
discrimination issues will arise for her. A recent study conducted by the South 
Austral ian Equal Opportunity Commission shows how discrimination complaints vary 
according to age and gender. When you think about it, this is logical and something 
we would expect. 
The South Australian study showed that teenage women lodge sexual harassment 
complaints, and then also lodge pregnancy complaints in their 20s, which are joined 
marital status complaints in their 30s. In their 40s, they lodge race and sex 
discrimination complaints. Teenage men lodge race complaints, age and sexuality 
complaints in their 20s; sexuality, race and sexual harassment complaints in their 30s, 
and race and disabil ity complaints in their 40s. The gender difference seems to end 
from the 50s onwards, with both sexes lodging disability and age complaints in their 
50s and age based complaints after that. 
It is highly likely that if we carried out a similar analysis in Queensland, similar 
results would be obtained - although there may be some differences as the South 
Austral ian legislation to date does not have the family responsibil ity ground. 
Under the ADA, there are two types of discrimination: 
Discrimination complaints can be either direct discrimination or indirect 
discrimination and it is important to understand this difference. 
Direct discrimination is straightforward - an employer decides to not offer a long 
term casual worker who has announced her pregnancy any more shifts because 
'pregnant women cause us problems in the workplace. '  This is direct discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy. 
I ndirect discrimination is a l ittle more complex. Indirect discrimination can occur if 
there i s  a rule or practice that impacts in a discriminatory way on a particular group of 
people covered by discrimination legislation more than others, and which is  not 
reasonable. An example might be that the workplace has a strict rule that requires all 
workers to be at work at 6.30 am. Consequently, this rule may have a greater impact 
on workers who have young children. This practice could be unlawful discrimination 
against women who are mothers who general ly  have a greater responsibility for 
organizing the care of young children than men, if the employer cannot show that the 
requirement is reasonable. So the term applies to everyone but it has a greater impact 
on women. 
Most discrimination cases dealing with lack of flexible work practices and many sex 
discrimination cases are indirect discrimination cases. 
Let us look in some detail at examples that i l lustrate women's rights not to be 
subj ected to unlawful discrimination at work. 
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Sex Discrimination 
Direct sex discrimination is where you are treated less favourably than another person 
on the basis of your sex, in circumstances that are the same or not materially different. 
An example would be a male and a female worker in the same workplace, receiving 
different remuneration for performing the same work. Moreover, the substantial 
reason for the difference in pay rate is the sex of the employee. 
An interesting case proceeding through the Federal Court at the moment is  a sex 
discrimination c laim by a female ex senior partner of Price Waterhouse Coopers 
( PWC), an accounting firm. She c laims that PWC had a ' boys culture ' that had 
obstructed her career. She is seeking $ 1 0  mil l ion against the firm ( Rich v 
Price WaterhouseCoopers) ,  and also has a victimization case running, claiming she 
was denied access to her cl ients after lodging the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC ) c laim. 
If  women are breastfeeding their child, they have the right not to be discriminated 
against. This type of discrimination wil l  rarely involve direct discrimination, as very 
few workplaces in Austral ia are set up to have a child-care arrangement at work. It 
wi l l  most often involve indirect discrimination. For example, if an employer refuses 
to provide faci l ities to a woman to be able to privately and hygienically express milk 
in order to breastfeed, and where the provision of such faci lities would reasonably be 
able to be accommodated in the workplace in question. 
In relation to pregnancy discrimination ,  pregnant women have the right not to be 
dismissed or treated less favourably at work because you are pregnant, or because you 
intend to or have accessed maternity leave. Pregnancy discrimination is  stil l  a major 
source of complaints to the Anti-Discrimination Commission (ADC) .  
Family Responsibilities Discrimination 
' Fami ly responsibil ities ' has a broad meaning. It refers to the person' s  
responsibi l ities to care for  or  support a dependent child or  any other member of  the 
person's immediate family who is in need of care and support. 
Immediate family includes your spouse or former spouse; your child or your spouse ' s  
child including step and foster children; parent, grandparent, grandchild or  your own 
siblings, or the sibl ings of your spouse or former spouse . 
Therefore, it inc ludes much more than the care of young children . 
S ince the late 1 990s there have been a range of both discrimination and Industrial 
Relations Commission cases across Australia where workers have used these grounds 
of complaint to try and achieve workplaces that accommodate the needs of workers 
with caring responsibil ities. The cases have dealt with a range of workplace i ssues .  
Some cases have succeeded in proving discrimination, while others have failed. 
Issues considered in certain cases include: 
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1 .  Working hours - such as the commencement and finishing times, taking into 
account child care arrangements . 2 
2 .  Work breaks or flexible work times to deal with family issues such as 
childcare arrangements, moving children from pre-school to day care centers. 3 
3 .  Unexpected time off work to deal with caring for a sick family member.4 
4.  Weekend work - whether being required to work unexpectedly on the 
weekend is a reasonable condition of work for a mother with a young child or 
a man caring for his brother who had suffered a brain injury. 5 
5 .  Job sharing - the right to implement job-sharing i n  certain circumstances. 6 
6 .  The right to move from full  time to part time work when returning to work 
from maternity leave. 7 
7 .  The entitlement to access carer' s leave and not b e  penalized. 8 
8 .  Not being offered work because a potential employee i s  the parent o f  young 
children, or is pregnant. 9 
9 .  Pregnancy discrimination resulting in  dismissal or  a return to a lesser position 
in the workplace when returning to work from maternity leave. 1 0 
While nearly all the above cases have involved women making complaints and taking 
them through to final hearing, it is also heartening to know that family responsibil ities 
are not the sole domain of women. From 2003 (the date the family responsibil ities 
ground was inserted into the ADA) to 2005 , a total of 65 complaints were made to the 
ADC in Queensland alleging discri�nination on the ground of family responsibil ities. 
Of these, 45 were made by female complainants and 20 by male complainants. 
The Process of M a king a Discri mination Complaint 
The framework of the legislation provides a two-tiered complaints process. The first 
tier allows for complaints to be made by individuals and by organizations to the ADC. 
If  the complaint is not resolved, it may be referred for public hearing to the Anti­
Discrimination Tribunal . 
2 Wood v Steggles ( 1 999) NSW I RC. 
3 Song v A insworth (2002) FMC A3 . 
4 Johnson v Kew Aged Care ( 1 999) A l RC .  
5 Porter v Matson and Locomotive International P ty  Ltd ( 1 997) QADT 2 .  
6 Bogle v Metropolitan Health Services Board (2000) WA Equal Opportunity Tribunal. 
7 Escobar v Rainbow Printing Pty Ltd (2002) FMCA 1 22;  Mayer v A ustralian Nuclear Science and 
Technology Organisation (2003) FMCA 209; Kelly v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2003 ) FMCA 5 84; Howe 
v Qantas A irways Ltd (2004) FMCA 242 .  
8 Commonwealth of A ustralia v Evans (2004) FCA 654. 
9 Everett v Copperart ( 1 997) QADT 1 4 . 
10 Rispoli v Merck, Sharpe and Dohme ( 2003 ) FMCA 1 60; Johnson v Gloria Marshall Figure Salons 
( 1 999) QADT 6.  
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The Commission complaint process is very straightforward: 
• once a complaint is accepted as being under the ADA; 
• the respondent is notified; 
• the aim is to have a conci l iation conference within six weeks of notification; 
• the conci l iation conference is a confidential process and gives those involved 
the opportunity to negotiate a settlement of the dispute in an informal meeting. 
There are no costs associated with accessing the Commission; 
• the majority of cases are resolved through the conci l iation process. Conci l iation 
can result in a range of outcomes; a change of workplace conditions or practices 
so discrim ination or sexual harassment does not continue; an apology; and or 
payment of financial compensation for damages. 
• If  it is not resolved by concil iation it can be referred to the Tribunal for a public 
hearing. 
• The Tribunal is a more formal setting. Evidence is presented in a court room 
situation, and the Tribunal member will make a determination on the 
information presented. Cases are sometimes reported in the publ ic  media. 
Costs are an issue in the Tribunal, and in some circumstances costs may be 
awarded against a losing party. 
Other Issues 
Some 'big picture ' issues continue to impact upon equality for women in the 
workplace. These are rights that many women sti l l  do not have in the workplace. 
Pay Equity 
Pay equity has been a huge issue for many decades. Pru Goward (former Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner and Commissioner Responsible for Age 
Discrimination) has pointed out that women continue to experience sex discrimination 
in thi s  area. The latest figures show women earn 83 .6  cents in the male dol lar when 
the average weekly earnings of ful l  time ordinary time work is compared. 
When part-timers and casuals are involved, this  gap widens to 65 . 3  cents in the male 
dollar. 
Women account for the majority of casual and part-time workers. In 2000 they made 
up 73 per cent of al l  part-time employees. This in itself  is not a bad thing. However, 
we know these positions are less secure, less well paid and preclude these employees 
from having access to training and career progression. 
The latest average weekly earnings figures are bad news for Australians wanting to 
juggle their paid work and family responsibi l ities. They show a decline of 1 .4 per 
cent in the gender pay gap over the last two years. Subsequently, there is  a widening 
inequali ty between men and women in the private sector. We need to put a b igger 
effort into progressing pay equity. 
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Lack of Universal Paid Maternity for Women Workers 
While some women working in the public service or for large corporate employers 
enjoy a right to paid maternity leave, the vast majority of women giving birth in 
Australia have no rights to paid maternity leave. This contrasts with countries such as 
Sweden, Austria, Germany and Finland which al l al low a significant period of paid 
maternity leave. There are significant social and equality benefits, as well as benefits 
to the economy and employers in having a universal scheme of paid maternity leave. 
This is an issue that has been the subject of considerable discussion and research since 
2002, but at this point in time the Federal government has failed to progress this  
important issue. 
The Ageing Workforce 
Currently, there is a shortage in labour and ski l ls being experienced across Austral ia. 
This is  expected to get worse with the ageing workforce. By the year 2040, there will 
be double the number of dependents per taxpayer. The Federal and State 
Governments have recognized this problem and are actual ly encouraging older 
workers to remain in the workforce.  This is where it becomes imperative to foster a 
more flexible, family friendly workforce. 
The responsibil ity for caring for children and other elderly or i l l  family members 
remains primari ly  with women. If  the government sees the need for workers to stay in 
the workforce, it must create the flexible family friendly conditions that al low fami ly 
members with caring responsibil ities to stay in the workforce as wel l as care for their 
fami ly  members . This is going to be a critical issue in the next couple of decades .  
For more information, a report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission provides a further insight into this particular area. The report is the 
culmination of two years research and consultation on work l ife balance. 
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COMMUNITY LITIGANTS IN THE QUEE NSLAND PLANNING 
AND E NVIRONMENT AL LEGAL SYSTEM 
Jo-Anne Bragg 
Principal Solicitor, Environmental Defenders Office (Qld) I nc. 
Jo worked as a corporate lawyer in Sydney before moving to Brisbane in 1 99 2 to take 
up the position of Solicitor at the Environmental Defenders Of ice (Qld) Inc. , making 
her the longest serving EDD solicitor in A ustralia. She delivered the following paper 
at the 2006 Queensland Environmental Law Association Conference 'Making it 
Better '. The paper was first published in the National Environmental Law Review in 
Autumn 2006. 
Who are Community Litigants and Why A re They I mportant? 
Community l itigants are parties to court proceedings who are motivated to protect 
environmental values or to advocate for a feature of value to the community. 
Examples of environmental community l itigants include the Karawatha Forest 
Protection Society and the Community for Coastal and Cassowary Conservation. 
They may be individuals or groups. They are not there to gain financially from 
development or to fulfil a statutory obligation. 
Community l itigants are amongst the users of the Queensland Planning and 
Environment Court (hereafter referred to ' the Court ' ) .  Community l itigants most 
frequently use the Court to defend or challenge a local government ' s  decision to 
approve an impact assessable development application. The perspectives and issues of 
community litigants in relation to the Court are often overlooked or at least 
overshadowed by the views of more frequent users 1 of the Court such as counci ls  and 
developers . 
This artic le seeks to reduce that imbalance and wil l :  
1 .  give examples of the outcomes community l itigants achieve; 
2 .  look a t  impediments to communi ty l itigants launching appeals/applications 
in Court and issues pertaining to the Court process; and 
3 .  propose improvements to the Court processes that might benefit 
community l itigants. 
1 I have endeavoured to estimate the number of community l itigants appeal ing to the Queensland 
P lanning and Environment Court during 2005 . Of those 66 1 appeal s/appl ications fi led in Court during 
2005 and notified to the Chief Executive of the Department of Local Government and Planning, a 
search reveals 1 42 submitter appeals/appl ications of which I identified 95 as "non commercial 
submitters". Not al l  that 95 would fit the definition of community l itigants. However the figure of 95 
does not inc lude co-respondents. 
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Outcomes for Commu nity Litigants 
Development Application is Modified or Conditions Improved 
The community l itigant rarely defeats the development application in Court; however, 
it often achieves changes to the development appl ication or improvements to 
conditions2 • This was the case in Friends of Springbrook A lliance Inc. and Ors v 
Gold Coast City Council & A nor. 3 This matter concerned a 1 4  hectare parcel of land 
on Springbrook plateau which was mostly covered with rainforest. The site already 
contained 4 tourist cabins in that part of the forest nearest the road and a nursery on 
c leared ground. Springbrook is widely recognised by ecologists as having 
biodiversity values equivalent to the natural values of the nearby World Heritage 
Areas. 
After Friends of Springbrook All iance ( FOSA), launched the appeal , their ecologist 
Dr Mike Olsen inspected the site and identified thousands of rare plants which would 
have been destroyed by the construction of the proposed additional cabins and road 
extension. In consequence, the developers changed the development appl ication so as 
to move the location of the tourist cabins out of the forest and into already cleared 
land, preventing the destruction of thousands of rare plants. The appl ication was 
further modified after the community litigants ' experts noticed, during a site 
inspection, that part of the wastewater system for existing cabins was malfunctioning. 
The wastewater system was then proposed to be improved and relocated. 
At the hearing, Judge Newton considered the modified appl ication and heard 
arguments on behalf of FOSA based on provisions in the local structure plan that 
expressed the importance of natural values in that Springbrook locality. His Honour 
dismissed the appeal by FOSA. The developer then changed the development 
application again, including proposing to roof the proposed recreation faci l ity. A 
number of the original conditions w ere varied, including insertion of a new condition 
that the proposed anci l lary recreational faci l ity for the site could only be used by a 
maximum of 1 2  guests staying at the cabins. The result was disappointing for FOSA. 
While the extra tourist cabins and recreation faci l ity might seem to have a small 
footprint, the decision gave further encouragement to other similar ventures on the 
narrow plateau. Cumulatively those developments were eroding the natural values of 
the area and altering the type of tourism. 
2 On Wednesday 3 May 2006 law student volunteers at EDO Qld Emily Dux, Cecel ia  Mehl  and Claire 
Book.less, later helped by Nancy Alexander, looked at every P lanning and Environment Court decision 
l isted for 2005-6 on the Queensland Court ' s  website to identify the results for submitter appel l ants 
There were a total of 1 22 decisions in 2005 and 35 so far in 2006. Amongst those 1 5 7 decisions they 
identified 48 appeals on impact assessable development appl ications. Of the 7 cases which were 
finalised "non-commercial submitter appeals", in 5 cases the development was approved with changed 
conditions and in 2 cases the development was approved with conditions unchanged. 
3 Friends o(Springbrook Alliance Inc. & Ors v Council o(the Citv o(Gold Coast & A nor [2005] 
QPELR. 1 48 .  Judgement del ivered by Judge N ewton at Southport on 1 9  December 2003 . There were 
three appel lants also including Ken and Jeanette O ' Shea and the Gold Coast and Hinterland 
Environment Council  I nc .  T he appel lants were represented by EDO Qld, barrister Paul Howorth, town 
planner Chris Buckley and ecologist Dr. Mike Olsen. 
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General Benefits of Submitter Appeals 
Well-run submitter appeals have other more general benefits to community litigants 
as a whole. Councils and developers are reminded that it may be worthwhile to meet 
the valid concerns of submitters to avoid appeal rather than doing a quick job. An 
experienced planner who is employed by a local government in development 
assessment wrote to Environmental Defenders Office (Qld) (hereafter referred to 
' EDO Qld ' )  in Apri l 2006. The planner stated that submitters ' views were routinely 
overlooked by p lanners during the development assessment process as submitters 
general ly  lacked the resources to back up their submission in Court. The planner 
opined that the whole development assessment process was heavily biased towards 
the developers and those with the biggest financial backing. 
Occasional Wins 
Some of the most prominent wins by Queensland community l itigants in recent years 
on environmental matters have been in the Federal Court4 ; however, community 
l itigants occasionally  successful ly  defeat development proposals in the Queensland 
Planning and Environment Court. For example, in Northern Queensland in 2004, the 
Yorkey' s  Knob Residents Association successfully appealed against the approval of a 
coastal development as the site was in a constrained development area under the 
planning scheme and the height and bulk was held to be against residents ' reasonable 
expectations5 . Also in 2000, a community group, Save Our Riverfront Bushland, 6 
was instrumental in defeating a major development application approved by the 
Brisbane C ity Counci l  which included unsightly development on a prominent 
ridgeline. Additionally, in 2002, Stradbroke Island Management Organisation7 
successfully opposed an application to develop a tourist resort on the site of the Point 
Lookout Hotel on North Stradbroke Island, though only after going to the Court of 
Appeal . The proposal failed to comply with development standards in the 
Development Control P lan regarding vegetation retention, building height, building 
length, boundary c learance and site coverage. 
Co-responding to Support and Check Local Government 
Occasionall y, a community l itigant elects to become a co-respondent when the local 
government has rejected an application and the developer appeals. This occurs often 
to not only  support the local government, but also to ensure that the community view 
point is stil l  represented if the local government decides for political or financial 
reasons to settle the appeal with the developer. As an example, the Karawatha Forest 
Protection Society joined as co-respondent to a developer appeal after the Brisbane 
4 Booth v Bosworth [200 1 ]  FCA 1 45 3 .  
Queensland Conservation Council Inc v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 1 .  
Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc [2004] FCAFC 
1 90.  
5 Yorkey's Knob Residents Association was represented by solicitor Kirsty Ruddock of EDO of 
Northern Queensland. Judgement was del ivered by J udge White I April 2005 .  
6 Wingate Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council & Ors [200 1 ]  QPELR 272 .  The group was 
represented by barrister Stephen Kel i her with sol icitor Robert Stevenson of EDO Qld. 
7 Stradbroke Island Management Organisation Inc & Ors v Red/and Shire Council & Ors [2002] QCA 
277 .  Counsel for S l MO was Mr Tom Quinn. Some years later the Hotel site is however being 
redeveloped. 
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City Counci l  rejected a residential development in land subject to environmental 
constraints over the road from the 900 ha Karawatha Forest. 
Outcomes Helped by Costs Rules and Legal Standing Provisions 
Community l itigants would rarely venture into Court if there were not legislative 
provisions to the effect that each party pays his or her own costs, rather than the 
general rule in other jurisdictions that costs follow the event. These favourable costs 
provisions8 are essential for community participation in a public interest jurisdiction. 
None of the above outcomes could be achieved if there were not favourable legal 
standing rules (recognition by the Court as an appropriate farty) under the Integrated 
Planning Act 199 7  (Qld) pertaining to submitter appeals and enforcement 1 0 in the 
Planning and Environment jurisdiction. However, impediments to community 
litigants using the Queensland Planning and Environment Court include the 
overwhelming number of development applications and the lack of legal and expert 
resources. 
I mpediments to Court and Issues with Court Process 
Number of Development Applications 
The rate of development in Queensland is overwhelming with South East Queensland 
the fastest growing region in Austral ia 1 1 • During March 2005,  a total of 59 1 
development appl ications (all categories) were lodged with local governments in 
Queensland alone, of which 279 were in South East Queensland 1 2 . The environmental 
impacts include: increasing degradation of Moreton Bay 1 3 ; unsustainable demands on 
our water resources evident in current public discussion of the water crisis; and koalas 
approaching extinction in our region. The number of development applications means 
that many volunteer community groups are unable to fully respond to even major 
development proposals; even though once built, the developments are effectively 
permanent. To give an example, in 2003 the Gold Coast and H interland Environment 
Counci l  (GEC KO) lodged more than one planning appeal, but only had the resources 
to pursue one appeal to a major hearing and that was jointly with FOSA in the 
Springbrook case as described earl ier. GECKO cannot handle many major projects at 
the one time as they also make submissions on numerous development applications, 
prepare detai led responses to draft planning documents, engage in public debate on 
environmental issues, and recently, lodge submissions with the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission. The Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland Bayside Branch (Qld) 
Inc . (WPSQ Bayside) is equally  overworked. 
In 2005/6 the WPSQ Bayside lodged two planning appeals and considered declaration 
proceedings in a third matter. Mr S imon Baltais of the WPSQ Bayside said: 
8 s4 . l .23 Integrated Planning Act 1 997 ("IPA"). 
9 s4 . l .28 I PA. 
1 0  s4 . 3 .22 I PA. 
1 1  South East Queensland Regional Plan 30 June 2005, page l .  
1 2 Local Government Association of Queensland, "Survey of Development Application Process" March 
2006, page l . 
1 3 Tarte D. and Greenfield P . ,  "Developing the SEQ Healthy Waterways Strategy" 2006. 
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The pace of development is too fast and disenfranchises our community. 
While our group has a lot of experience in the planning process we are a 
volunteer organisation and it is a great difficulty to go to Court opposing 
even a fraction of the developments . 
The South East Queensland Regional Plan redirected population growth but made no 
effort to ensure it is ecological ly  sustainable or to slow it down so a continuation of 
the rate of development appl ications is expected. EDO Qld has requested for that 
Plan to be amended to reflect reduced population increase. The EDOs have also made 
a number of suggestions for amendment to the Integrated Planning A ct 1 997  ( Qld) 
( ' I P  A ' )  to increase the accountab i lity of appl icants for development approval in the 
deve lopment assessment process and reduce the demands on both counci l  staff and 
community group time 14 • Local and State governments alike are lacking resources to 
deal effectively with the rate of development and would benefit from less rapid 
deve lopment. Another major impediment to community l itigants ' participation is  the 
lack of legal and expert resources to assist them. 
No Legal Aid/or any Planning or Environmental Matters in Queensland 
WPSQ Bayside and GECKO as mentioned above, cannot afford to brief a legal team 
and bevy of experts in relation to all  major development appl ications of concern to the 
community. Instead, they rely  on pro bono and reduced price assistance in order to 
run even a few cases. The funds they raise are from after-tax dol lars donated by 
fami ly  supporters. The developers on the other hand can c laim legal fees as a tax 
deductible business expense and often have a full team of lawyers and experts 
engaged prior to the lodgement of the development appl ication. Lack of resources is 
a barrier to many cases being initiated or run to a hearing by community l itigants in 
the P lanning and Environment Court. 
Queensland, in effect, does not grant legal aid in environmental or planning cases, 
even for important public interest cases. The last legally  aided planning appeal dates 
back to 1 992 and concerned a concrete batching plant at Maleny. A community 
group or individual seeking legal aid for a publ ic interest planning case has next to no 
chance of aid. This is partly because other areas of law are given priority but also 
because the appl icant for aid must pass not merely a test of the merits of the case but 
also a means test of income and assets with a very low threshold. For a group to pass 
the means test, Legal Aid adds up all the resources of members of the group and 
checks to determine if the total is below the means test. To determine whether Legal 
Aid might grant aid for a very important test case concerning nature conservation 
laws, EDO Qld assisted c lient Dr Carol Booth to lodge an application to Legal Aid 
Queensland. The appl ication was for funds for an appeal to the Court of Appeal 
relating to a decision of the Planning and Environment Court on the first third party 
enforcement action under the Queensland Nature Conservation A ct 1 992. The merits 
of the case were not an issue as we had the opinion of the Senior Counsel ;  however, 
aid was refused on the means test. Although that case, heard before the Court of 
1 4  Environmental Defenders Office (Qld) I nc, Environmental Defenders Office of Northern 
Queensland Inc .  and Queensland Conservation "The review of the Integrated Planning Act 1 997 :  
M aking the System Fairer and Achieving Ecological Sustainabi lity", M arch 2006. 
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Appeal 1 5  was successful , other simi lar cases are not run at all due to the absence of 
legal aid. 
By contrast, New South Wales does offer legal aid for environmental matters. To a 
certain extent, this explains why community litigants in New South Wales over time, 
have been able to effectively run a large number of important test cases in the Land 
and Environment Court. Legal Aid Queensland in 2005 conducted a review of its 
Civil Law Services and the EDOs lodged a submission cal l ing for public funding for 
public interest environmental test cases. The Queensland Public Interest Law 
Clearing House (QPILC H)  lodged a submission call ing for a more general pub l ic 
interest test case fund. 
So now it is establi shed that where community groups do reach the Planning and 
Environmental Court, they usually lack the resources required to engage experts on all  
relevant issues. 
Cost of Experts and Link Between Client and Expert 
Some of the gravest problems with the Planning and Environment Court from the 
perspective of community litigants relate to expert evidence. As mentioned before, 
affording to pay for experts is a barrier to partic ipation in the Court by community 
litigants. Often, the only way that experts are retained is by obtaining a vastly 
reduced price or free assistance which is available usual ly  only from a small number 
of generous experts or if possible, cl ient contacts . Many community litigants come to 
Court with either no experts or with far fewer than their well resourced opponent. So  
for example, in  the FOSA case mentioned above, the Appellants ' experts accepted 
significantly-reduced fees. Waste disposal was a major issue in that case, but the 
Appellants could not afford a waste water qual ity expert to debate with the 
developers ' expert, or a traffic expert. 
The adversarial way in which expert evidence is adduced in the Court has been 
strongly criticised by Justice Davies, who considers that the current system 
encourages expert witnesses to express opinions biased in favour of their cl ient. 
Justice Davies has spoken out in favour of Court appointed experts on a number of 
occasions 1 6 , giving opinions that the financial link between c lient and expert is a 
powerful one and that the duty to the Court by the witnesses is not a sufficient counter 
balance. 
Community l itigants often complain to EDO Qld of bias by opposing experts and 
makes references to particular developers routinely using the same experts. This issue 
of bias by experts is also problematic in the development appl ication process that 
precedes court and the EDOs have proposed a few ideas to reduce the problem 1 7 .  The 
idea of a Court appointed expert is attractive so that the Court does in fact obtain 
independent advice. Due to the financial constraints on community groups it is, 
however, important that in public interest cases community l itigants are not forced to 
contribute a share of those witness costs. Another issue is the lack of easily 
understood information for community l itigants using the Court. 
1 5 Booth v Frippery PIL & Ors [2006] QCA 074. 
1 6  For example of some of his views see Reservilt v Maroochy [2002] QCA 367 at [9] . 
1 7  Above n 1 4 .  
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Lack of Information for Self-represented Litigants 
Community litigants are often uncertain of and alarmed by the Court processes and 
have insufficient information. The problems are particularly acute when they are not 
legally represented. Self-represented l itigants, in a small but unacceptable number of 
cases, are threatened with adverse costs by opposing solicitors when they have done 
nothing to risk a costs order or sometimes are misleading! y treated. In November 
2004, I received a copy of a five page letter to a self-represented l itigant sent by a 
well-known Bri sbane firm seeking further and better particulars of the submission the 
self-represented l itigant group lodged with counci l  before the development 
application was decided. The letter stated the request was made pursuant to the 
directions order of the Court. However, that was a most unusual interpretation of the 
directions order to the extent it was misleading. The letter from the sol icitors was 
general ly  worded in such a way that the self-represented l itigant thought compliance 
was required under the directions order .  To comply with this  type of request would 
have taken the sel f-represented l itigants at least eight to twelve hours of work. 
It is very important that the Court produce easy to understand information about Court 
procedure and the operations of the registry; including an outline of when the Court 
has the power to award costs against a party. It is acknowledged that such 
information is in an advanced state of preparation, largely courtesy of Judge A lan 
Wilson ' s  efforts. As wel l  as putting this on the (Court) website such information 
needs to be given to every party without legal representation when the appeal or 
application or notice of election is  lodged so it can be read before any directions 
hearing is held. It would be useful to change the Notice of Appeal to refer to the 
availabi l ity of such an information paper or for the paper to be suppl ied with the 
Notice of Appeal to ensure that submitters receiving that Appeal and trying to decide 
what course of action to take, have the basic information. 
The Environmental Defenders Offices have prepared a Community Litigants 
Handbook 1 8  with detailed advice and guidance for l itigants, and includes example 
forms. This wil l  be available on our website and for purchase in hard copy format for 
a modest fee. 
Tension Between Speed and Justice 
Developers and their lawyers frequently argue for fast directions timetables and early 
hearings, often producing affidavits about how much interest their finance is costing 
them while the appeal proceeds. 
Developers often try to create a sense of urgency about their appeal to hurry along the 
other parties. Self-represented l itigants are in many cases badgered with ominous 
letters warning them not to be late with the Court direction timetable. However, the 
developers will in many cases be late and breach the Court timetable when it suits 
18 The Community L itigants' H andbook Using the P lanning Law to Protect Our Environment has been 
prepared by Anita O ' Hart, Project Officer and Solicitor on behalf of Environmental Defenders Office 
(Qld) Inc, and Environmental Defenders Office of Northern Queensland Inc. I t  is  expected to be 
available in early June 2006. 
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them 1 9 or leave an appeal unpursued for years20• Similarly, developers complain that 
local governments are slow in development assessment, but yet fai l to promptly 
supply information requested by counci l ,  some taking more than ten months. 
My observations are that Courts on occasions give too much credence to developers ' 
demands for a fast timetable. This is partly because the Courts are laudably 
endeavouring to run the Court efficiently and deal with cases in  a timely manner. 
However, this may lead to injustice for the community litigant who does not 
understand court procedure or forms and who may sti l l  be trying to find an expert at a 
reasonable fee. It is also worth remembering that community li tigants, unlike 
developers and their lawyers, may have to work on their case in the evenings after 
work or on weekends. For instance, if the timetable allows for two weeks responding 
to a request for further and better particulars, a self-represented l itigant will  not only 
take many times longer than an experienced professional in the legal field, the 
response will  need to be done on the weekend. Two weeks is really four days for 
such a l itigant. There are also provisions in the IP A pertaining to appeals that are too 
fast for submitter appellants, such as two business days to serve the Notice of Appeal . 
There have also been a number of costs decisions that are harsh against submitters . 
For example, costs were awarded against a submitter who appl ied to respond to a 
developer appeal five weeks after the al lowable time when it appeared that the counci l  
was going to settle with the developer2 1 • Community people want to keep out of court 
if counci l  is doing its job; hence, that decision is harsh.  
Decisions Made Out of Step With Community Values 
Community litigants are frequently gravely disappointed by the Court 's  decisions . In 
most cases, the community litigant (though not every submitter) has made detailed 
submissions on the planning scheme and seeks to uphold parts of the planning 
scheme. Sometimes, the reasons fer these disappointing deci sions are the strength of 
the expert evidence, or flexibi l ity in the planning scheme skilfully argued by the 
developer. However, in other cases, disappointing results can be traced back to a lack 
of strong State policy on environmental issues where the system is lagging behind 
community values. For example of deficits in State policy, there is no State Planning 
Policy on c limate change or on biodiversity in general .  There is however legislative 
scope for Judges considering impact assessable development applications in the Court 
to consider and give weight to issues such as c l imate change that may not have been 
addressed in the relevant planning instruments or even in the l i st of issues by parties. 
I base that comment on the purpose of the Integrated Planning Act 1 997 which aims 
1 9 Land Far Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council and Karawatha Forest Protection Society No. BD 3 5 34 of 
2004. 
20 Jimbelung Ptv Ltd v Beaudesert Shire Council & Ors [2005] QPEC 032 .  The Appeal was filed on 1 7  
Apri l  1 998 then notices of election lodged. The next step i n  the l itigation by the Appel lant was taken on 
25 February 2005 when the developer' s lawyers lodged an appl ication for directions. By that time 
some members of the multiple respondents by e lection had died, a number of members of the Friend of 
M ount Tambourine Mountains Association Inc .  had expended considerabl e  energy on other major 
p lanning proj ects relating to the Mountain and the regulatory regime had changed. However Judge 
Alan Wilson granted the Appel lant leave to proceed with the appeal under r389 Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules. 
2 1  King v Charters Towers City Council [2003 ] QPEC 036 .  
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to achieve ecological sustainabi l ity22, the definition of "impact assessment"23 which 
requires a broad consideration of the impacts of development by the decision maker 
and on the role of the Court in making a fresh decision in relation to the development 
application before the Court. 
Improvements to the Court Process to Benefit Commu nity Litigants 
In conclusion, here are some proposals for making things better for community 
litigants in the Planning and Environment Court: 
Getting to Court 
• Reduce the number of development applications in the system so the community 
has a more realistic chance to consider and if necessary appeal on development 
appl ications24• 
• Restore Legal Aid and increase resources for Queensland publ ic interest 
environmental and planning cases. 
Court Process 
• Proceed with Court appointed experts but ensure community l itigants are not 
priced out of Court. 
• Improve the Court website to include an information paper on the Court for self­
represented l itigants, including information on costs. 
• Provide each self-represented litigant with a copy of the information paper and 
require Appellants to give a copy of the information paper to each submitter when 
serving the Notice of Appeal . 
• Keep updated a Community Litigants Handbook25 containing detai led advice. 
• Continue with and strengthen active public interest community legal services -
Environmental Defenders Offices. 
• Set timeframes pertaining to court processes, such as directions timetables or time 
to serve the Notice of Appeal under the IPA, so as to relate to valid needs of 
submitters, not just developers ' insistence on a speedy process. 
• Courts to take a hard line against harassment and intimidation of self-represented 
l itigants by sol icitors . 
Decision-making and Outcomes 
• Invite the Court to consider the purpose of the IPA, the definition of impact 
assessment and the nature of the merit hearing where appropriate in impact 
assessable development appl ications on appeal .  This is so the Court may explore 
and give weight to issues such as cl imate change that may not be dealt with in the 
planning documents or even the i ssues of the parties. 
22 s 1 .2 .  l I P  A .  
23 Dictionary I P  A:  
impact assessment means the assessment (other than code assessment) of­
( a) the environmental effects of proposed development; and 
(b) the ways of dealing with the effects. 
24 Above n 1 4 . 
25 Above n 1 8 . 
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• Urge the State government to produce strong State policies on important issues 
such as biodiversity and cl imate change. 
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MURRI COURTS - AN EMPOWERING PROCE SS? 
N e h a  Chhatbar 
Student, The U niversity of Queensland 
Neha is studying a combined Arts/Laws degree, majoring in Political Science. She 
participated in the Magistrates Work Experience Program in 2006 and is currently 
WA TL Secretary. 
In this essay, I argue that an Indigenous political critique of some of the experiences 
of Aboriginal peoples in relation to restorative justice and the Murri Courts is 
encapsulated by the following words of Goldberg: 
The more ideologically hegemonic l iberal values seem and the more open to 
difference l iberal modernity dec lares itself, the more dismissive of difference it 
becomes and the more closed it seeks to make the circle of acceptabil ity. 1 
Although l iberalism has declared itself open to Aboriginal difference through the 
Murri Courts and restorative justice, in reality, both are a form of co-optation and an 
invitation to Aboriginal peoples to enter the l iberal circle of acceptabi lity, without 
opening the circle to a different c ircle of acceptabi l ity. This occurs in three ways. 
Firstly, superficial changes are made to the mainstream court system, in a declaration 
of openness to and accommodation of Aboriginal ity, yet the fundamental nature of the 
mainstream legal and criminal justice2 systems do not change, as Aboriginal law 
remains unrecognized by European law. This is a continuation of the colonisation 
process of non-recognition of the worth of Aboriginal values and laws, through an 
inclusionary, rather than exclusionary, racist practice. Thus, I argue that proponents 
and opponents of Murri Courts share the same objectives and their proposed processes 
achieve the same outcomes. Secondly, liberalism, through its claim that restorative 
justice constitutes a pre-modem and Indigenous form of justice, is an appropriation of 
Indigenous cultures through the essentialisation of actual Aboriginal cultures and 
laws. This 'essence' of so-cal led Indigenous forms of justice is appropriated so that 
l iberalism can declare itself open to Aboriginal difference, whilst avoiding the need to 
actually  open the l iberal c ircle of acceptabi l ity to Aboriginal values, paradigms and 
laws. F inally, in order to complete its masking of the falsity of its declaration of 
openness, l iberalism denies the historical and systemic causes of disproportionably 
high rates of Aboriginal imprisonment, blaming individuals instead. Before arguing 
these three points, I wil l  briefly explain what restorative j ustice and the Murri Courts 
are, as wel l  as mainstream Australia 's  perspectives of the two. 
1 David Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning ( 1 993) 6-7. 
2 Note that the term 'criminal j ustice ' is  ironic, as the criminal  j ustice system is  deployed as a tool of 
oppression by the colonial state. Furthermore, the term 'j ustice ' is not value neutral .  Rather, it is 
commonly understood in the context of the values of l iberal ism - such as autonomy, rights and 
individual ism - and can differ significantly from the notion of 'j ustice ' in Aboriginal philosophies. 
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It has been argued that restorative justice is a pre-modem form of justice. As a pre­
modem form of justice, it is associated with Indigenous people - who are regarded as 
possessing civilisations and cultures which pre-date modernity. 3 Another primary 
feature of restorative justice, which is said to make restorative justice effective in 
reducing re-offending, is ' reintegrative shaming' - the term used by Braithwaite to 
describe the positive effects of shaming criminal offenders in the context of a society 
which is  communitarian in nature.4 Restorative justice is thus said to be an apt form 
of justice for Indigenous communities, because authority and decision-making in 
Indigenous communities is thought to be communitarian and cooperative in nature, 
rather than individualistic and adversarial .  5 Restorative justice practices have 
therefore been adopted specifical ly  to apply to Indigenous peoples in Austral ia, New 
Zealand and Canada. 
In Queensland, restorative justice commenced in 2002 in the form of the Murri 
Courts.6 Murri Courts are sentencing courts for Aboriginal peoples and for Torres 
Strait Islanders who have pleaded guilty to an offence which can be tried summarily  
in the Magistrates Courts, and who have a reasonable l ikelihood of receiving a prison 
term for their offences. 7 Murri Courts for adults are held in Brisbane, Rockhampton, 
Mt Isa and Townsville, and a Murri Court sits in the Childrens Court in Brisbane, 
Caboolture, Townsvil le and Rockhampton.8 
Restorative justice involves the partic ipation and exchange of information between 
those most directly affected by the offender's  behavior. 9 Three core elements are 
present : victim reparation; offender responsibil ity and rehabi litation; and community 
support. 1 0 Murri Courts are not full restorative justice practices, according to 
McCold 's  conception of what restorative justice entai ls, as the victim of the criminal 
offence does not participate in the sentencing process. Nevertheless, Murri Courts are 
a form of restorative justice because the Aboriginal community is drawn into the 
process through the involvement of Elders and Aboriginal Justice Advisory Groups. 
Murri Courts also embody the noticn of restorative justice because of their objective 
of increasing the participation and presence of Aboriginal offenders 1 1  in the 
sentencing process. This is said to be achieved by making the Aboriginal person feel 
more comfortable at the hearing through the use of less formal English, the presence 
of a support member for the Aboriginal offender, the non-wearing of the robe by the 
Magistrate, and the seating of the Magistrate and E lders with the Aboriginal offender 
at an oval table, rather than separately  and at a height. 1 2 
3 Kathleen Daly, ' Resorative J ustice : The Real Story' (2002) 4 Punishment and Society 55 ,  6 1 -62. 
4 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration ( 1 989) 4, 1 4 . 
5 Daly, above n 3 .  
6 Department of Justice and Attorney-General ,  'Review of the Murri Court: Have Your Say ', (2005) 
Department of Justice and Attorney-General 
<www.justice.gld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/MurriCourtReview.pdf> at 1 May 2007. 
7 Queensland Courts, ' Magistrates Court Annual Report 2002-2003 ', (2003) Queensland Courts 
<http://www.courts.gld.gov.au/publ ications/annual/mag2002-2003 .pdf>, at l May 2007. 
8 Department of Justice and Attorney-General ,  'The Murri Court ' ,  (2006) Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General <www.justice.gld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/C 1 1  MurriCourt.pdf> at 1 May 2007 . 
9 Daly, above n 3 .  
1 0  I bid.  
1 1  People  who have offended against the  law of the state of Queensland wi l l  be referred to  as  
' Aboriginal offenders ' in this essay, with an acknowledgment that they are being punished for 
offending against a system and set of Jaws brought to the Austral ian continent by British colonisers. 
1 2  DJAG, above n 6 .  
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A right-wing, exclusionary racist perspective of restorative justice and Murri Courts is  
that there should be no accommodation of the cultural differences between Aboriginal 
peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples whatsoever. Murri Courts, according to this 
view, constitute more favorable treatment of Aboriginal peoples than of non­
Aboriginal peoples. 1 3 Other grounds on which Murri Courts are opposed is that they 
supposedly provide a softer option for Indigenous offenders and sentenc ing options 
are i l l-defined. 1 4 
The contrary perspective is that cultural accommodation by the mainstream criminal 
j ustice system is  a means of reducing disproportionably high rates of Aboriginal 
imprisonment. 1 5 For instance, reconnecting offenders to their communities and 
formalising the authority of E lders are regarded as important means of ensuring that 
social control is exercised over offenders. 1 6 Consequently, by supposedly enabling 
' reintegrative shaming' to take place, Murri Courts are regarded as effective in 
reducing re-offending. 1 7 Murri Courts are also considered an effective way in which 
to reduce high rates of Aboriginal imprisonment because Magistrates hand down 
alternate sentences to imprisonment, and because re-offending, breaches of court 
orders, and failures to attend court hearings are supposedly reduced. 1 8  
Additionally, due to the involvement of Aboriginal Elders and Aboriginal Justice 
Advisory Groups, Murri Courts are regarded as an implementation of the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
( ' RC IADIC ' ) .  This is because RCIADIC recommended greater involvement of 
Aboriginal peoples in the criminal justice system, as a means of empowering 
Aboriginal peoples and allowing 19 them self-determination. 2° Cunneen also argues 
that increasing negotiation and consultation with Aboriginal peoples in the 
development of restorative justice schemes is in accordance with the princ iple of self­
determination. 2 1 Blagg similarly assumes that empowerment of Aboriginal peoples 
can be achieved by increasing the control and power of Aboriginal peoples over the 
1 3 Danie l  Briggs and Kate Aunty, ' Koori Court Victoria - M agistrates '  Court ( Koori Court) Act 2002 ' ,  
( Paper presented a t  the Australian and New Zealand Society of Cri minology Conference, Sydney), 1 .  
1 4 Ibid; DJAG, above n 6; Luke M cNamara, ' Indigenous Community P articipation in the Sentencing of 
Criminal Offenders : Circle Sentencing ' (2000) 5 Indigenous law Bulletin 9. 
15 DJAG, above n 6;  Natalie Parker and M ark Pathe, ' Report on the Review of the M urray Court ' ,  
Department of Justice and Attorney-General 
<http://www.courts .gld.gov.au/publ ications/articles/magistrates/ ANZSOC%20conference%202006.pdf 
> at 30 May 2007, 23 .  
1 6  Tom Calma, 'Customary Law in Sentencing and Changes to Tenure Arrangements on Communal ly 
Owned Land ' (Presented at  the Indigenous Legal I ssues Forum 3 5 th Annual Legal Convention, 
Canberra, 2007); Annette Hennessy, ' Indigenous Sentencing Practices in Australia' (Presented at 
International Society for Reform of the Criminal Law Conference:  J ustice For All - Victims, 
Defendants, Prisoners and Community, Bri sbane, 2006) 5-6 .  
1 7  Ib id;  Parker and P athe, Above n 1 5 , 23;  Helena Wright, 'Hand in H and to a Safer Future: I ndigenous 
Fami ly Violence and Community Justice Groups' (2004) 26 Indigenous Law Bulletin 1 7- 1 8 . 
1 8  DJAG, above n 6. 
1 9  The very idea that Aboriginal people  must be ' al lowed' self-determination is  a reflection of the 
skewed balance of power, whereby non-Aboriginal systems dominate and are imposed upon Aboriginal 
ones. 
20 DJAG, above n 6 .  
2 1 Chris Cuneen, 'Community Conferencing and the F iction of Indigenous Control '  ( 1 997) 30 
A ustralian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 293, 295.  
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criminal justice processes which affect them. 22 In this paper I argue that these views 
in favor of restorative justice and the Murri Courts constitute inclusionary racism. I 
also argue that the views of proponents and opponents carry the same objectives and 
achieve the same outcomes. 
Both proponents and opponents of restorative justice and the Murri Courts speak from 
within liberal philosophical thought. They recognize Aboriginal peoples only in so 
far as they are within the liberal c ircle of acceptabi l ity or are capable of being 
incorporated into the c ircle. As Brigg and Murphy state, the only  difference between 
the left and the right is 'process ' .  23 Proponents favor Murri Courts for Aboriginal 
offenders, while opponents are against a different sentencing process for Aboriginal 
peoples. However, the objective of both groups is the same - maintenance of the 
fundamental values underlying the legal and criminal j ustice systems. The outcome 
of the different processes favoured by proponents and opponents is also the same -
non-recognition of Aboriginal peoples as Aboriginal peoples. 
Murri Courts are a declaration by the mainstream of the openness of l iberalism to 
difference, but in real ity, the l iberal c ircle of acceptabi l ity remains closed to 
Aboriginal difference. Murri Courts are proudly regarded by governments and by 
Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples within the mainstream as displaying 
cultural sensitivity, openness and flexibi l ity to Indigenous cultures through the 
accommodation of Indigenous differences. 24 It is true that at a surface level, a token 
level of openness is displayed though some acknowledgement of Aboriginal 
difference - through the inclusion of Elders at the table, the preparation of a pre­
sentence report by Aboriginal Justice Advisory Groups, and the use of less formal 
language for the benefit of the Indigenous offenders. However, the l iberal circle of 
acceptability remains closed to Aboriginal values and ways of thinking: it ' shies 
away from any fundamental philosophical or structural change, opting instead for a 
mechanism that is able to absorb new ideas and new ways of approaching certain 
issues within the already existing structure ' .  25 In Murri Courts, Aboriginal peoples 
are sti l l  sentenced under the laws of a white system, by an authority figure who is 
placed there by the white system, and in a court room established under the white 
system. Murri Courts do nothing to overturn the imposition of a European system of 
law on pre-existing Aboriginal systems, but rather, are a perpetuation of the existing 
system. Thus, while Murri Courts provide Aboriginal peoples with slightly more 
room to move within the mainstream system, they are ' sti l l  bound to another power' s 
order' .  26 Consequently, contrary to common views that Murri Courts are a means of 
empowerment for Aboriginal peop les, Murri Courts are a continuation of the process 
of disempowerment which commenced from the arrival of European colonisers. 
The history of colonization in Australia from 1 788 onwards is characterized by non­
recognition of the value and worth of Aboriginal cultures, belief systems and legal 
22 H arry B lagg, ' A  Just M easure of Shame: Aboriginal Youth and Conferencing in Austral ia'  ( 1 997) 37  
The British Journal of Criminology 48 1 ,  483 .  
2 3 Morgan Brigg and Lyndon Murphy, ' Whitegoods: Despite A l l  the Rhetoric There H as Been L ittle  
Recognition of the Way in Which Different Cultural Frameworks Should Set Political Goals and 
Aspirations ' (2003 ) 67 Arena Magazine 30.  
24 Daly, above n 3 ;  Calma, above n 1 6 . 
2 5 Lyndon Murphy, Who 's Afraid of the Dark? A ustralia 's A dministration in A boriginal Affairs 
(Masters Thesis, The University of Queensland, 2000) 8 -9 .  
26 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto ( 1 999) xi i i .  
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jurisdiction.27 From the outset of colonisation, the coloniser' s law was imposed on 
Aboriginal peoples, to the exclusion of Aboriginal laws. Even so, ' there are many 
indications that Aboriginal customary laws and traditions continue as a real 
controll ing force in the l ives of many Aborigines ' .  28 Although Aboriginal law 
continues to be enforced in Aboriginal societies - an example being the j urisdiction of 
the Y olngu c lans of northeastem Arnhem land over certain disputes - the formal 
existence of Aboriginal laws and j urisdiction remain unrecognized by the mainstream 
legal system. Murri Courts are a continuation of the colonisation tool  of non­
recognition, as the laws which are enforced in the Murri Courts are the laws of the 
coloniser society. Aboriginal peoples are not recognized as Aboriginal peoples 
through participation in  the Murri Courts because their values, beliefs and laws are 
excluded. 
Non-recognition of Aboriginal peoples has occurred in Australia's history through 
both inclusionary and exclusionary racist practices. lnclusionary racism performs 
non-recognition through the inclusion of Indigenous people in the criminal j ustice 
system and other mainstream Australian systems, while exclusionary racists engage in 
non-recognition through the exclusion of Aboriginal peoples. Murri Courts, promoted 
as a means of Aboriginal empowerment to be contrasted with previous practices of 
exclusionary racism, are an example of inclusionary racism. lnclusionary racism is 
characterized by cultural or internal assimilation, and institutional assimilation. 
Cultural or internal assimilation is  the adoption of a mindset by Aboriginal peoples 
whereby they reject Aboriginal culture, values and ideas to adopt those of the 
coloniser, in the bel ief that the latter are superior - in other words, the ' colonisation of 
the mind' .  29 ' Institutional assimi lation refers to the incorporation of the minority 
group into the institutions and organizations of the dominant society' - the 
Indigenisation of service del ivery. 30 By appearing to be open to Aboriginal 
difference, Murri Courts invite Aboriginal peoples to participate in mainstream 
institutions, which are informed by the values and philosophy of l iberal ism, rather 
than Aboriginal values and ideas. As Murphy and Brigg observe, the encouragement 
by the left of Aboriginal self-determination is a more successful tool of assimilation 
because Indigenous people are co-opted to enter the l iberal c ircle of acceptabi lity. 3 1 
Another means by which Aboriginal peoples are incorporated into the l iberal circle of 
acceptabi l ity, while the c ircle itself remains c losed to difference, is through l iberal 
modernity's essentialisation and appropriation of Indigenous culture. Restorative 
j ustice is a means by which l iberal modernity essential ises Indigenous culture, in 
order to remake it recognizable to the mainstream. By  imposing a recognizable 
structure and order upon Indigenous culture, Indigenous differences can be 
incorporated into the mainstream structure without requiring fundamental changes to 
this structure. This process is named 'Orientalism' by B lagg. As stated by B lagg, 
'Orientalist discourses are, primarily, powerful acts of representation that permit 
Western/European cultures to contain, homogenise and consume "other" cultures ' .  32 
By the transplantation of restorative justice from Canada and New Zealand to 
2 7 Murphy, above n 25 ,  5-6 .  
28 Austral ian Law Reform Commission The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary laws ( 1 986) 30.  
29 Murphy, above n 25 ,  9, 54 .  
30 Ibid. 
3 1  Murphy and Brigg, above n 23, 3 1 .  
32 Blagg, above n 22,  483 . 
78 
Australia - on the ground that it is an Indigenous model of dispute resolution -
Indigenous cultures are essential ised and differences between Indigenous groups are 
not recognized.33 Consequently, the appl ication of restorative justice to all Aboriginal 
groups in Australia may not be compatible with the values and culture of some or al l 
groups. 
For instance, a primary feature of restorative justice is communication between the 
offender and victim. However, some Aboriginal groups in Austral ia isolate the 
offender and attempt to ensure that the victim and offender do not meet. 34 
Furthermore, proponents of restorative justice contrast it with retributive justice. 
However, spearing and other forms of physical punishment are used in Indigenous 
cultures - punishments which are associated with a retributive model of justice. 35 
Proponents of Murri Courts and restorative justice also argue that both these processes 
use 'reintegrative shaming' to reduce reoffending. The assumption underlying the 
encouragement of the use of ' reintegrative shaming' by Aboriginal communities is 
that the communities should take responsibility for the enforcement of whitefel la 's  
law. But as Murphy has pointed out, the 'Two Laws ' technique used in some 
Aboriginal communities means that these Aboriginal communities may not agree with 
the mainstream that they share responsibil ity for the enforcement of law and order in 
relation to issues such as alcohol abuse and petrol sniffing. 36 This is another way in 
which the concept of restorative justice fails to take into consideration Aboriginal 
laws, cultures and beliefs. The concept that restorative justice is universally  
applicable to Indigenous communities is also consistent with liberalism' s  concern to 
conceptualise in terms of homogenous universals, rather than to deal with difference 
and specificity. 37 Thus, the claim that restorative justice is an Indigenous form of 
justice, which can be contrasted with liberal modernity's  practice of retributive 
justice, masks the fact that the concept of restorative justice is also a creation of the 
western liberal system. 38 This c laim is a means by which liberalism can declare itself 
open to difference without actually needing to open the liberal circ le of acceptabil ity 
to a different circle. 
The final way in which liberal ism ensures that it need not open the circle of 
acceptabil ity to Aboriginal difference is through the non-recognition of historical and 
structural causes of high rates of Aboriginal imprisonment. For l iberalism, history is 
an irrelevant context. 39 The social issues which Aboriginal peoples face are 
understood to be the result of non-Aboriginal irrationality or Aboriginal deficiency, 
rather than a history of non-recognition and colonialism and a continuation of the two 
in the present-day power structure. Murphy identifies the policy of non-recognition 
of 'Aboriginal peoples as Aboriginal peoples ' as the ultimate cause of the symptoms 
present in Aboriginal communities today.40 Similarly, Alfred states that the 
symptoms present in Indigenous communities in Canada 'can all be traced to this  
33 Daly, above n 3 ,  63-65 ;  McNamara, above n 1 4, 5-6 .  
3 4  Cuneen, above n 2 1 ,  30 I .  
3 5  Daly, above n 3 .  
36 Lyndon M urphy, ' Restorative Justice: I s  I t  a New Strategy For Old  Ideas? ' ,  ( Paper Presented a t  the 
Caxton Legal Centre Conference on Restorative Justice, Bri sbane, 1 999) I 0. 
37 Blagg, above n 22; Goldberg, above n I ,  4. 
38 Ibid; Daly, above n 3 .  
3 9  Goldberg, above n 1 .  
40 Murphy, above n 25 .  
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power relationship, to the control of Native l ives by a foreign power' . 4 1 However, for 
l iberalism to identify non-recognition and colonial ism as the causes of the high rates 
of Indigenous imprisonment would be for it to fundamentally  critique itself. 
In order to avoid a fundamental re-examination of its hegemonic values, l iberalism 
attributes blame to Aboriginal peoples for symptoms such as high rates of 
incarceration. The assumption behind the Murri Courts is  that the defect or problem 
lies inherently in Indigenous people, but that mainstream society wil l  patronizingly 
tolerate these 'defects ' by 'generously' making accommodation for them in order to 
faci l itate their assimilation. For example, because the Engli sh of Aboriginal peoples 
may be 'Aboriginal English ' ,  the use of legal j argon in the Murri Courts is avoided. 
Because there is no fundamental change to the legal system itself, what is suggested 
to Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples is that the problem lies with Aboriginal 
peoples, rather than the system, the philosophy of liberalism which informs the 
system, or the policy of non-recognition practiced from the time of colonization. 42 An 
alternative to blaming the Aboriginal individual is to blame high rates of incarceration 
on the irrationality of non-Aboriginal individuals; for instance, through police officers 
targeting Aboriginal peoples to a greater extent than non-Aboriginal peoples.43 As 
stated by Goldberg, for l iberalism, ' racist expressions are generally reduced to 
personal prejudices of individuals, to irrational appeals to irrelevant categories ' .  44 By 
ignoring systemic and historical causes of high rates of Aboriginal imprisonment, and 
by blaming the individual, l iberalism negates the need to open itself to an Aboriginal 
c ircle of acceptabi l ity. 
Through the Murri Courts and restorative justice, Aboriginal peoples are invited to 
step inside the l iberal c ircle of acceptabi l ity. However, the l iberal circle never al lows 
itself to intersect with another c ircle, as this would mean opening its boundaries to 
difference and to the questioning of its own hegemonic values. This paper has 
discussed three ways in which Murri Courts and restorative j ustice ensure that the 
l iberal circle of acceptabi l ity remains c losed to a different c ircle. Firstly, Aboriginal 
law remains unrecognized by European law. Secondly, Aboriginal cultures and laws 
are essential ised and appropriated for incorporation into the mainstream criminal 
j ustice system. F inally, historical and systemic causes of disproportionably  high rates 
of Aboriginal imprisonment are disregarded. Until l iberalism loosens its hegemonic 
control and opens the circle of acceptabi lity to intersection with a different circle, 
' initiatives ' such as the Murri Courts and restorative j ustice will continue to 
disempower, rather than empower, Aboriginal peoples. 
4 1 Alfred, above n 26. 
42 Murphy, above n 25 ,  5 1 -52 .  
4 3  B lagg, above n 22 ,  494; Cunneen, above n 2 1 ,  483 .  



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MAGISTRATE S '  WORK EXPERIENCE PROGRAM 
Each year, W ATL offers their members the opportunity to participate in the Magistrates '  
Work Experience Program. In 2007 ,  WA TL received a vast number of applications with the 
following students selected to participate in the Program: 
• Louise Bell





The participants spent one ·day a week for 1 0  weeks with a Magistrate, assisting with 
administrative and research tasks and sitting in on court sessions. W ATL would l ike to thank 
the following Magistrates for offering their time to support the Magistrates ' Work Experience 
Program in 2007:  
• Mr Michael Hall iday
• Ms Barbara Tynan
• Ms Joan White
• Ms Wendy Cull
• Mr John Lock
• Ms Anne Thacker
We would also l ike to thank Chief Magistrate Marshall Irwin and N arel le Kendall for their 
ongoing support of the Program. 
A requirement of the Work Experience Program is that participants submit an essay that 
focuses on an issue that arose as part of their experience. The Editors would like to thank 
Clare Cappa from the TC Beirne School of Law for her continuing support in assisting w'th 
the adjudication of the essays. 
The following pages contain the essays submitted by this year' s  winner and runner-up. 
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PRIORITISING T H E  PU RPOSES OF SENTENCING 
Yii Fen Tan 
Student, The University of Queensland 
Yii Fen is studying a combined Arts/Laws degree majoring in Psychology and 
International Relations. She participated in this year 's Magistrates ' Work 
Experience Program, and was awarded first place in the Essay Competition. The 
following paper was delivered at the APE 2007 by Thy Nguyen, Co-Editor of 
Pandora 's Box 2007. 
Introduction 
The laws and practices relating to the sentencing of offenders is unquestionably one 
aspect of the j udicial system that receives much consideration. Indeed, entire legal 
journals 1 and conferences2 have been dedicated to the study of sentencing. This c laim 
to attention is justified, for sentencing is an area of the law that raises a multitude of 
complex and often controversial issues. By those vested with the responsibi l ity and 
power to impose sentences, sentencing has been described as highly difficult and 
often unpleasant work. 3 One issue which contributes to many of the difficulties faced 
by those involved in sentencing is that of the purpose - or perhaps more accurately, 
the purposes - of sentencing. Although it is general ly accepted that several purposes 
of sentencing exist,4 there is no consensus as to whether all of them are achievable or 
equally worth pursuing. This, by extension, raises the question of whether the 
purposes of sentencing should be prioritised, and it is this issue which forms the basis 
of this commentary. In considering whether prioritisation of sentencing purposes 
should be encouraged either legislatively or as a matter of sentencing policy, both the 
benefits and difficulties involved in prioritising sentencing purposes will be reviewed. 
This wil l  be followed by an attempt to suggest a potential alternative to prioritising 
the purposes of sentencing. 
The Purp oses of Sentencing 
With the exception of sentencing for Commonwealth offences, Australian 
jurisdictions have consolidated sentencing regimes, most of which explicitly l ist the 
purposes for which a sentence may be imposed. 5 Whi lst there are differences in 
1 See, eg, the International  Journal of Punishment and Sentencing. 
2 See, eg, the Conference on Sentencing: Principles, Perspectives and Possibil ities, Canberra, 1 0- 1 2  
February 2006 . 
3 The Hon S ir Gerard Brennan, 'The H igh Court and the Sentencing Environment ' (Paper presented at 
the Conference on Sentencing: Principles, Perspectives and Possibil ities, Canberra, 1 0- 1 2  February
2006) ;  Geraldine M ackenzie, ' The Art of Balancing: Queensland Judges and the Sentencing Process'
( 2003 ) 28 A lternative Law Journal 288, 289.  
4 See, eg,  Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (2nd ed,  1 999).
5 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing) A ct 2005 (ACT) s 7 ;  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1 999 ( NSW) s 
3A; Sentencing Act 1 995 (NT) s 5 ;  Penalties and Sentences Act 1 992 (Qld) s 9; Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1 988 ( SA) s 1 0; Sentencing Act 1 99 1 (Vic) s 5 . 
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terms of wording and order within these l ists, as wel l  as with more purposes in some 
of the regimes than others, there are five common sentencing purposes that can be 
discerned. They are: punishment, rehabi l itation, deterrence, denunciation and 
protection of the community. 
The first of these common purposes, punishment, refers to the idea that an offender 
should receive a sentence that causes some kind of loss to the offender because he or 
she deserves to suffer for the wrongdoing. 6 The rehabi litation purpose, on the other 
hand, is about the offender receiving a sentence that will attempt to address and 
correct the reasons behind the offending, in hopes of facilitating a pro-social change 
in the offender that wil l  ultimately discourage the commission of future offences. 7 As 
for the sentencing purpose of deterrence, there is a two-fold rationale .  Firstly, there is  
general deterrence, which views sentencing as a means of discouraging other people 
from offending. This is based on the theory that people wil l  be less inclined to 
commit offences by learning from examples of past offenders that negative 
consequences follow offending. Secondly, there is specific deterrence, which refers 
to the idea that sentenced offenders will themselves be discouraged from re-offending, 
as they wil l  have learned first-hand that negative consequences wil l  follow. 8 The 
fourth common sentencing purpose of denunciation is the purpose by which the 
sentence acts as a way of communicating both to the offenders and the public that the 
unlawful behaviour is unacceptable to society and wil l  not be tolerated. 9 Finally, the 
purpose of protection of the community refers to the notion of imposing a sentence 
that wil l  have the effect of shielding society from harm. 1 0 
Underlying these sentencing purposes are two broader sentencing theories, generally 
referred to as the uti litarian theory and the retributive theory. 1 1 In brief, the uti l itarian 
theory proposes that the preferable sentencing options are those which wil l  lead to the 
most beneficial outcomes for the greatest number of people, and it is this which 
j ustifies the sentencing option exercised. Rehabi litation and deterrence closely align 
to this theory, as the beneficial outcomes of decreased offending and reformed 
offenders are the intended results of sentences implemented for these purposes. 1 2 In 
contrast, the retributive theory suggests that the basis for the sentencing option 
exercised is that the wrongdoing itself justifies censure and punitive action, 
irrespective of whether any beneficial outcomes wil l  be produced. 1 3  The sentencing 
purpose of punishment is the one most consistent with this theory. There is, of 
course, some overlap of purposes between these two theories. Deterrence, for 
example, falls within the util i tarian theory but is also l inked to the retributive theory, 
given that a sentence that seeks to punish offenders is l ikely to have the effect of 
showing others that there are negative consequences to offending, thereby 
discouraging such behaviour. 
6 ' Sentencing' (2005) 55 Hot Topics 1 ,  6; Mirko B agaric, ' Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere ' ( 1 999) 
2 1  Sydney law Review 597;  Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 204 .  
7 ' Sentencing' ,  above n 6, 9 ;  M irko B agaric, 'Strategic (and Popular) Sentencing' (2006) 2 
International Journal of Punishment and Sentencing, 1 34; Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 2 1 2 . 
8 ' Sentencing ' ,  above n 6, 8; Bagaric, above n 7, 1 36;  Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 207 . 
9 ' Sentencing' ,  above n 6, 9; Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 2 1 5 . 
1 ° Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 2 1 6. 
1 1  S ee,  eg,  Bagaric, above n 6 .  
1 2 Ibid. 
1 3 Ibid;  Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 204 .  
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The Benefits of Prioritising the Pu rposes of Sentencing 
It is noted that there are some sentencing regimes where the protection of the 
community is explicitly treated as a 'paramount consideration ' ,  such as in s 3 (b) of 
the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). However, beyond such statements, the 
purposes of sentencing are not specifical ly prioritised. Similarly, there are no 
stipulations within the sentencing regimes that require all of the purposes of 
sentencing to be considered when a sentence is given. This means that the judicial 
officers who impose sentences may consider (or refrain from considering) any of the 
sentencing purposes that they deem appropriate. The lack of prioritisation has drawn 
some criticism from commentators such as Bagaric 1 4 and Fox and Freiberg. 1 5 One 
sign ificant line of reasoning advanced by such critics is that the very nature of some 
of these purposes places them at odds with one another and that prioritisation is, as 
such, needed for clarity. 
Another reason cited for the prioritisation of sentencing purposes is that doing so 
would give more structure to what is, at this point in time, largely unfettered judicial 
discretion. Whilst judicial discretion is  strongly defended 1 6 and is considered to be 
essential in the task of imposing sentences, the argument nevertheless exists that more 
structured judicial discretion could lead to greater transparency and perhaps greater 
consistency in sentencing. Furthermore, if people know exactly what to expect and 
are assured that approaches to sentencing are consistent, it is possible that confidence 
in, and understanding about, the judicial system and its officers will also increase .  
This benefit is important to mention, given that one a im of most consolidated 
sentencing regimes is to promote better understanding by the public of how and why 
sentences are imposed. 1 7 Prioritising sentencing purposes would therefore be one step 
further in this direction, particularly given that the purposes of sentencing may be 
interpreted as confl icting in nature. 
It has also been suggested that sent�mcing itself as an area of law could benefit from 
prioritisation of sentencing purposes. By promoting greater transparency and 
consistency in sentencing, and thus a better understanding of sentencing practices, 
faster and more systematic progress in the development of sentencing laws, policies 
and practices would be faci litated. 18 For al l of these reasons then, it would appear that 
prioritising the purposes of sentencing would - at least theoretical ly - be 
advantageous. However, this  inference needs to be balanced with consideration of the 
practical difficulties involved in attempting any such prioritisation. 
The Difficulties in Prioritising Sentencing Purposes 
It is  safe to say that the biggest obstacle in attempting to prioritise the purposes of 
sentencing is identifying exactly how the purposes should be prioritised. Sentencing 
affects so many different types of offenders and follows the commission of all manner 
1 4 Bagaric ,  Above n 6. 
1 5 Fox and Freiberg, above n 4, 203 . 
1 6 See, eg, M argaret McMurdo, ' Why the Sentencing Discretion Must be M aintained' (Speech 
del i vered at the Austral ian Lawyers Conference, Aspen Colorado, 1 3  January 2000). 
1 7  See, eg, Penalties and Sentences Act 1 992 (Qld) s 3(g), Sentencing Act 1 99 7  (Tas) s 3(f), Sentencing 
Act 1 99 1  (Vic) s I (v) .  
1 8  Bagaric, above n 6. 
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of offences. Therefore, given the range of circumstances that might exist in any given 
case, it is difficult to say unequivocally that any one view is more qualified than any 
other. 
The inabi lity to settle decisively on any one particular purpose as the purpose to 
pursue is evident in many ways. Over the last several decades, different sentencing 
purposes have influenced sentencing laws and practices in varying degrees. It has 
been noted, for example, that the decade through the 1 960s saw a tum away from 
rehabi litation models of sentencing in favour of more punitive approaches, only to 
swing back to increasing support of rehabi litative sentencing options. 1 9  Such shifts in 
attitude have also been accompanied by other developments that have had an impact 
on sentencing, such as the growing importance of victims ' views within the legal 
system. With sentencing practices continually evolving l ike this, it is extremely 
difficult to expect that any prioritisation of sentencing purposes will be effectively 
implemented or  endorsed for the long-term. This difficulty is  further i l lustrated by the 
fact that even amongst the most learned legal minds, there is no agreement as to 
which sentencing purpose deserves elevation to the status of being the most important. 
At least this much is evident through a variety of Austral ian cases, each of which have 
cited different purposes ( inc luding some not discussed here) as being the most 
important in sentencing. 20 
Another aspect of this issue that merits discussion is that there are both positive points 
and negative points about each of the sentencing purposes, and it is unclear if, for any 
one of these purposes, the positive points outweigh the negative points to a degree 
sufficient to warrant prioritisation. The sentencing purpose of rehabi litation is one 
instructive example of this .  For its positive points, rehabi litation is a uti l itarian 
purpose that is more forward-looking in proactively trying to make constructive 
changes which, if effective, wil l  result in decreased offending. One of its negative 
points, however, is that it is stil l  unclear whether rehabi litative sentencing options are 
in fact effective.2 1 It might also seem rather counter-intuitive - and perhaps 
politically  unpalatable - to prioritise rehabi litation as a sentencing option. This 
assertion has two bases : firstly, that the pub lic has tended to view the legal system as 
being too soft on offenders;22 and secondly, the fact that rehabi litative sentencing 
options are l ikely to be perceived as costing valuable taxpayer dol lars that could be 
better spent e lsewhere. With other pros and cons attached to the other sentencing 
purposes as well ,  it is  difficult to evaluate whether there is  any purpose for which the 
positive points outweigh the negative points enough to j ustify priority in any 
sentencing purpose hierarchy. That some of the sentencing purposes necessarily  
overlap only further compl icates such evaluations. 
There are also some practical issues that could potentially  arise if a policy of 
prioritised sentencing purposes were to be introduced. The way in which the 
1 9  Arie Freiberg, 'Sentencing: Trends and I ssues ' (2005 ) 86 Reform 7; Arie Freiberg, 'Twenty Years of 
Changes in the Sentencing Environment and Courts'  Responses' (Paper presented at the Conference on 
Sentencing: Principles, Perspectives and Possibi l ities, Canberra, 1 0- 1 2  February 2006) .  
20 See, eg, Bagaric ,  above n 6. 
2 1  See, eg, B agaric, above n 7, 1 34 ;  Andrew von H irsch and Lisa Maher, ' Should Penal 
Rehabi l i tationism Be Revived? '  in Andrew von H irsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), Principled 
Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy ( 1 998)  26, 27 .  
2 2  Judge J M Robertson, ' A  Short Sentence: Pub l ic Opinion and Criminal Sentencing' (Speech 
del ivered at a publ ic  l ecture, B ri sbane, 3 1  August 2005) .  
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sentencing purposes are prioriti sed might raise questions about the sentencing options 
avai lable within existing sentencing regimes in terms of whether there are sufficient 
options that are geared towards achieving the purposes prioritised. That is, to ensure 
that prioritised purposes are achievable at a practical level ,  thought must be given to 
whether the means to carry out those purposes exist .  If they do not, then there could 
also be implications for the financial support and resources al located to sentencing 
options, or even for the introduction of more innovative sentencing options . 
Prioritising the purposes of sentencing might, therefore, be the catalyst for other 
sentencing practice changes. Although the legal community should not shy away 
from change where it is necessary or beneficial, neither should it engage in change 
without an adequate appreciation of al l  of the repercussions that could fol low. 
Overall ,  with so many complexities involved in attempting to prioritise the purposes 
of sentencing, it is submitted that the uti l ity of any such scheme must be 
overwhelming to justify the effort. As an alternative to this, however, it is suggested 
that one possible approach could be to implement and communicate a sentencing 
policy whereby j udicial officers consider all of the sentencing purposes in the 
aggregate. This alternative wi l l  now be discussed. 
An Alternative to Prioritisation : Consideration of All of the Purposes of 
Sentencing 
The sentencing regimes general ly l ist various factors that must be considered when 
imposing a sentence on an offender. 23 Whi le many of these factors are in some way 
related to the purposes of sentencing, it remains the case that they should not be seen 
to constitute an exhaustive account of the only matters relevant to the purposes of 
sentencing. This, combined with the fact that it is not strictly necessary for j udicial 
officers to consider al l of the sentencing purposes discussed here, means that there is 
some scope for disparity in approaching the task of sentencing. Such disparity is 
l ikely to result as a function of judicial discretion. It is not the intention here to 
criticise j udicial discretion. However, it is suggested that by mandating consideration 
of all of the purposes of sentencing collectively, a more structured approach to 
sentencing might emerge. 
As part of this proposal of considering al l sentencing purposes, j udicial officers would 
be required (either legislatively or as a matter of policy) to turn their minds to every 
sentencing purpose, as wel l  to the sentencing purposes in the aggregate, when 
imposing a sentence on an offender. This is not to say that the sentencing option 
ultimately exercised would have to be justified with reference to every purpose. 
Indeed, judicial discretion would be maintained for the matter of dec iding in each 
individual case how much weight to apportion to each purpose. However, in ensuring 
that every purpose is at least considered, there is a l ikel ihood that there wi l l  be (even 
if only marginally) more c larity in sentencing practices than exists with the current 
approach of a l ist of purposes that lacks any meaningful guide as to its use. 
It is  conceded that this  proposal is far from perfect and, in fact, a number of issues 
need to be addressed. The first issue concerns whether this suggestion of considering 
all sentencing purposes would, in practice, be useful . The vast majority of judicial 
23 See, eg, Penalties and Sentences Act 1 992 (Qld) s 9(2) .  
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officers probably already consider al l the purposes when they impose sentences. 
Additionally, Mackenzie24 noted from her time interviewing Queensland j udges on 
their sentencing views that judges did not consider a l ist of sentencing purposes to be 
particularly useful . This therefore begs the question of whether encouraging 
consideration of all the sentencing purposes would even be helpful to those whose job 
it is to sentence. Despite this, however, it is contended that the clarification afforded 
by specifying that al l sentencing purposes must be considered would be a benefit to 
the publ ic in terms of greater transparency and a c learer understanding of why judicial 
officers sentence as they do. For instance, if people understand that rehabi l itation is  
viewed to be as legitimate a purpose as the punishment purpose, then i t  might go 
some way to mitigating the impression that the legal system is too soft on offenders. 
Encouraging consideration of all  the purposes would also circumvent the difficulty in 
trying to determine which sentencing purpose - if any - is superior. 
Another potential problem with this suggestion of considering all sentencing purposes 
is  whether it is  possible to sufficiently reconci le purposes that are interpreted to 
conflict with each other. Much more detailed discussion would be required to 
determine if such reconci l iation is viable. However, as a starting point, it is 
instructive to note that some commentators have made suggestions which support this .  
Hudson,25 for example, has noted the possib i lity of sentencing options that comprise 
rehabi litative methods in the content of a sentence, but that also punish offenders in 
terms of the quantity of a sentence. The challenge, though, remains in exploring 
whether there are (or can be) sufficient sentencing options that util i se the best aspects 
of such conflicting purposes. 
At the present time, what is c lear is that the purposes of sentenc ing are not only 
varied, but also accompanied with many complexities as to whether they should be 
prioritised. It has been suggested in the latter half of this commentary that 
encouraging al l purposes of sentencing to be considered collectively may be an 
alternative approach to take, although this proposal too is burdened with its own 
complexities . Perhaps further developments wil l  be made in the future as initiatives 
such as Sentencing Advisory Councils have a greater role to play in the landscape of 
Australian sentencing. 
24 M ackenzie, Above n 3 ,  290. 
2 5 B arbara Hudson, ' Beyond Proportionate Punishment: Difficult Cases and the 1 99 1  Cri minal  Justice 
Act ' ( 1 995) 22 Crime, law and Social Change 74, as cited in Sue Rex, ' A New Form of 
Rehabi litation? ' in Andrew von H irsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings 
on Theory and Policy ( 1 998) 34, 39.  
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I ntroduction 
Drug Courts initiate a process of social change through providing partic ipants with an 
avenue to access a drug and crime free existence. Drug Courts look to the 
relationship between drug dependency and crime and seek to provide long-term 
solutions to the problem of drug dependency through rehabil itation rather than 
pursuing conventional forms of punishment such as imprisonment. The program has 
developed as a response to the ineffectiveness of mainstream sentencing options to 
address the escalating and recurring problem of drug related crime. As a result, Drug 
Courts represent an innovative and contemporary approach to criminal justice in thi s 
field through their holistic approach towards the rehabi l itation of Drug Court 
participants. This paper will  analyse the theoretical underpinnings of Drug Court and 
look to the effectiveness of the Court in addressing link between drug dependency and 
cnme. 
Procedural Position of the Court 
'Holistic treatment of the person as well as the problem. ' 
Clare Cappa 1 
The Drug Court Program in Queensland was established in 2000 and is governed by 
the rules and procedures outl ined in  the Drug Court A ct 2000 (Qld) (hereafter referred 
to ' the Act ' ) .  Pursuant to the Act, Queensland Drug Courts (operating out of 
Southport, Beenleigh, Ipswich, Townsvil le and Cairns) aim to reduce the level of drug 
related crime through promoting the rehabi litation of participants rather than pursuing 
punishment through mainstream sentencing options such as imprisonment. This 
allows participants to break away from what Magistrate Costanzo describes as the 
' drug-crime-jai l  cycle ' .  2 Through the promotion of rehabil itation, the Court aims to 
reduce the level of criminal activity and the health risks associated with drug 
1 Clare Cappa, 'The Social ,  Political and Theoretical Context of Drug Courts' ( 2006) 32( 1 )  Monash 
University Law Review 1 45 at 1 5 7. 
2 Magistrate John Costanzo, Final Report on the South-east Queensland Drug Court Pilot, (2003) 
Queensland Courts 2. 
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dependency, aid in the re-integration of Drug Court participants into the community, 
and alleviate pressure on the court and prison systems. 3 
While participating in the Drug Court program, partic ipants undertake an intensive 
drug rehabi l itation order ( IDRO).  The original sentence imposed (a term of 
imprisonment), is suspended while participants undertake the IDR0.4 In order to be 
eligible to undertake an I DRO, partic ipants must, pursuant to the Act, be c lassified as 
drug dependent and such dependency must have contributed to the commission of the 
offence/s. 5 The offender needs to plead guilty to the relevant offence and the relevant 
offence cannot be of a violent or sexual nature as c lassified under the Act. 6 The 
IDRO imposes numerous conditions on the offender' s rehabil itation7 and is completed 
within three phases. 
On the success or failure to complete the IDRO, the magistrate reassesses the original 
sentence imposed upon the participant and evaluates the level of their participation in 
the Drug Court program. The magistrate must then vacate the IDRO and impose a 
final sentence. 8 For successful participants who graduate from the Drug Court 
program, the final sentence wi l l  generally be less than the original sentence and will  
not involve a term of imprisonment. It wil l  usual ly involve a period of probation, 
viewed by the Drug Court team as added support for the participant. 
The progress of the participant is  monitored by the Drug Court team throughout the 
term of the IDRO. The Drug Court team is multi-discipl inary consisting of 
representatives from Queensland Police, the Department of Corrective Services, 
Queensland Health and Legal Aid. 9 At the Southport Drug Court, representatives 
from the residential treatment facilities usually attend Drug Court meetings. These 
meetings are held every morning to discuss the progress and rehabil itation of the 
individual participants . The team advises the magistrate on the progress of each 
participant and they discuss the appropriate course of action to take in furthering each 
participant 's  rehabilitation. 1 0 This allows the court to maintain a close and 
coordinated focus on each participant. These team meetings distinguish Drug Courts 
from traditional criminal courts as the prosecution and defence general ly work 
together in assessing the rehabi litation needs of each individual partic ipant. 
The appropriate findings of the Drug Court team meetings are subsequently repeated 
in open court. Participants are required to attend regular court reviews where they are 
expected to converse with the Magistrate about their progress and learning. 1 1  These 
court reviews are more frequent within the earlier phases of the program (usually 
weekly) and become less frequent as participants progress through the Drug Court 
program. This close and individual monitoring by the court is supplemented by 
partic ipants being subject to  frequent and random drug tests in the form of supervised 
3 Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) s3 . 
4 Ibid s20. 
5 Ibid s6. 
6 Ibid s7. 
7 Ibid s22 for core conditions within the I DRO and s23 for additional requirements that can also be 
imposed. 
8 I bid s36. 
9 Ibid s36A (3)  defines 'Drug Court team' .  
1 0  Ibid s36A - The Drug court magistrate must consider the views of the Drug Court team. 
1 1  Magistrate John Costanzo, above n 2 ,  5 5 -56.  
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urine analysis administered through the Department of Corrective Services and 
Queensland Health. 1 2 
Throughout the term of the IDRO, there are numerous mechanisms used by the Drug 
Court to encourage compliance with the order. The use of rewards and sanctions is 
the primary way in which the Drug Court compels  its participants to comply with the 
conditions of the IDR0. 1 3 Formal rewards are outlined by the Act. 1 4 Rewards may 
include but are not l imited to a decrease in the level of supervision of the offender by 
the court, a decrease in the amount of community service or monetary penalty owed 
under the IDRO, and a change in the educational or treatment programs the 
partic ipant is undertaking. 1 5 Other less formal rewards that have become apart of the 
drug court process include applause, al lowing a participant to be reviewed early for 
phase graduation, and subsequent graduation between phases. 1 6 These rewards 
encourage participants to continue with their rehabil itation efforts, and through 
positive reinforcement, aid in developing self esteem and a healthier self-image. 1 7 
Sanctions are also imposed to recognise a breach of any condition of the IDRO. 
Formal sanctions are outl ined by the Act. 18 Sanctions can include but are not l imited 
to an increase in supervision by the Drug Court team or any other person, a term of 
imprisonment and an increase in the level of monetary penalty or community service 
owed under the IDR0. 1 9 Less formal sanctions have also become useful tools of the 
Drug Court to highlight to a participant that their behaviour on the program has been 
unsatisfactory or needs refocussing. The use of essay writing is frequently employed. 
Participants are asked by the Magistrate to a write an essay on a topic determined by 
the Drug Court team depending on the needs of the participant. The Magistrate will  
then read the essay and may request it to be read allowed in open court asking the 
participant to reflect upon the meaning of the essay topic. 20 
Theoretical Underpinnings of The Drug Court 
'It is the spirit and not the form of the law that keeps justice alive. ' 
Earl Warren 
U .S .  Supreme Court Justice, 1 953 - 1 969 2 1 
The Drug Court, through its processes and procedures, represents a contemporary and 
innovative approach to addressing the problem of drug related crime. Drug Courts 
operate within the theoretical paradigm of ' therapeutic jurisprudence ' .  This involves 
12 See above n 3 .  
1 3  Ibid s30. 
1 4  lbid s3 1 .  
1 5  Ibid s3 1 .  
1 6  Magistrate John Costanzo, above n 2, 28-29. 
1 7  [ bid ( For further analysis of the role  of rewards in the Drug Court program and their effect on Drug 
Court Participants) .  
1 8 See above, n 3 ,  s32.  
1 9  Ibid s32 
20 Magistrate John Costanzo, above n 2, 29-32 (For a further analysis of the role  essay writing and 
other sanctions play in the Drug Court program and their effect upon participants in the Drug Court 
program) . 
2 1 Earl Warren cited at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2006 05/008875 .php 
at 28  August 2007. 
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' an approach to criminal j ustice which seeks to use the court process to enhance and 
support the possib il ities for the treatment of offenders ' .  22 Drug Courts therefore, 
unlike traditional criminal courts, recognise the link between drug dependency and 
crime and seek to provide alternative long-term solutions to the problem of drug 
dependency. These long-term solutions include court driven rehabi litation rather than 
pursuing punishment through mainstream sentencing options such as imprisonment. 
This therapeutic approach towards drug related crime is evidence of the emergence of 
broader attitudes towards the concepts and causes of 'drug use ' and ' drug related 
crime ' .  Cappa notes society 's  approach towards the problem of 'drug use ' has 
changed. 23 ' Drug use '  is no longer simply viewed as an act that is wrong and 
deserves punishment. 24 It is now accepted that ' Drug users are a danger to both 
themselves and to the community, and it is therefore in the interests of all that the 
addiction be treated ' .  25 It is this wider conceptual isation of 'drug use ' that has given 
rise to the development and support for Drug Courts. 
The changing attitudes towards the problem of 'drug use ' has also been coupled with 
the realisation that imprisonment is largely ineffective in addressing the recurring and 
escalating problem of drug related crime. As Indermaur and Roberts note : 
While an interest in justice/retribution will maintain the popularity of 
imprisonment for violent and persistent offenders, there is an opportunity to 
present potentially  more effective responses for those offenders who are not 
violent and who appear to have 'personal problems. 26 
These changing perceptions of 'drug use ' ,  'drug related crime' and the real isation that 
mainstream sentencing options do not effectively address the problem of drug related 
crime, and it has been the impetus to find new and effective alternative forms of 
justice to address such contemporary issues. This has given rise to the development 
of 'problem orientated courts ' .  27 Problem-orientated courts, as Freiberg explains, 
represent a move 'away from a focus on individuals and their criminal conduct to 
focus on examination of offenders ' problems and solutions to them' . 28 Drug Courts 
are therefore problem-orientated courts as they seek to rehabi l itate offenders and 
address the causes of their drug addiction and subsequent criminal offending, rather 
than simply punishing offenders through mainstream sentencing options such as 
imprisonment. As Cappa contends: 
The Drug Court process deals with the causes of the crime which has been 
committed instead of accepting the traditional compartmentalisation of justice 
2 2  David I ndermaur and Lynne Roberts, ' Drug Courts in  Austral ia :  The First Generation' (2003 ) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1 36 at 1 37 .  
2 3 Claire Cappa, 'The Social ,  Po litical and Theoretical Context of Drug Courts ' (2006) 3 2( 1 )  Monash 
University Law Review 1 45 at 1 49.  
24 Ibid 1 49 .  
2 5 I bid  1 49 .  
2 6  David Indermaur and Lynne Roberts, ' Drug Courts in Austral ia :  The First Generation' (2003) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1 36 at 1 37 .  
2 7  See above, n 23 ,  1 63- 1 64;  Arie Freiberg, ' Drug Courts: Sentencing responses t o  drug use and drug­
related crime ' (2002) 27(6) A lternative Law Journal 262. 
28 Arie Freiberg, ' Problem-orientated courts : Innovative Solutions to Intractable Problems?'  (200 1 )  1 1  
Journal of Judicial A dministration 9.  
9 1  
which renders the underlying causes of the cnme someone else ' s  
responsibil ity. 29 
McGlone, l ike Cappa, views the emergence of Drug Courts as evidence of broader 
changes within the attitudes towards the administration of criminal justice in 
Queensland. McGlone notes that: 
There has been an increased interest in the rehabi l itation of offenders, a search 
for alternative forms of justice, an acceptance by judges and magistrates of 
their managerial role and the development of a 'problem solving' orientation 
by police, courts and other agencies. 30 
As a result, Drug Courts reflect a contemporary and innovative approach to criminal 
justice in this field. Through promoting rehabi l itation over incarceration, the Drug 
Court is a problem-orientated court looking to solve the causes of drug dependency 
and subsequent criminal offending within participants. The administration of justice 
in a therapeutic way reflects contemporary attitudes and beliefs towards 'drug use ' 
and 'drug related crime ' and its wider contextual relationship to soc iety as a whole. 
Rehabilitation : The I ndividualisation of Justice 
'Knowledge is power. ' 
Sir Francis Bacon3 1  
Engl ish author, courtier, & philosopher (1 56 1  - 1 626) 
The Drug Courts, as discussed above, are problem-orientated therapeutic courts that 
seek to rehabi l itate drug dependant participants rather than simply punishing them 
through mainstream sentencing options. Rehabi l itation of participants is achieved 
through an individually focussed court process. This individualisation of justice 
focuses on the needs of the individual and seeks to equip individual participants with 
the knowledge and resources to access a drug and crime free existence. 
Throughout the course of the Drug Court program, participants receive individualised 
court supervision, unprecedented in traditional punitive justice. This individualised 
attention allows the rehabi l itation process to be 'participant specific ' ;  that is, the Drug 
Court rehabi litation program which is tai lored to meet the needs of the individual 
partic ipants themselves. This al lows the problems of individual participants to be 
dealt with in a forum of professionals (Drug Court team) who will be responsive to 
their needs. 
A variety of rehabil itative programs are on offer to Drug Court partic ipants that seek 
to equip participants with tools to develop new coping mechanisms and healthy 
behavioural patterns that are independent of drugs and crime. Such programs include 
substance abuse relapse prevention programs, cognitive ski l ls development programs, 
29 Cappa, above n 23, 1 46.  
30 Daniel McGlone, ' Drug Courts - A departure from adversarial j ustice' ( 2003 ) 28(3)  Alternative law 
Journal l 36 .  
3 1  Sir Francis Bacon, Religious Meditations, Of Heresies, 1597 cited at 
http://www. luminarium.org/sevenLit/bacon/ at 28 August 2007 . 
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anger management programs and ending offending and l ife ski l ls  programs. 32 These 
programs are coupled with less formal requirements such as the submission of diary 
entries to the Magistrate on court review dates. These diary entries force participants 
to communicate with themselves providing participants vital insight into their own 
recovery. As participants progress into the later phases of the Drug Court program, 
they are encouraged to gain employment or undertake courses to further their 
education. This encourages partic ipants to continue their self-development in various 
areas of their l ife and successfully reintegrate themselves back into the community in 
a meaningful way. 
Through providing such rehabil itation programs and c lose support, participants are 
equipped with the knowledge of where to get help when they are considering relapse 
or feel that their personal circumstances are spiral l ing out of control .  One of the 
major findings outlined by Magistrate Costanzo in the Final Report on the South-East 
Queensland Drug Court Pilot was that unsuccessful participants whose programs had 
been terminated were voluntari ly returning to treatment services attended whilst on 
the Drug Court program. 33 Furthermore, many participants who did not complete the 
program noted that despite failing to graduate they had made positive gains from their 
partic ipation and now had the knowledge of treatment services available to them 
should they wish to access help. 34 
Drug Courts as a result, initiates a process of social change by providing participants 
the knowledge of and access to the resources to commit to a drug and crime free 
existence. Through the individualised court process the Drug Court is able to be 
responsive to rehabi l itation needs of each individual participant and provide them 
with the appropriate resources to further their personal development. As a result, 
participants are provided with the knowledge and the subsequent power to build new 
l ives independent of drugs and crime. 
Success of The Drug Court 
' To your Honour I owe my life. You have made me feel like a person again. 
I respect you and the Drug Courts greatly. ' 
Former Drug Court Graduate35 
Despite the relatively short existence of Drug Courts in Queensland there have been 
numerous quantitative studies analysing the success of the drug court program in 
addressing the l ink between drug dependency and crime. 36 To date, studies generally  
indicate that Drug Courts have been successful in addressing the problem of drug 
related crime. 37 Magistrate Costanzo noted that through participating in the Drug 
Court program, participants gained more knowledge and ski l ls  then they would have 
32 Magistrate John Costanzo, above n 2, 8 1 -82. 
3 3  Ibid ix. 
34 f bid. 
3 5  Magistrate John Costanzo, above n 2,  1 3 7 .  
36 A quantitative analysis of the statistical success of Drug Court i s  beyond the scope of this article for 
further information see Toni Makai and Keenan Veraar, 'Final Report on the South East Queensland 
Drug Court ' (2003)  Australian Institute of Criminology; David I ndermaur and Lynne Roberts, ' Drug 
Courts in Austral ia :  The First Generation ' (2003) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1 36 .  
3 7  Magistrate John Costanzo, above n 2,  vii- xi ( For a description of the benefits noted by Magistrate 
Costanzo). 
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had they been imprisoned38 . An obvious consequence is that the partic ipants would 
be more likely to access rehabil itation services in the future. 39 Other significant 
benefits to both the participants themselves and society as a whole included, the birth 
of drug free babies as a result of participation in the Drug Court program, reduction in 
the l ikelihood that children would follow the same drug dependent l ifestyle of their 
parents and increased self esteem and motivation for further education and 
employment amongst Drug Court participants . 40 
Despite the success of the Drug Court in addressing the link between drug 
dependency and crime, the Drug Court has attracted criticism. 4 1 Critics  of the Drug 
Court program challenge the procedures and processes of the Drug Court and ask 
whether procedural fairness can be achieved within the Drug Court framework. 42 
Fox, for example, questions the quality of consent given by a defendant in choosing to 
undertake the Drug Court program.43 He argues that no real choice is given to a 
defendant who is in the situation of deciding between imprisonment and the 
program.44 Furthermore, it is arguable that the l ikelihood of imprisonment, should an 
offender choose to plead not guilty to the relevant offence (thus disqualifying them 
from the Drug Court program) is a burden on the accused's right to trial and an 
unwarranted inducement upon an accused' s  decision to plead guilty. The function of 
the Drug Court team has also been criticised. 45 It is argued that the defence is in a 
position of tension between the wishes of the participant and the rehabi l itation goals 
of the Drug Court team. As McGlone notes, 'One wonders at the position of 
defendant in this process and questions whether the defendant 's  position is  adequately 
represented when it runs contrary to professional assessments ' .  46 
Such criticisms are useful in highlighting that drug courts have, as McGlone notes, 
' an inbuilt tension that is not easily resolved' .47 This tension exists between the strict 
procedural rights of the accused and the substantive benefits conferred upon the 
accused by having access to the Drug Court program. Although the criticisms are 
procedurally justified, the Drug Co �1rt, through its eligibi l ity requirements, seeks to 
help and rehabi l itate the ' hard-end' offenders whose ' last chance ' may be the Drug 
Court program itself. It in itself confers upon participants a unique opportunity to 
commit to change in a forum which will  be responsive to the needs of the individual 
partic ipant 's  themselves. As indicated to date the Drug Court program has been 
successful in rehabi litating participants and has contributed to society at large through 
effectively addressing the l ink between drug dependency and crime. Such substantive 
benefits outweigh strict procedural tensions outlined by commentators such as 
McGlone. 
38 Ibid x .  
3 9  [bid 
40 Ibid 
41 Cappa, above n 23 ,  1 74- 1 75 ;  Morris Hoffman, 'Commentary: The Drug Court Scandal ' (2000) 78 
North Carolina Law Review 1 437 .  
42 McGlone, above n 30 ,  1 39 .  
43 fb id .  
4 4  [b id .  
4 5  [bid 1 3 8 .  
46 [ b id  1 39 .  
47 Ibid 1 40.  
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Conclusion 
The Drug Court program represents a contemporary and innovative approach towards 
addressing the link between drug dependency and crime. Drug Courts operate within 
the theoretical paradigm of therapeutic jurisprudence and seek to provide long-term 
solutions to the problem of drug related crime through court driven rehabilitation 
rather than seeking punishment through mainstream sentencing options such as 
imprisonment. The program through its individualised court focus is 'participant 
specific' and is therefore responsive to the individual rehabilitation needs of each 
participant. The program successfully addresses the link between drug dependency 
and crime through its holistic treatment of Drug Court participants and has, as a result, 
provided an effective alternative sentencing option for drug dependant offenders. 
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